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ABSTRACT 
Cultural institutions embody normative models. The press is no exception. The 
current operating model of the Canadian press is based on the twin normative principles of 
freedom of expression and the freedom to pursue profit. By themselves, however, these 
twin principles do not ensure a public forum within which the ideas, perspectives, interests 
and concerns of citizens and groups can be exchanged, in a consultative atmosphere, with 
other citizens, other groups, and policy makers. 
Critics of the prevailing model are increasingly pointing out its failure to contribute 
to the development of an inclusive, functional, and participatory civil society. As Canada 
enters the twenty-first century, it is time to formulate a new model of the press. based on 
the contemporary needs and aspirations of its citizens. This thesis is a contribution to this 
process. It begins by examining the need for reform, through a review of the current state 
of the press. Next it examines the normative roots of the prevailing operational model of 
the press, in order to place its emergence, and possible reform, in a historical context. An 
alternative model, based on the concept of a consultative public forum, is then proposed, 
and its primary objectives and operating principles are outlined. The thesis concludes by 
exploring the prospects for such reform, identrfylng four fronts on which reform will need 
to be pursued if it is to be effective: the press, the public, the political economy, and the 
academy. 
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PREFACE 
Over the course of the last decade, I have been a reforestation contractor, a student 
of environmental issues, and an environmental studies teacher at the high school level. 
Through my education and experience in environmental issues - especially forestry issues 
- I have gained considerable insight into the difficulties involved in their resolution. 
Lmxeasbgly complex whr?ologicd, econonzic, social, and poiitica.1 forces all converge to 
make these some of the most intractable issues of the day. Yet even as they become more 
intractable, their resolution becomes more urgent. Every day that we do not resolve these 
issues we further impoverish our environment and ourselves. Some of this 
impoverishment will take generations to recover from. Some of it, such as the extinction of 
species, is irreversible. 
Our inability, as a society, to come to grips with these issues has many interwoven 
causes. Institutional structures are often inadequate. Political and economic interests are 
often unwilling. Cynicism and disiUusionrnent leave large portions of the population 
indifferent and apathetic. Racism, sexism, nationalism, inordinate class disparities, and 
other divisive forces act as barriers to consensus and cooperation. An obsession with 
science, technology, and economic expansion kames the terms of social progress in a 
narrow, materialistic manner. And a lack of fundamental communicative skills and forums 
inhibits community development, collective decision-making, and conflict resolution. 
The thesis that follows is concerned most immediately with this last point: the 
inadequacy of communicative skills and forums in our society. But my intention is that the 
thesis be understood in the context of the broader needs, and movements, that are occurring 
on all of these fronts. No one of them is isolated. They are all interdependent. 
The contributions that I hope to make with this thesis are threefold. First, I hope to 
illustrate the inadequacy of one contemporary fonun of public communication - the press 
- in serving the needs of our society as we wrestle with these intractable issues. Beyond 
mere criticism, I also hope to offer an alternative model of the press that could prompt 
dialogue and reflection about reform. Finally, beyond simply offering such a model, I also 
hope to present a persuasive case that such reform is both possible and worth working for. 
This last objective has undoubtedly been the most difficult. This is a deeply 
pessimistic and cynical age, and academics frequently position themselves in the advance 
guard of these sentiments. With the entrenchment of these sentiments, however, a 
paralyzing contradiction seems to have developed in human affairs. On eke one hand, 
people - including many academics - long for change. On the other, uncritical assent is 
given to the proposition that we are incapable of such change. 
I would argue, however, that as long as we accept such a proposition it will be both 
self-fulfilling and self-defeating. Granted, a healthy degree of skepticism and the capacity 
for critical analysis are valuable assets. They allow us to see the need for change, recognize 
the obstacles, and navigate a realistic course. They enable and empower us. Wholesale 
pessimism and cynicism, on the other hand, do the opposite - they disable and 
disempower us. 
As a father of two young daughters, I recently watched as the older one learned 
how to walk. It was a very difficult skill for her to learn - and a difficult process, at 
times, to watch. She had some setbacks, took some bad falls, and received a few good 
bruises. But when she fell, she was not told to give up the effort, nor was she instilled by 
her parents with selfdoubt. She was encouraged with each new step, each new 
approximation, and she eventually learned. 
When we struggle as societies to collectively take new steps, to acquire new social 
skills and capribilities, why are we SQ often paralyzed with pessimism and self-.doubt about 
our nature - our capacity to chmge and develop? Why can we not view our collective 
development in ways that are analogous to our individual development? Do we forget our 
past social accomplishments so easily? Do we forget, for instance, that on many continents 
vii 
throughout history, and up until only a century ago, the enslavement of other human beings 
was considered a morally acceptable and legally sanctioned practice - and those who 
defended it argued that its abolition would be contrary to human nature? Do we forget that 
the dictatorial authority of monarchs was likewise considered a necessary function of the 
state - and those who defended it argued that humanity was, by nature, incapable of other 
forms of government? Or do we forget that until recently private disputes were often settled 
by duels - the pistol being recognized as a legitimate and legal instrument for conflict 
resolution - and those who upheld dueling argued that to legally abolish the practice 
would, again, be contrary to human nature? 
The thesis that follows assumes that meaningful processes of social development 
and change are not "contrary to human nature," but rather w e  hwnan nature. Acquiring 
new social skills and capabilities is inevitably difficult, and we can expect bruises and 
setbacks along the way. But that does not make them unworthy of effort or impossible of 
achievement. Some will undoubtedly view this interpretation of human nature and social 
development as an outburst of naive idealism I view it as a conscious, deliberate, and 
empowering interpretation of our social capacity as a species. 
INTRODUCTION 
April 13,1993. The British Columbia government announces its Clayoquot Sound 
land-use decision. All of the area's old-growth forests are to be clearcut, with the exception 
of the Mergin watershed. In response to the announcement, local citizens set up a blockade 
of MacMillan Bloedel's logging operations near Kemedy Lake. The blockade soon attracts 
people and support from across Canada More than 9 0  peaceful protesters are eventually 
arrested. Many of them are criminally convicted. 
These events, following the 1993 Clayoquot Sound land-use decision, spawned a 
media frenzy that quickly spread beyond British Columbia to the national and even 
international news media. The events had all the right ingredients of a newsworthy story: 
emotionally loaded controversy, a David-and-Goliath-like conflict, illegal actions, media- 
genic visuals, and heated interviews. 
The Clayoquot Sound events sold newspapers. .And as a valuable cornmodity for 
the commercial press, they were covered extensively. But what was the public value of that 
coverage? Did it engage citizens in a meaningful dialogue about the issues at hand? Did it 
provide an opportunity for those issues to be publicly worked out? Did it assist the efforts 
of citizens and their elected representatives to c l a m  the principles upon which future land- 
use policy could be formulated? Did it contribute to the development of a more inclusive, 
participatory, and functional civil society? In short, did it serve in any way as an effective 
forum for public consultation? 
Interest groups on all sides of the Clayoquot issue would probably concur that the 
press performed poorly according to these criteria And although these questions have not 
been specifically researched within the academic community, the general literature in the 
field of media studies would tend to support that conclusion. The contemporary press, it 
seems, is not in the business of fulfillling these public functions. In fact, the business it is 
Li, a d  the principles that c ' t ~ e n d j  guide its operaiim, seem to ahnost preclude its ability to 
pec%S%?S of p u b k  CQW&Z&Q~* 
Most groups seeking to create and engage in such public consultation have learned 
that in order to even get the attention of the press, they have to adopt an almost guerrilla 
approach to public communications. They have to learn how the media operate and then 
employ tactical communications strategies to gain coverage. Corporate and partisan 
interests have been practicing this type of strategic communication for decades, under the 
name of public relations, and they have become quite proficient at it. But public interest 
groups are also gradually learning and adopting these skills. For instance, the blockade at 
Clayoquot Sound was, among other things, a media strategy meant to force entry into the 
public sphere. 
But are we, as a society, satisfied with a guerrilla approach to public 
communications? At best, it seems to turn the press into a battle field in which a war of 
words and images is waged. Rather than engaging the public in meaningful consultation, it 
merely turns the public sphere into a discursive war-zone. It does not provide an 
opportunity for citizens to engage in dialogue among themselves, or with their elected 
policy makers, for the purpose of working out difficult public issues. It does not contribute 
to the development of a more inclusive, participatory, and functional civil society. 
If the press is to serve as a forum for public consultation, rather than discursive 
warfare, it needs to be reformed. This thesis is an effort to stimulate inquiry and discussion 
regarding the nature and possibility of such reform. In developing this thesis I have 
intentionally waded deep into the waters of normative media theory. In doing so, I share 
McQuail's (1994) concerns and convictions regarding both the status of normative media 
theory and the need for communications scholars to engage more fuliy in it. According to 
McQuail, 
the status of normative theory is very uncertain and contested in the growing field 
of 'communication science'. . . There has been a tendency to take the media 
institution and its way of working as an empirical given and proceed from there, 
I a v h g  no-nnative 01 ethical matters tc, other specialists. . . The result has been a 
mginalization of the subject of social theory of the media and a widespread 
reluctance on the part of 'scientists' to generalize about the proper role of mass 
media in society - what they ought to be doing. Of course, there is no shortage 
of social critics and polemicists who are ready to step in, but what they generally 
do is pass judgement rather than formulate or clarify the standards of judgement. 
What generally passes for 'mass communication theory' seems to exist, therefore, 
in a wider theoretical and normative vacuum. . . This state of affairs is 
unsatisfactory at a time of considerable change and reconstruction of media 
institutions, when normative questions need to be faced. (p. 236) 
My intention in adopting a normative approach in this thesis is not to make absolute 
normative pronouncements on the subject of media refam. Rather, the ideas developed in 
this thesis are exploratory and suggestive. They are intended as one contribution to a 
dialogue that others, like Dennis McQuail, are also beginning to engage in: a dialogue to 
"formulate and clanfy standards" mat can guide reforrn of the mass media. 
The focus of this thesis will specifically be on the press , and this requires some 
definition as well as some qualification. The press, as the term is used in this thesis, refers 
essentially to printed, periodical media characterized by a focus on public affairs - by 
which I mean events and issues of reasonably broad civic concern. Throughout the thesis, 
I reluctantly use the terms newspqer and news magazine as approximate substitutes for 
the press, and the tern nays as an approximate substitute for public aflairs content. This is 
merely because these are the dominant cultural forms of periodical print media and public 
affairs content that exist today. It is not, however, an endorsement of these cultural fom5 
as natural, inevitable, or ideal. In fact, the normative model proposed in this thesis requires 
the reader to exercise some imagination in envisioning a form of discourse that does not fit 
neatly into any of the existing genres of news, such as "hard" news reports, editorials, 
opinion columns, and so forth. The broad category of news, however, seems to be the 
best fit currently available to the form of discourse I am proposing. In addition, whiie I am 
confming the focus of this thesis to print media, I want to dso  suggest that the consultative 
objm-~ves && SI~iZ~p~zs h2 bL& 'l"les& ii(ji hT&d pfint j,, t'neir 
application. Many of them could, I believe, be creatively applied to electronic broadcast 
media, to newly emerging forms of electronic text-based media, and, of course, to 
interpersonal and small group settings, from which they largely derive. In fact, I submit 
that our entire universe of public discourse would benefit from the creative and purposeful 
application of these objectives and principles. But in the interests of keeping this thesis 
mmageable, I m I;m&hg my f o a s  to hat  cnnstellatjor? of bifcolurse as the press. 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter One examines the need for reform 
through a review of the literature on the current state of the press. Chapter Two analyzes 
the normative roots of the prevailing operational model of the press in order to place its 
emergence, and possible reform, in a historical context. It also considers some normative 
alternatives that have so far been proposed. Chapter Three presents an alternative model of 
the press based on the concept of a consultative public forurn.1 Its primary objectives and 
operating principles are outlined. Chapter Four explores prospects for the realization of 
these proposed reform, identifying folx fronts on which reform will need to be pursued if 
it is to be effective: the press, the public, the political economy, and the academy. 
In choosing to refer to this model as a consuitatitre forum I recognize that the word 
consultation carries negative connotations to some people. Specifically, many govemment- 
sponsored public consultations in recent decades have proven to be little more than social 
marketing exercises designed to bestow legitimacy on government decisions that have 
akady been made, or a which narrow constraints have already been placed on the 
outcome. It has been s~ggested that the concept of democratic communications might 
therefore be mom suitable, as used by Wasko and Mosco (1992), Keane (1991), and others. 
h my expefience, however, tk concept of bemocracic communication is an extremely 
vague and difficult concept to pin down, and there is much disagreement on a mutually 
satisfactory nezriq even of the wmd &mocmq. additicm, the word demxmy has 
&o collected negative or superficial connotations for many people, thmugh its long 
historical association with the particular forms of partisan-liberal politics practiced in 
Canada, the United States, and many Western countries. For these reasons I prefer to use the 
term mnsulta!ion, which has a much more precise meaning. I therefore ask those readers 
who are made uneasy by tbe term to suspend their judgement of it until it is defined by the 
presentation of the consultative model in Chapter Three. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PRESS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Why Care? Cultivation Theory and the Press as a Cultural Institution 
Most media scholars and policy makers agree that the mass media collectively 
constitute "a pervasive political and cultural force" (Hackett, 199 1, p. 12). For instance, 
issues of imported c d W  content would not consume the attention of Canadian media 
scholars and policy makers if this was not a widely shared conclusion. 
Early efforts to explain media influence assumed a simple, causal relationship 
between mass media content and audience response. The hypodemic neede theory of the 
media, for example, assumed that the mass media simply injected values, attitudes, and 
ideas into a susceptible public. Even though these simplistic causal theories have been 
rejected in recent decades, the search for more subtle models of media influence continues. 
One of these more subtle models is cultivation theory. Cultivation theory 
conceptualizes the media as merely one set of cultural institutions in a complex cultural 
ecology that influences public discourse, values, and behaviour. It has been used to assess 
media influence on violence (Gerbner, & Gross, 1976), sex role attitudes (Morgan, 1982), 
attitudes toward aging (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980), racial and sexual 
stereotypes (Gross, 1984), intellectual skills (Morgan, & Gross, 1980), socialization and 
peer-group affiliation (Rothschild, & Morgan, 1987), environmental attitudes (Shanahan, 
19931, and other social variables. 
Acco~ding to Shanahan. the term cultivation "is used to indicate that the process is 
conceived as a cumdative one; there is really no question of immediate effects or impact" 
(1993, pp. 186-187). As Gerbner (1990) explains: 
Cultivation is what a culture does. That is not simple causation, though culture 
is the basic d u r n  in which humans live and learn, . . . Strictly speaking, 
cultivation  IT?^^ the _~KX~ I :  independent (though not isolated) contibution that, 
a particularly consistent and compelling symbolic stream makes to the complex 
process of sociriiization and enculturation. @. 249) 
According to the logic of cultivation theory, the cumulative influence of the mass 
media will affect not only public attitudes and behaviour but also the public's relationship 
to, and expectations of, the media. In other words, through subtle and complex processes 
of cultivation, the media aormdize themselves. To varying degrees we relate to the media 
in a manner, and according to expectations, that the media themselves have cultivated over 
time. Such a conceptual framework does not necessarily imply deliberate manipulation or 
conspiracy. Nor does it assume that these cultivated attitudes are absolute, universal, or 
nun-negotiable. Rather, it recognizes that we are cultural beings and that we are influenced 
to varying degrees by our cultural institutions, even as we are capable of influencing them. 
The following review of the descriptive literature on the mass media is suggestive of 
the kind of influence that the press exerts on our culture - the attitudes, values, and 
behaviour that it cultivates - and hence the need for reform. 
The Commercial Logic of the Press and its Cultural Implications 
A fundamental characteristic of the contemporary commercial press is the logic of 
readershipmaximization that drives it. According to this logic, the primary product of the 
press is not content but readership. And the primary service of the press is delivering its 
product, the attention of readers, to its primary clientele: advertisers (Smythe, 198 1). 
Moreover, it is not just any readership that is sought: Efforts are made to maximize 
readership within populations that have the specific purchasing patterns that advertisers are 
in,&~sw in. 
E m y  newsworkas, of course, make a case for the relative autonomy of the press 
in its public service functions. The record of the press, however, tends to undermine these 
driven operation, and public service functions ape subservient to the b m m  Lqe. 
The application of this commercial logic has had a signiticmt influence on public 
affairs content. One consequence has k i l  the orientation of the press toward a readership 
that advertisers will find most attractive: consumers - especially affluent consumers. 
Public affairs content therefore is constructed and directed largely toward a consuming 
public, rather than a civicly active public. According to Hackett (1991): 
News in the commercial mass media tends to be directed toward an assumed 
mass audience of consumers and political spectators - rather than (for 
example) workers and active participants in political life. This narrative 
orientation, this mode of address, this positioning of audiences is most evident 
in the hsion of "news" and advertising in the fashion, living, home, travel, 
sports, and leisure sections of Canadian dailies. Even "hard news" reportage 
subtly complements the ads in some ways: In its selection and construction of 
stories, news discourse appears to take the standpoint of the assumed "average" 
consumer. (pp. 68-69) 
Another consequence of this commercial logic is the continual pressure on the press 
to gain and hold the attention of readers (a pressure that is felt even more urgently in 
television news). After all, the reader's attention is what advertisers pay for. Ironically, 
the first definition provided for the word entertain in the American Heritage Dictionary 
(1969) is "to hold the attention of." The line between news-as-information and news-as- 
entertainment is therefore a somewhat blurry line - and becorning increasingly blurry wifh 
the emergence of a growing subset of news appropriately labeled injfo-tainrnent. Granted, 
the so-called quality press, such as Canada's Globe and Mail, may be governed by a fairly 
strong information-providing function. But most popular broad sheet a ~ ~ d  tabloid papas 
clearly have strong commercial incentives to entertain. As Downs (1972) observes: 
News is "consumed'' by much of the American public (and by publics 
everywhere) largely as a form of entertainment. As such, it competes with other 
types of entertainment for a share of each person's h e .  Every day, there is a 
fieice straggle for space in the kgMy limited universe of newsprint and 
television viewing time. Each issue vies not only with all other social problem 
and public events, but also with a multitude of "non-news" items. (p. 42) 
Yet another consequence of this commercial logic is the need for the press to avoid 
alienating both its advertising clients and its readership through critical challenges to 
existing political2 and commercial interests on the one hand, and to popular perceptions and 
values on the other. As Dunwoody and Griffin (1993) point out: 
News media are an integral part of cornunities and tend to reflect the concerns 
of the power structure of their particular setting, usually serving as reinforcers 
of established authority, powerful interests and mainstream values. (pp. 27) 
In order to retain both its clients and readership, the press therefore frequently 
adopts what is assumed to be a non-threatening posture of social neutrality. This rationale 
is the same as that which Hackett (1991) identifies operating in the network news: 
This trend accentuates the avoidance of challenges to the preconceptions thought 
to be current among the majority of the audience. The audience maximization 
imperative encourages network news to reflect what news producers take to be 
the nation's dominant cultural and political "common sense." (p. 68) 
It should be pointed out, however, that the interests, values, and "common sense" 
of the audience (which is itself made up of diverse individuals and groups) frequently 
contradict the interests and values of advertising clients. Partly for that reason the press 
often does critically examine specific cases of political or commercial corruption, injustice, 
and so forth. But these critical examinations generally focus on the misdeeds of specific 
individuals or corporations, as a few bad apples in an otherwise good barrel. And the press 
can easily suwive without the patronage of those few bad apples. What the press rarely 
It should be pointed out that in addition to commercial advertisers. governments and 
political parties are also major sources of advertising revenue for the press, and the 
commercial viability of many newspapers depends in pant upon a range of direct and 
indirect government supports, including advertising revenue punnett, 1988). 
does, however, is critically examine the implications of an entire industry, an en& sector 
of tke economy, or even an entire poiiticai system, the alienation of which coukd have 
significant financial repercussions on the press itself. It may be acceptable to question a 
few bad apples, but the commercial logic of the press means that it is rarely acceptable to 
question the nature of the barrel itself. This logic (combined with other biases and 
pressures discussed hter in this chapter) therefore undermines the potential value of the 
commercial press as a public forum within which critical analysis and reflection can occur 
regarding the fundamental economic and political structures and relationships in society, as 
well as popularly held perceptions and values. 
The sum of these consequences suggests that the commercial logic of the press, at 
least as it is currently manifest, limits its contribution to the development of a participatory 
and functional civil society. By commonly assuming a passive readership of consumers 
and political spectators, delivering public affairs content as entertainment, and failing to 
provide a forum for the critical discussion of political and economic structures and 
relationships, as well as popular values and preconceptions, the commercial press seems to 
currently tend more toward the cultivation of civic stasis than civic change and 
development. Little thought is given to the commercial logic of the press, however, 
because of the prevailing assumption, inherited from classical economics, that a free, 
market-driven press will automatically function in the collective interests of society. This is 
an assumption that we will return to in Chapter Two. 
News Values 
From the commercial/entertainrnent logic discussed above, as well as the journalistic 
traditions and history that are interwoven with it, are derived a set of common news values 
that influence the selection and construction of public affairs content. These news values, 
or standards of navs-worthiness, have been the subject df considerable media research. 
'While: iis* of these values vary depending on the conceptual categories employed by 
different researchers, the following are widely agreed upon. 
Eveirt-orientation. Dominant among news values, and broadly supported in the 
literature on news construction, is the emphasis on discrete events instead of issues, trends, 
or processes. According to Lorimer and McNulty (1991): 
%%at the news brings us is events rather than issues. As any public interest 
group knows. . . any amount of informed analysis about a particular issue will 
never bring it onto the front pages. But an event, whether putting up a tent on 
Parliament Hill or barricading major traffic routes, will provide saturation . 
coverage. @. 1 18) 
The event-orientation of the press is based in large part on the production schedule 
and organizational constraints of news professionals. Under the pressures and routines of 
production "the time span taken by an event" is critical in determining its coverage (Hartley, 
1982, p. 76). Hartley points out, for instance, that 
murders take very little time and their meaning is quickly arrived at. Hence their 
frequency fits that of daily newspapers and programmes. On the other hand, 
economic, social or cultural trends take very much longer to unfold and to be 
made meaningful: they are outside the frequency of daily papers. @. 76) 
The event-orientation of the press is also based on a perception that in order to hold 
the readership's attention news must be continually new; it must be immediate and current, 
Hence news has come to be thought of in terms such asfresh or stale. As Osler (1993) 
explains: 
News must be about something that is happening now. An event that occurred 
twelve months ago is almost out of the time frame demanded by the competitive 
nature of electronic journalism, unless it can be updated and given fresh life by 
some amazing new development One of the results of this crushing concern 
with "now" is that our yesterdays, our sense of history, and our appreciation of 
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cause and effect relationships over extended periods of time tend to be lost in the 
rhytlbs of modern jo.uiialism. @. 15) 
The constant pressure for new stories is most problematic in the coverage of 
ongoing social and environmental issues. As Stocking and Leonard (1990) report in their 
discussion of environmental coverage in the news: 
Particularly problematic for those who would responsibly report on 
environmental degradation and depletion is the media's insatiable appetite for 
new angles. This hunger contributes to the well-known issue-of-the-rnoath 
syndrome. (Last month it's oil spills, this month it's oil prices.) It allows 
persistent, and growing, environmental problems to slide out of sight if there is 
nothing "new" to report. @. 40) 
Or, as Meadows (1991) describes the problem, the press's "attention span is short; 
they create their own fads and tire of them" @. 75). 
Drama / graphicness / sensation. A widely identified cluster of related news 
values is the emphasis on the dramatic, the graphic, and the sensational. As news historian 
Mitchell Stephens (1 988) argues: 
Sensationalism appears to be a technique or style that is rooted somehow in the 
nature of the news. News obviously can do much more than merely 
sensationalize, but most news is, in an important sense, sensational: it is 
intended, in part, to arouse, to excite, often - whether the subject is a political 
scandal or a double murder - to shock. (p. 2-3) 
Such sensationalism, Stephens further suggests, is not merely a recent 
phenomenon, but is as old as news itseE 
Anyone who clings to the notion that the sensationalism practiced by Rupert 
Mmdoch or even the most shameless present-day j o d s t s  is unprecedented 
could be set straight by spending a few minutes with any number of sixteenth- 
or seventeenth-century newsbooks. (p. 1 12) 
?-he thrust of Stephens9 historical argument is that sensationalism can be traced back 
sensationalism arguably received a newfound impetus with the comercialization of printed 
news and with its later competition with television news as an entertainment commodity. 
The result has undoubtedly been an amplification of sensational and entertaining values, 
including graphicness and drama, at the expense of substantive public discourse. As Osler 
(1 993) states: 
Closely related to journalism's passion for human interest and other 
entertainment values, is the craft's insistence on graphic qualities in the news. 
Basically, news people tend to shun abstract information apparently on the 
grounds that if it can't be seen, touched, or kicked, it probably isn't 
newsworthy. . . . 
Print shares the problem, with every press reporter preferring to write stories 
that require picturesque adjectives, busy verbs, and nouns that label real things 
and visceral actions. And if a great news photo is there to accompany the copy, 
so much the better. The presence of television as print's overwhelming news 
competitor in the modern media environment, has intensified the search for the 
graphic in print, (p. 13) 
This tendency exerts significant pressure in the selection and construction of public 
affairs content. As Desbarats (1990) explains, "a dramatized version of the event must be 
able to be presented" in order to make it newsworthy (p. 110). Thus: 
A rare hazard is more newsworthy than a common one, other things being 
equal; a new hazard is more newsworthy than an old one; and a dramatic hazard 
- one that kills many people at once suddenly or mysteriously - is more 
newsworthy than a long-familiar illness. (Singer, & Endreny, 1987, p. 13) 
Emphasis on the dramatic and graphic has obvious consequences for the content of 
public discourse. It leaves little room for the consideration of broad social problems and 
concerns requiring a degree of abstraction. But beyond its influence on content, it also 
places profound pressure on sources seeking representation in the press, often pressuring 
them to articulate their concerns through dramatic and graphic actions if they want coverage 
(Gitlin, 1980). This is especiaiiy the case for sources who 80 not otherwise fit into the 
normal hierarchy of representation in the news (as discussed later in this chapter). Hackett 
(1991) describes this pressure in his work on news and the peace movement in Canada: 
The media's appetite for drama and novelty present a Hobson's choice for the 
peace movement: the altcrnatives of disappearing from the front pages, or of 
constantly escalating its tactics and rhetoric to stay above the media's rising 
boredom level. @. 79) 
"The upshot" of thesz news values, according to Osler (1993), "is that we learn 
more from our news media about tle drama than about the substance" of public affairs (p. 
1 I). Granted, the press (especially the quaIi0 press) is much more able to provide 
substance to public affairs reporting than television is. But the press still demonstrates these 
tendencies. 
Personalities. Another widely identified news value is the emphasis on the 
words and actions of individuals or pers~nalities. Stephens (1988), referring to 
personality-based news as "published gossip," offers the following criticism: 
Gossip on the street or over coffee has earned its negative reputation not only 
because it is intrusive but because it is so often exchanged with a touch of 
cattiness. We make comments about individuals behind their backs that we 
would never make to their faces, and in these comments we reveal one of our 
less appealing qualities. . . Published gossip too speaks to that unattractive side 
of our natures. (p. 106) 
Aside from the displacement of substantive discourse by "published gossip," and 
the unattractive picture of ourselves that this practice reflects, the emphasis on personalities 
has other disconcerting consequences. Prominent among these is the tendency to exalt the 
social status and perspectives of certain types of people - most notably "elite people in 
positions of power, or celebrities" (Hackett, 1991, p. 76) - over others. As Meadows 
(1991) notes, the media "are attracted to personality and authority. . . they are uninterested 
in people they've never heard of' (p. 75). 
The focus on elite personalities, however, comes not only at the expense of 
unkn~wn personalities. It also tends to exclude the shared perspectives, concerns and 
conditions of organizations, groups, and communities. As Gans (1979) states, it causes 
the press to "focus on people rather than on groups" as the primary subject of public 
discourse (p. 50). This focus has many implications that have barely been explored, 
including the profomd constraints it places on the communications efforts of organizations 
and groups that do not wish to exalt individuals to the status of celebrity-spokespersons 
(Hackett, 1991, p. 22). 
The focus on individuals and personalities also comes at the expense of substantial 
focus on more abstract historical structures and forces. As Hartley (1982) explains: 
"Events are seen as the actions of people as individuals. Individual people are easier to 
identify - and to identify with - than structures, forces or institutions" @. 78). The 
overall consequence is again to place profound limitations on the substance of public 
discourse. 
Simplicity. Another widely idenWied news value is simplicity. The constraints 
that commercial news workers operate under, combined with their assumptions regarding 
the needs and habits of readers, leaves little space for the presentation of complexity, 
subtlety, and context The result is that it becomes extremely difficult to cover social, 
environmental, and other -issues that are, by nature, complex, subtle, and contextual. In 
selecting stories, news workers are therefore inclined toward a story that is "relatively 
unambiguous in its meaning" (Desbarats, 1990, p. 110). 
According to Hartley (1982)- the "unmbiguity" or "clarity" of an event is a key 
factor in determining its newsworthiness: 
Events don't have to be simple in themselves, necessarily (although that helps), 
but the range of meanings must be limited. In this way news-discourse differs 
radically from literary discourse. In news, the iratrhsic po!yse.?ric (a~biguous 
- capable of generating many meanings) nature of both events and accounts of 
them is reduced as much as possible; in literature it is celebrated and exploited. 
tp. 77) 
When complex, subtle, and contextual issues do force themselves into the press due 
to other overwhelming news values, newsworkers often cope by simplifying and 
decontextualizing them Of course, these are not deliberate or malicious attempts to rob the 
iwws of meaning. Rather, they are attempts to conform to the constraints within which 
commercial news workers operate. Most journalists, for instance, are not specialists with 
background in the subjects they are reporting on (and the current trend is toward increasing 
reliance on generalist reporters). Nor do journalists have unlimited resources at their 
disposal to investigate and pursue stories. In addition, commercial journalists operate 
under extremely tight deadlines in the constant scramble for new stories. The 
understandable result, as Meadows (1991) notes, is that journalists "have little tolerance for 
uncertainty, ambiguity or complexity," and therefore must simplify issues in order to 
present them (p. 75). 
Another pressure toward simplification is the trend toward smaller stories and 
shorter column lengths in the press, due in part to competition with the rapid fire images 
and stories of television news. Thus news is increasingly offered to consumers not as a 
staple, but as a snack. This trend is especially problematic in the coverage of complex 
social and environmental affairs. As Stocking and Leonard (1990) point out: 
The recent trend toward bite-sized bits of news affects all reporters, of course, 
but it packs a particulat wallap with environmental journalists. The environment 
story is one of the most complicated and pressing stories of our time. It 
involves abstract and probabilistic science, labyrinthine laws, grandstanding 
politicians, speculative economics, and the complex interplay of individuais and 
societies. . , . Perhaps more than most stories, it needs careful, longer-than- 
bitesized reporting and analysis, now. (p. 42) 
In fairness, a counter-trend can be discerned in which some newspapers, and 
especially news magazines, are trying to consciously fill a niche that television cannot easily 
fill: the provision of in-depth background and analysis. But the overall trend at the 
moment, as Stocking and Leonard point out, is toward shorter co1umn lengths. 
Violence, conflict, and negativity. Another widely identified cluster of news 
values can be seen in the emphasis placed on violence, conflict, and negativity as 
entertainment values. For instance, the extensive 1977 Ontario Royal Commission on 
Violence in the Cornrnunications Industry found that media content "contains a higher 
proportion of violence than is found in the normal daily lives of individuals," and that 
it seems clear that in the eyes of many media people a major function or purpose 
of the media is for entertainment. . . . Media people also seem to assume that 
violence is entertainment. (p. 145) 
Osler (1 993) concurs: 
It is an unfortunate reality that of all the information scenarios one might 
imagine as lending themselves to the processes that shape news, none lends 
itself so readily as one in which social or natural violence provides the strong 
and central theme. (p. 18) 
He further suggests that: 
Violence takes many forms, and it is useful to keep in mind that some of these 
can be less obvious than others. As has already been suggested, controversy 
and confrontation are two of these more subtle forms. They often stand in as 
surrogates for violence. (p. 19) 
Controversy and confrontation, it should be qualified, are very real socid 
phenomena (as is violence), and not to be simply swept under the carpet or ignored by the 
mass media. Many conflicts certainly do need to be public1.y recognized and addressed. 
But in exploiting them for their enter?-ent value the press often distorts or obscures the 
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essential substance of conflicts. Rather than contributing to their resolution it may well be 
further inflaming them in the process. It is thus the drama of conflict, not the substance of 
conflict, that generally makes the news, along with a range of other negative and often 
threatening phenomena. As Hackett (1 99 1) observes: 
Drama and conflict are si@icant news values, as is negativity; death, injury, 
destruction, social, or environmental harm, or threat of these, are more likely to 
be covered than good news. (p. 76) 
The consequences of these news values are many. On the level of social influence, 
there is growing consensus around the conclusion that "the simple over-representation ~f 
human and natural violence in om daily news may, with time, incline us to believe that the 
world may be a more violent place than, in fact, it actually is" (Osler, 1993, p. 19). 
Another consequence is felt by sources seeking representation in the press. As Hackett 
(1991) points out: 
Many peace groups philosophically renounce violence and the politics of 
enmity, attempt to build bridges to those who do not share their convictions, 
and seek consensual forms of internal decision-making. These facets of the 
peace movement's life obviously do not accord well with the news value of 
conflict, in two senses. Fist, nonconfiontational events are relatively unlikely 
to be reported in the first place. Second, when the language of newstalk 
emphasizes elements of conflict, it denies to peace groups the chance publicly to 
define their own activities in their own terms. (p. 79) 
Another consequence of these news values - one that has received remarkably little 
attention - is the manner in which they influence the tone of public discourse, and in turn 
the tone the public comes to expect from public discourse. With violence, dramatic 
conflict, and negativity as reigning standards of newsworthiness, news stories are 
frequently constructed around extreme and ~ffensive statements. On the one hand, this can 
be seen in the manner that reporters quote public figures, often taking statements out of 
context to accentuate their inflammatory nature, or focusing on a few heated moments in a 
much larger dialogue. On the other hand, it can be seen in the almost automatic coverage of 
the ultimtums and oiknsive posturing that characterize many labour and 0 t h  public 
disputes; or the partisanship, derision, insult, and character assassination that characterizes 
much modem political debate. Outside of hard nays, it also can be seen in the almost 
constant stream of ridicule, contempt, and derision that frequently characterize editorials, 
opinion columns, letters to the editor, and even political cartoons. 
it should be emphasized that all of the commercial news values presented above are 
not used by journalists merely in selecting stories for print. Journalists do not merely select 
stories. They actively construct them (Hartley, 1982, pp. 75-86). From the universe of 
relevant background information, issues, facts, opinions, sources, statements, etc., 
juamdists select and emphasize sow:: ova  others, and embed them w i t h  specific 
nanative styles, in order to create "news." 
Furthermore, under the cqstant pressure to drum up news that cunfonns to the 
commercial values outlined above, journalists sometimes go to great lengths to massage 
stories to fit. Commercial imperatives, in other words, sometimes pressure journalists "to 
force the evidence to conform to their story" (Meadows, 1991, p. 75). As Osler (1993) 
describes: 
This is especially true in the often convoluted seeking out of the obscure sub- 
themes of controversy or confrontation, that are then used quite literally to force 
and twist the subject into a journalisticaIty entertaining mold (p. 11) 
Very little that happens in rhe world actualfy meets the criteria of 
newsworthiness. Thus, there is a continuing creative struggle in every 
newsroom to force information into a mold that rarely fits. . . . this practice is 
so well entrenched that a term for it exists in the jargon of the craft- 
"i.rardeningW the news vafues. @. 16) 
The hardening of news valt~es as a means of forcing inappropriate information 
into the narrowly defined news mold of journalistic tradition is a very common 
practice. @. 17) 
It should also be noted that the net result of the commercial news values discussed 
above seems to be the construction of a world in which human nature is largely 
characterized by adversarid relationships, aggression, competition, self-interest, and other 
divisive characteristics - characteristics that are presented at the expense of emphasis on 
mutuality, reciprocity, service, cooperation, and other unifying social forces. This is a 
theme we will return to in Chapters Three and Four. 
Source Biases 
Another dominant characteristic of the contemporary press is the manner in which it 
systematically privileges the representation of some segments of the population over others. 
Several theories that have been developed to explain the source-biases of the press are: 
presented below. 
information subsidies. Oscar Candy (1992) has developed an economic 
critique of source-bias "based on the recognition that access to information represents 
genuine costs to decision makers" @. 141). "Information subsidies," according to Gandy, 
are used "by poky actors to increase the consumption of persuasive messages by reducing 
their cost, without reducing their perceived value or utility for decision-making" (p. 142). 
Gandy draws on the work of Leon Sigal(1973), who identifies three channels 
through which journalists gather information: routine, informal, and enterprise. Routine 
chanrrek include public relations handouts, semi-official documents, and other readily 
avaiktble material representing the lowestcost channel of information gathering. At the 
other end of the spectrum, enterprise channels comprise high-cost investigative research 
and reporter-initiated interviews. 
Gandy (1980) proposes an information subsidy model in which "the information 
subsidies of journalists and other gatekeepers operate on the basis of simpIe economic 
rules. J01m-ntists need news, h o m e r  defmd, and routine solaces are tZle easiest way to 
gain that information" (p. t 06). The result, Gandy asserts, is that 
the news media, traditionally seen as an independent and highly credible source 
for information about the environment, is in fact, dominated by purposive 
information supplied by [sources] interested in influencing private and public 
decision-making. @. 106) 
Nor do journalists only receive information subsidies directly. Information 
subsidies are provided to policy makers, interest groups, the academic community, and 
even the entertainment industry - after which this subsidized information continues to 
move across h a  and other boundaries and thus is received by journalists indirectly 
(Gandy, 1982, 1992; Turow, 1989). 
The problem with information subsidies, Gandy (1980) argues, is that "success in 
providing idonmation subsidies to one's chosen targets is closely tied to the resources 
available to the subsidy giver" (p. 106). Therefore: 
Although all policy actors may engage in public relations, not all actors have the 
resources with which to ensure the success of their efforts. Public policy may 
be considered a game where the outcome is far from certain . . . but one is less 
at risk in wagering on the outcome when the combatan.& differ greatly in their 
resource endowments. Although public relations resources may occasionally be 
brought to bear in a ciebate on behalf of the interests of the citizen/consumer . . . 
corporate and government bureaucracies are the primary clients and 
beneficiaries. (Gandy, 1992, p. 135) 
Information subsidies, in other words, privilege the representation of resource-rich 
and press-sawy interests within society, allowing these interests to dominate public 
discourse and "structure realities for millions of people" (Turow, 1989, p. 212). 
Primary definition. Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (1978) have 
developed a structural critique of source-bias based on the theory that sources with different 
positions in the social hierarchy have different access to the media. According to this 
and therefore act asprimoly definers of public issues. Th-ese include govemini  officials, 
industry and organizational representatives, and various experts that the media consider 
authoritative, accredited, and objective sources. According to Hall et d.: 
Media statements ae ,  wherever possible, grounded in 'objective' and 
authoritative statements made from 'accredited' sources. This means constantly 
turning to accredited social representatives of major social institutions. . . . 
Ironically, the very rules which aim to preserve the impartiality of the mcia, 
and which grew out of desires for greater professional neutrality, dso seivc 
powerfully to orientate the media in the 'definitions of social reality' which their 
'accredited sources' - the institutional spokesmen - provide. . . . 
The result of this structured preference given in the media to the opinions of the 
powerN is that these 'spokesmen' become what we call the primary definers of 
topics . . . [This] pennits the institutional definers to establish the initial 
definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question. This interpretation 
then 'commands the field' in all subsequent treatment and sets the terms of 
reference within which all further coverage of debate takes place. Arguments 
against a primary interpretation are forced to insert themselves into its definition 
of 'what is at issue' - they must begin from this framework of interpretation as 
their starting point. @. 58) 
Hall et al. conclude that the media's 
structured relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial 
secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged 
access, as of right, to the media as 'accredited sources'. From this point of 
view, in the moment of news production, the media stand in a position of 
structured subordination to the primary definers. (p. 59) 
Revisiting the concept of primary definition in 1985, Hdl siimm-s the 
inequitable consequences of structural privilege: 
Some things, people, events, relationships always get represented: always 
centre-stage, always in a position to define, to set the agenda, to establish the 
terms of the conversation. Some others sometimes get represented - but 
dwjjs at the m g i r r ,  &ways responding to a question whose t e r n  and 
conditions have k e n  defined elsewhere: never 'centred'. Still others are 
always 'represented' only by their eloquent absence, their silences: ~ n :  refracw 
through the glance or the gaze of others. (p. 9) 
Other media scholars have been careful to qualify the impression Hall et al. give of 
primary definition as absolute and non-negotiable. ScNesinger (1990), for example, 
argues that exceptions to structwal privilege do exist, that the boundaries of privilege can 
shift over time, that the flow of definition is not always mi-directional from sowce to 
media, that negotiation may occur prior to definition, and that counter-definitions can 
dislodge primary definitions. Schlesinger therefme moves away from a theory of structural 
determinism and toward a theory of structural advantage. "It is necessary," he writes, "that 
sources be conceived as occupying fields in which competition for access to the media takes 
place, but in which material and symbolic advantages are unequally distributed" @. 77); 
"putting it differently, primary &$inition becomes an achievement rather than a wholly 
structurally predetermined outcome" (p. 79, original emphasis). 
Another qualification of the primary definer thesis comes from Ericson, Baranek, 
and Chan's (1989) extensive study of Canadian news sources. In their study, Ericson et 
id. confirm the existence of structural privilege and a "hierarchy of credibility" that to a large 
extent determines source access to the media (p. 396). But they do not find that this 
s t n r c d  privilege necessarily translates into primary definition. Instead, they assert that 
news definitions emerge through a complex process of negotiation between sources and 
journalists, that this process is not uniform across news and source organizations but is 
instead highly context dependent, and that it is sometimes the journalist, and not the source, 
that provides the primary definition (g. 378). Ericson et 4. derive this assertion from 
findings that a hierarchy exists not only among sources, but that "a hierarchy of relatively 
powerful and influential journalists" also exists, with powerful resources at their disposal to 
shape news deifinitions @. 378). "News organizations," Ericson et al. conclude, 
i!u"ieieby 3oiTi with key source organizations in representing the authoritative 
apparatus of society. News becomes a vehicle for communication among those 
towards the top end of the knowledge structure of society, while those at the 
bottom end are left to spectate." @. 5) 
These arguments therefore qualify absolute and deterministic notions of primary 
definition, and suggest a more fluid process in which complex processes of negotiation 
occur that are highly context dependent. At the same time, however, they support the 
general concept of smcturally privileged access, from which privileged opportunities to 
negotiate news definitions derive. As Schlesinger concludes, 
there is still undoubtedly a strong case for arguing that the way in which 
journalistic practice is organized generally promotes the interests of authoritative 
sources, especially those within the apparatus of government and state. That is a 
paramount finding of much of the contemporary sociology of journalism. (p. 69) 
Hegemony. Another theory of source-bias can be traced to the theory of 
hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s. Although a life-long Marxist, 
Gramsci was unsatisfied with the notion of historical materialism and its emphasis on 
economic forces as the determinant of social structure. Instead, Grarnsci was interested in 
the historical force that cultural beliefs, ideas, and values exert in perpetuating a 
consciousness and social structure that harbours injustice and inequity (Grarnsci, 1971). 
According to Gramsci, powerful interests in society maintain dominance not by 
economic coercion or physical force alone, but by the cultivation of a "hegemonic" system 
of beliefs and values that reinforces their dominant position. This system of beliefs and 
values then "becomes enmeshed wit!! the 'common sense' though which people make their 
lives and their world intelligible" (Hackett, 199 1, p. 57). 
A wide range of social institutions are engaged in this cultivation, often unwittingly 
through the uncritical acceptance, imitation, and transmission of these beliefs and values. 
These are primarily institutions with a "pedagogic relationship" with society (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 353,'. 2 i - i ~  m y  imcheie state institutions, the clergy, the educational system, the 
f a d y ,  t!!e ~ S S  L4~~orchg to H d e y  (1994): 
These institutions are prolific producers of sense, knowledge and meanings - 
they are cultural agencies whose importance lies just as much in their role as 
organizers and producers of individual and social consciousness as in their more 
obvious 'stated' functions. Although they are relatively autonomous from one 
another, peopled by different personnel with difFerent professional skills and 
ideologies, nevertheless these cultural agencies collectively form the site on 
which hegemony can be established and exercised. (p. 134) 
A wide range of contemporary scholars continue to invoke the concept of 
hegemony. This is especially apparent in the field of communications, where the mass 
media conform so well to the hegemonic model (see, for example, Cassidy, 1992; Gitlin, 
1980; Hartley, 1982). As Hackett (1991) explains: 
The media constitute a hegemonic apparatus par exceilence, given their 
distinctive characteristics: Their continuous availability and lifelong flow, their 
constant provision of definitional categories, their ideological similarity 
concealed beneath a diversity of forms, their appropriation of leisure time and 
pseudoresolution of people's needs in fantasy and entertainment, and their 
intermeshing with other hegemonic institutions. (p. 59) 
As a hegemonic institution, the media tend to privilege those sources whose 
perspectives are in accord with hegemonic interpretations of reality. At the same time, the 
media tend to filter out or misrepresent the counter-hegemonic perspectives of those who 
are not. Again, this is not necessarily a conscious or deliberate process on the part of 
newsworkers. Rather, it reflects the frequent alignment of their professional judgement and 
work routines with the hegemonic beliefs and values of the day. Hegemony thus exerts its 
influence by simply making alte.mative perspectives appear "unrealistic, or unreasonable, or 
even renders them unthinkable within the established maps of reality" (Hackett, 1991, p. 
57). 
One result of this process is that the diversity of perspectives n:presented in the 
we2 are dirnLirJ~1:~ Hegemony, of course, is n e w  absolute wi~~ates - i . .  
Opportunities for the representation of alternative and critical perspectives - or counter- 
hegemonies - do exist. But they must compete from the periphery of public discourse 
against privileged sources reinforcing dominant interpretations of reality. 
The duee theories of source-bias presented above need not be understood as 
mutually exclusive explanations. In many resgects they may be understood as 
complementary and mutually compatible. Regardless of the theoretical explanations of 
systemic source-bias, however, the existence of source bias is one of the most widely 
agreed upon conclusions in media research. It is supported by researchers in countries 
around the world (Anderson, 1993; Gandy, 1980; Gans, 1979; Greenberg, Sachsman, 
Sandman, & Salome, 1989; Hansen, 1991; Nohrstedt, 1991; Sparks, 1986) including 
Canada (Chapin, & Stirling, 1977; Einsiedel, & Coughlan, 1993; Ericson et al., 1989; 
Hackett, 1991). The Canadian media, including the press, thus systematically privilege 
some sources over others and thereby diminish the breadth of perspective available as a 
resource to the public and its policy makers. 
"The news-media institution," in the words of Ericson et al. (1987), "is effectively 
closed to most citizens" @. 364). This is, again, a theme that we will return to in Chapter 
Three. 
Other News Determinants 
Aside from the commercial logic, news values, and source biases discussed above, 
two other categories of news determinants are relevant to this discussion. These are 
explored below. 
Frame, siereiifjpes, and prejPrdgement. We all selectiveiy interpret the 
work! around us by limiting the mount of ir,Fmation we receive in m y  @.veil situation 
and by making sense out of that information according to previous experiences and 
culturally learned patterns of understanding. If we did not do this we would drown in the 
ocean of information that our senses continually receive. Therefore, from this ocean of 
available information we consciously and unconsciously select that which we require and 
interpret it according to mental models, or maps, that allow us to function and navigate in 
the world. 
Newsworkers are no exception to this rule. They employ the same selective and 
interpretive coping skills that all of us do in our daily lives and work - the same skills that 
were employed in constructing this thesis for that matter. But the selective interpretations 
of the world by newsworkers (or the interpretations of privileged sources that they re- 
transmit) carry one distinction: They are disseminated to entire populations. Of course, 
readers do not merely accept these selective interpretations uncritically. They renegotiate 
the meaning of the news they receive through their own processes of selection and 
interpretation. But the universe of information available to them has already been limited by 
the press. In addition, the constant repetition of similar interpretive frameworks by the 
press can have the subtle influence of cultivating, reinforcing, and naturalizing widely 
shared interpretative patterns. 
Much of the scholarly study of interpretive patterns in the press has employed the 
theoretical concept of nausframes. The terrnffame was originally used by Bateson (1972) 
and Goffman (1974) as a psychological concept describing how individuals include, 
exclude, and organize experience. The concept was imported into media analysis by 
Tuchman (1978) in her analysis of news construction, and soon after it was expanded by 
Gitlin (1980) in his analysis of the media's coverage of the New Left student movement in 
the 1%0s. Today the concept of news frames is used widely in the literature on media 
analysis, although slight variations of defiition are employed depending on the researcher. 
Tadcard, Hendrickson, Silberman, r3liss, and Ghanem (1991) offer a useful summary 
definition of a news frame a "a central organizing idea for news that supplies a context and 
suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and 
elaboration" (p. 5). 
While news frames may be an inevitable part of news reporting, one of the 
problems with their current manifestation is that they tend to be highly uniform throughout 
the news industry. As Dunwoody and Griffin (1993) note: 
Considerable evidence suggests that frames utilized by journalists for story 
construction are not idiosyncratic. . . Rather, journalists across a wide range of 
media seem to employ similar mental maps and, thus, produce stories that 
reconstitute the world in similar ways. (p. 24) 
This uniformity is variously attributed to organizational routines and constraints 
(including simply the lack of time and resources), or to commercial/entertainment 
imperatives, or t~ the lack of critical analysis on the part of newsworkers. Regardless of 
the cause, however, the result is the formulaic or stereotypical presentation of events, 
issues, and people. For instance, in Daley and O'Neill's (1991) analysis of press coverage 
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, they conclude that the "disaster narrative" - a widely 
replicated news fra-mp, - was employed in the press coverage of the event, that this 
coverage therefore "resembled weather forecasts" in its focus on the daily spread of the oil 
slick, and that it naturalized the "disaster" by juxtaposing it with an earthquake that had hit 
the community 25 years earlier (p. 47). The result, according to Daily and O'Neill, was 
that the widely replicated disaster narrative 
naturalized the spill, effectively withdrawing from discursive consideration both 
the marine transport system and the prospective pursuit of alternative energy 
sources. The disaster narrative overtly moved discourse away from the politid 
arena and into the politically inaccessible realm of technological inevitability. 
(P. 53) 
h addition to the "formula-governed and patterned" framing of large scale events, 
Osier (iW3) notes the same process at work with the stereotyped coverage of individual 
people: 
Journalism tends to label people stereotypically. In their haste to cover events 
and report them in their media as quickly as possible, repoms tend to see their 
news sources not as individual human beings with unique characteristics who, 
for instance, happen at the moment to be giving speeches on public platforms. 
Instead, they are ''labour leaders" or "student radicals," "feminists," or 
"politicians." Such labels carry stereotypical attributes and when these prevail, 
as often they do in journalism's haste, information becomes formula-governed 
and patterned. (p. 20) 
Media analysts also point to the manner in which these commonly replicated news 
frames predispose journalists to cover certain types of events. As Desbarats (1990) points 
out, "events make the news more readily when they fit the reporters' preconceived notions 
of what should be happening. . . . unexpected events that can be expected within fiarnes of 
reference used by reporters are newsworthy" (p. 110). As Hackett (1991) explains, 
moreover, news frames are often determined in advance for pre-scheduled events: 
Predetermined news angles facilitate newswork They simpllfy such routine 
tasks as selecting interviewees, deciding which of an infiity of potential "facts" 
are relevant to the story, and nxxting deadlines. Indeed, in some newsrooms, 
editors literally pencil in "angles" for projected stories days before they occur. 
(P. 261) 
The existence of highly stereotypical, and often prejudicial, news frames, is 
therefore well supported in the literature. It should be emphasized, however, that the 
existence of frames, in and of themselves, is not the problem. As discussed above, 
interpretive frames serve many inescapable, and often pasitive, functions. They allow 
people to make sense out of a universe of potentially available information. And the 
comparison and contrast of diverse h m e s  allows people to gain new insights, find new 
meaning, and even abandon previously held interpretations within that universe of 
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information. The problem arises when the same stereotypical and often prejudicial •’ram= 
are replicated again and again throughout the news media uncritically. The mass 
dissemination of these highly uniforrn news frames further limits the breadth of perspective 
available as a resource to the public and its elected policy makers and may actually entrench 
problematic perceptions and interpretations of issues, events, and people. This theme will 
also be picked up again in Chapter Three. 
Ethical relativism. One of the most subtle determinants of news discussed in 
this thesis is the professional obligation felt by newsworkers to convey a posture of ethical 
relativism. In their bid for objectivity and public neutrality, journalists generally avoid the 
explicit discussion of ethical principles in the construction of their news stories, (as explicit 
referents, for instance, in analyses of social conflict)? Instead, the discursive universe of 
the press is characterized by a relativism in which conflicting or competing groups refer not 
to ethical principle but to self-interested pragmatism in the pursuit, dnd justification of their 
goals. In such a universe, public decision-making often becomes a process of cost-benefit 
analysis in which the more powerful interests get to decide the variables in the cost-benefit 
equation (Christians, Ferrk, & FacMer, 1993, pp. 57-60). 
This state of ethical relativism in the press is, of course, part of a much larger and 
understandable postmodern response to centuries of intolerant and oppressive ethics rooted 
in rigid theologies and natural-law philosophies. But the extreme rejection of ethical 
- 
This is not to suggest that news discourse is value free. For himnee, in his analysis of 
American news, Gans (1979) asserts that a number of "enduring values" are implicit in the 
news, such as "the preservation of the freedom of the individual against the encroachments 
of nation and society" (p. 50). In addition the better part of this chapter has drawn 
attention to other implicit commercial and ideological values in the news. Such implicit 
values are very different, however, from the explicit public examination and articulation of 
principle, as referents for social policy and practice. The following discussion, as well as the 
normative discussion on ethical principle in chapter Three, should clarify this distinction. 
principles is not without its consequences. In a collection of essays entitled Principled 
Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value (1993), Judith Squires 
s-s the postmodem position and the challenge it presents to public discourse. 
Asording to Squires, "the postmodem condition is paralyzing in its deconstruction of all 
'principled positions' ," as it 
involves the rejection of all essentialist and transcendental conceptions of human 
nature; the rejection of unity, homogeneity, totality, closure, and identity; the 
rejection of the pursuit of the real and the true. In the place of these illusory 
ideals we find the assertion that man is a social, historical or linguistic artifact; 
the celebration of fragmentation, particularity and difference; the acceptance of 
the contingent and the apparent, (pp. 1-2) 
"In this context, out of this impasse," Squires calls "for a move from tearing apart 
the pre-suppositions of western thought, to beginning the arduous task of re-thinking - 
the 'hard road to renewal' " @. 5): 
If moralities, values and identities are not essential or absolute, if they are 
constructed and invented, then we must 'be concerned with the process of 
invention and articulation. This recognition is accompanied by a belief that our 
identities, values and moralities are constituted through communities. . . . Thus 
this path out of impasse asserts that rather than accepting a postmodern 
surrender to nihilism, we should look towards, and attempt to realize, 
communities in which there is the possibility of the development of a vocabulary 
of values in which a l l  can share. (pp. 6-7) 
"Principled positions," she concludes, "are in need of political articulation" @. 9). 
In its current state, the press does not purposefully foster the public articulation of 
W p l e  that Squires calls for as the basis of community. Rather, the press tends to 
occupy what it considers to be the neutral and apparently safe territory of ethical relativism. 
The contradiction in tbis position, however, is that relativism itself becomes a normative 
universal with significant social implications (Christians et al., 1993). Among these social 
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implications is the closure of the press as a public forum for articulating principled positions 
for public decision-making. This theme, once again, will be picked up in Chapter Three. 
The Need for Reform 
The aggregate of characteristics examined above presents a picture of the Canadian 
commercial press as fundamentally motivated by profit, as opposed to public service; as 
generally cultivating a passive, not active, public; as emphasizing the entertainment value 
over the civic value of public affairs content; and as reluctant to critically examine dominant 
social values, perspectives and interests. It is a press that tends to emphasize events at the 
expense of issues, trends, and processes; drama and graphicness at the expense of 
problems and concerns requiring a degree of abstraction; individual personalities at the 
expense of organizations, groups, and communities; simplicity at the expense of 
complexity, subtlety, and context; and violence, conflict, and negativity at the expense of 
mutuality, reciprocity, service, and cooperation. It is also a press that tends to 
systematically privilege some sources over others and one that tends to disseminate highly 
stereotypical and often prejudicial interpretative perspectives, and that generally is reluctant 
to facilitate public dialogue grounded in reference to ethical principles. 
In fairness, it should be stated that the press does not reflect all of these 
characteristics all of the time. It is not a monolithic entity. Different genres, different 
market niches, and merent newsworkers and organizations all determine the relative 
presence or absence of these characteristics. Nor are newsworkers or organizations 
deliberately or even conscioudy promoting them - newsworkers and organizations 
opxate under a range of personal, economic, organizational, and cultural pressures. And 
m y  of them respond even to the sit= pressures h very riiffaent ways. 
Excep!io~s pan therefore be f eud  to alt of the f d g s  outlined above. 
Neverthe1ess, research on the current state of the press is generally in agreement with these 
findings. And this agreement suggests, at least to me, the desirability of reform. 
CHAFTER TWO 
THE NORMATIVE ROOTS OF THE CONTEMPORARY PRESS 
tn order to approach the subject of reform it is first useful to place the subject in 
historical context. Specifically, in order to understand how the press might be reformed, it 
is helpful to answer the questions: How did the press come to operate this way in the first 
place? 
Many possible explanations to this question have been proposed. A range of press 
histories have been written, variously emphasizing economic, political, organizational, and 
other social and historical forces. Undoubtedly each of these forces has exerted, and 
continues to exext, influence on the press. This thesis, however, is concerned primarily 
with a different force: the force of normative ideals. The focus on normative ideals, 
however, is not an effort to invalidate other explanations of the development of the press. 
Rather, the thesis conceives of normative ideals as one among a variety of interacting forces 
that historically shaped the development of the press and, perhaps most crucially, conceives 
of it as a force that contrntrws to legitimize its current smture  and perfomme. 
The Ascendancy of a Seventeenth-Century Normative Model 
The normative principles underlying the current operation of the Canadian press 
derive from the historical struggles of emerging Wester- liberal democracies. The outcome 
of these struggles was the establishment offieedom of qression and thefiee pursuit of 
prqft as the twin operating principfes of the Western press. 
fress freedom, in this historical context, has a very specific meaning. It refas to 
&e strict absence of state controis on the press: the ability of individuals to express 
themselves in print without govenunent censorship or punishment The pursuit of profit 
refers to the corm]iloffificiffion f the printed word through the competitive, freemarket 
opefation of the press. By the close of the twentieth c e n w ,  these twin principles have 
become em- mst  Westm O e m c i e s  as naert*d asilriipiions akut  the 
way the press should operate. 
But the naturalization of these twin principles tends to obscuie their normative 
nature as well as the possibility of alternatives. Freedom and the pursuit of profit in the 
operation of the press are not universal constants like the co-efficient of gravity or the speed 
of light. Rather, they aie socially constructed normative principles. And together they 
constitute a normative model - albeit a very simplistic one - of considerable social 
consequence. 
The ascendancy of this normative model can be traced to seventeenth-century 
Europe, and to Britain in particular. As Keane (1991) notes, "in the European context, the 
long and drawn-out fight for 'liberty of the press's appeared first and most vigorously in 
Britain (from where it spread rapi ?!y to America and, less energetically, to the Continent)" 
(p. 8). It is therefore in Britain that a historical re-examination of these principles should 
begin. 
British Libertarian Principles: Freedom and Profit 
In seventeenth-century Britain, many parts of the population were struggling to free 
themselves from centuries of feudal authoritarian rule. Within such an environment, 
control over the operation of the press became a site of political and commercial struggle. 
In the sixteenth century, the British monarchy had established rigid press controls by 
Conferring exclusive kensing privileges, requiring the registration and review of printed 
works, and prosecuting the publishers of dissenting perspectives. According to press 
histoiim Mitchell Stephens, the control of the press by the monarchy appears to have been 
"remarkably successful", "with few exceptions," Stephens (1988) has concluded from his 
historical research, "the press was not available to those who challenged authority" (p. 95). 
Tnese tight controis continued through the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth 
eeiitiiy, when war broke out in B ~ ~ ,  w b e - h g  the miiaicch's contoi. IPii the 
period that followed, press restrictions were largely unenforceable, and the population got a 
brief taste of press freedom. Authority, however, was quickly reconstituted under a 
victorious Parliament. Aware of the potential of the press as an instrument of political 
dissent, as well as the revenues that could be generated through state taxation of the press, 
the Parliament promptly reintroduced licensing legislation that would again censor, and tax, 
the press. But the population resisted. 
Debate over the proposed legislation precipitated an early statement of normative 
principle that would become a powerful reference point in the struggle for a free press. In 
1644, John Milton delivered a parliamentary speech defending freedom of expression in the 
press. In this speech, entitled Areopagitica, after the Atheniaq high court where the rights 
of citizens were defended, Milton condemned censorship as both impractical and morally 
unacceptable. While his primary motive may well have been his commercial self-interest as 
a writer, in his argument, Milton appealed to a Christian concern for the pursuit of "truth." 
He argued that people must be allowed to seek truth for themselves, as a God-given right, 
and that only through the publication of "evil" as well as "good" could truth be recognized, 
for "the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil" 
(1974, pp. 19-20). "Truth is strong," Milton wrote, "She needs not policies, nor 
strategems, nor licensings to make her victorious" (p. 59). 
With this argument, Milton introduced a self-righting conception of truth - derived 
&om a largely theological position - into the struggle for press freedom. Subsequent 
liberal writers would secularize this concept, rephrasing it as part of an economic metaphor: 
the marketpace of idear. Osler (1993) summarizes the modern version of this concept: 
It is the belief that there is a self-righting process at work in the free marketplace 
of ideas. Most people will usually be inclined to select good and useful ideas 
fiom a l l  they read, and reject the ideas that are bad or worthless. Thus, over the 
long run, the marketplace of ideas may cleanse itself, and no censor or act of 
liensing is therefore necesssry. @.%) 
Milton was not effective in averting the licensing act and, in the words of Stephens 
(1988), "the relative freedom the English press had experienced began to evaporate [as the 
Parliament] gradually reimposed most of the press controls the Tudor monarchs had 
perfected" @. 171). Within the populace, however, momentum in support of press 
freedom continued to grow, motivated by the mutual reinforcement of political and 
commercial incentives. 
In 1690, John Locke lent powerful support to both the pdtical and commercial 
aspects of this struggle with his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which became a 
cornerstone of classical liberal thought. In his essay, on the one hand, Locke espoused an 
uncompromising individualism and a strong mistrust of state, implying a political role for 
the press as a free and independent watchdog on the state. On the other hand, Locke's 
conception of natural rights - the rights of every individual to life, liberty, and property - 
spoke to the commercial struggle. For derived from these natural rights were not only the 
right to free expression, but the right to own, operate, and pursue profits through operation 
of the printing press: one of the primary means of public expression. Locke thus provided 
a strong normative foundation for the commercial freedom of the press. 
Four years after the publication of Locke's essay, the British Parliament ended 
official state censorship of the press. In practice, press freedom, in the sense of strict non- 
interference by the state, would be realized only gradually. Many legal and political 
skirmishes would still be fought over the next two centuries - most notably over the use 
of libel law as a mechanism of censorship through intimidation, as well as over various 
forms of taxation. 
A generation after Locke had published his Essay, another powerful argument for 
the free press began to take form in Adam Smith's economic philosophy. Smith - the 
intellectual father of modern capitalism - argued that the individual pursuit of self-intenst 
in an unregulated economy was the surest path to humanity's collective well-being. In his 
famous treatise on the -Wealth oj-Nations, Smith made his well-known assertion that an 
"invisible hand" acted in a free market economy to ensure that the pursuit of individual self- 
interest translated into the greatest collective benefit (1910) . Thus regulation was 
condemned and the pursuit of self-interest was exalted as a social virtue. While Smith did 
not apply his theory specifically to the operation of the press, his work was enormously 
influential within the struggle for press freedom. It provided the strongest argument yet for 
"the pursuit of profit" as a nornative pihciple of the press, and to this day it is a bulwark to 
the Western operation of the press. 
In 1859, the argument for a free press was advanced further by John Stuart Mill in 
his classic essay On Liberty. The second chapter of Will's lengthy essay dealt specifically 
with "'I'he Liberty of Thought and Discussion." In his essay, Mill made explicit the 
previously implicit argument for the press as a watchdog against the state. "Liberty of the 
press," according to Mill, was imperative as "one of the securities against a corrupt or 
tyrannical government" (1956, p. 19). Mill also revisited and amplified the "self-righting" 
conception of truth derived from Milton. Referring to the "peculiar evil of silencing the 
expression of an opinion," Mill argued that it was 
robbing the human race: posterity as well as the existing generation; those who 
dissent from the opinion still more than those who hold i t  If the opinion is 
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth, if 
wrong, they lose, what is airnost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (p. 21) 
The arguments of Mitton, Locke, and Mill represent only three prominent voices in 
a rich and complex histcricd struggle. Whether their individual motives WSiC rooted in 
genuine h u m ~ h  concern or In the interests of their own privileged class is z question 
that is certainly open to debate. Regardless of their motives, however, their words became 
normative reference points in struggles for the freedom of the press throughout the Western 
world. They firmly established freedom of expression and the free pursuit of profits as the 
twin normative principles of the press in -Western societies - principles that found renewed 
expmsioii as as 1682 Cadiaa Chmer of Rigkt Fxdom. 
Amplification in the United States 
The historical British struggle culminating in the ideal of a free commercial press 
represents, in the words of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956), "the transfer of the 
press from authoritarian to libertarian principles" (p.44). This transfer, moreover, was 
occurring in Britain at the same tlme that American colonists were struggling for full 
political emancipation from Britain in the new world. 
In the context of the larger American struggle for independence, the struggle for a 
libertarian press was embraced with tremendous fervor by colonial rebels. Press history in 
the United States thus followed the same course as Britain, but at an even more accelerated 
pace. The concerns expressed by Milton, Locke, and Mill were passionately restated and 
amplified across the Atlantic by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, 
Thomas Paine, and other influential revolutionary leaders. A free press was perceived by 
the colonists as one of the "great bulwarks of liberty" in the new nation they were building 
(Madison, quoted in Altschull, p. 119) .As Jefferson wrote in defense of both a free press 
and a free America: 
No experiment can be more interesting than that we are now trying, . . . the fact 
that man may be governed by reason and truth. OUT first object should therefore 
be, to leave open to him all avenues to truth. The most effective hitherto found 
is freedom of the press. (Lipscomb, Ed., 1904, pp. 32-33) 
Because the American struggle for press freedom occurred as an extension of 
oulright rebellion and in the context of the establishment of an entirely new and independent 
nation, the guarantee of press fr;eeborrs was quickly taken up as a constitutional issue. The 
freedom of the press thus gained protection in the first amendment to the American 
constitution. This amendment - the first article of the Bill of Rights - specified bat 
"Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press". 
Tt;i;s, from the bid$ of the nation, press f i d o m  6ecarnpY a fundmend article of 
Amlrkcan democracy, constitutiondy reinforced and secured. This first constitutional 
guarantee of press freedom in the Western world, in turn, set a precedent that was later 
echoed in the constitutions of many other Western nations. 
The Libertarian Model Imported into Canada 
In Canada, the early development of the press occurred in an imitative and 
somewhat compressed manner. At the end of the eighteenth century, at a time when a 
flourishing press existed in both England and the United States, British North America had 
only the most rudimentary printing industry. But this lag did not last long. As Osler 
(1993) describes, "a sort of telescoping of historic processes prevailed" as "Canadians 
attempted to make up for lost time once printing arrived in strength during the 1830s and 
1840s" (p.86). 
In the last half of the nineteenth century, newspapers became well-established in 
major Canadian population centres sixh as Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal - adopting the 
libertarian and commercial principles of the British and American press without sigmficant 
debate. As Lorimer and McNulty (1991) explain: 
the basic principles of press operation in Canada evolved from struggles fought 
elsewhere. These principles were not then critically re-examined for their 
appropriateness to the Canadian environment. Rather, it was more a case of 
trying to find a way of adhering to the principles in spite of the lack of 
journalistic evolution within Canada. @. 57) 
The first centwy of press operation in Canada was, therefore, primarily a process of 
catch-up, with little evaluation or rethinking of the underlying principles that drove the 
process. And the foundation laid at that time still supports the structure and operation of the 
press in Canada today, which is little different from the American and British models. 
Press Reform Issues and Efforts in Canada 
In the first half of the twentieth century, however, Canadians began expressing 
increasing concern regarding the role and social purpose of the press in Canadian society. 
Especially prominent was concern regarding Canada's vulnerability to the import of culture 
and identity from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Britain. Concerns about 
the inundation of American and British periodicals into Canada actually can be traced back 
to pre-codederation (Kesterton, 1967). But after the turn of the twentieth cenm-y, 
these concern were transformed into sigmficant public debate. As Osler (1993) writes: 
By the 1920s, public debate on the state of Canadian periodical publishing and 
the competition it faced •’ram primarily American sources had become both 
vigorous and articulate. Arguments that will be entirely familiar to modern 
Canadians of the satellite television era were being made in Parliament, pulpit, 
and press urging the introduction of measures both to protect the domestic 
periodicals industry economically, and to preserve Canadian lifestyle and 
cultural values in the process. (p. 166) 
By 1931, the federal government responded to this concern by introducing a duty 
on imported publications - the first significant protective policy related to the Canadian 
press. But the concern was far from resolved. In 1% 1, the Report of the Royal 
Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences in Canada 
reiterated the concern about the flow of cultural content from the United States. The report 
asserted that "the opinions, attitudes, tastes, beliefs and prejudices of Canadian citizens 
must be enormously affected, whether for good or ill, by [the] vast quantity of reading 
matter which so readily comes their way" through the periodical press @. 60). It argued, 
moreover, that "probably few Canadians are aware that the news of the world which comes 
to them is largely gathered and written by Americans for Americans" (p. 63), and that 
Canada is the only country of any size in the world whose people read more 
foreign periodicals that they do periodicals published in their own land . . . 
This prestigious and influential report, while it did not generate specific 
recommendations for press refom, did lend credence to subsequent arguments in support 
of a government obligation to concern itself with the social purposes of the press - 
arguments that were reinforced by a precedent that already had been established in 
broadcasting regulation.4 Many cornrnissions and task forces examining press related 
themes followed. Among these was a 1961 Royal Commission on hblications, chaired 
by newspaper editor Grattan O'Leary. The O'Leary report sought to protect the cultural 
integrity of the Canadian press through the implementation of various tax measures, 
justifying them with the argument that 
only a truly Ca.~adian printing press, one with the 'feel' of Canada and directly 
responsible to Canada, can give us the critical analysis, the informed discourse 
and dialogue which are indispensable in a sovereign society.(p. 2) 
Another examination of the press came with an extensive 1970 Senate study of the 
mass media, chaired by Senator Keith Davey. This study was the first to significantly 
broaden normative media concerns beyond the cultural import and identity issues that had 
historically dominated public and government consideration. The report was primarily 
concerned with media economics and ownership patterns - particularly ownership 
concentration. Its "most fundamental conclusion," accordingly, was that "this country 
should no longer tolerate a situation where the public interest in so vital a field as 
Concerns over broadcasting ownership and content had prompted the Canadian 
government to form a Royal Commission on Broadcasting in 1928. By 1932, 
recommendations of the Commission were adapted and translated into law through the 
Canadian Radio and Broadcasting Act. The Act established the principles of both a 
permanent regulatory agency in broadcasting and a state-owned broadcasting service, 
which, through a series of subsequent permutations, evolved into the present-day Canadian 
Radio-television and Teleco~~~~uunications C mmission and the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation. 
information is dependent on the greed or goodwill of an extremely privileged group of 
businessmen" @. 67). The report went on to argue that 
the principle is now well established that the state has a right to safeguard the 
public's right to information by approving, disapproving, or disallowing 
various property transactions within the broadcast industry. The Committee 
believes it is time for this principle to be extended to include the print media. @. 
68) 
The committee's primary recommendation, therefore, presented the first official 
challenge to the libertarian principle of unrestricted freedom to pursue profit through the 
press. It recommended the establishment of a federal Press Ownership Review Board to 
represent the public interest by regulating future mergers and takeovers not only of the d d y  
press but of weeklies and other periodicals as well (pp. 71-74). It also recommended the 
establishment of a federal Publications Development Loan Fund to foster diversification 
within the industry (pp. 78-79). 
In addition to issues of ownership, the report also examined (and raised further 
questions about) advertising influence, institutional biases, news values and news 
definitions, news nets and flows, inter-media relationships, journalistic traditions and 
education, industry working conditions, media influences on the public, and public 
attitudes toward the media. Upon the completion of its study, and moved by concern over 
the quality and social impact of the contemporary press, the Committee urged the formation 
of a voluntary national Press Council to self-regulate and improve media quality and 
content It also urged industry not to sacrifice quality at the expense of profit maximization, 
urged government and industry to establish post-graduate journalism scholarships to 
improve the quality of Cax~dian reporting, urged joumdsts and editors to organize in order 
to demand improvements in the quality of news and w~rking conditions, and urged the 
public to guard against apathy and work toward creating a more "participatory journalism" 
(pp. 256-259). 
Tne immediate impact of the Senate report was negligible. Tne government did not 
+ n t m  -b a t  UP xw ;+a rnon .-vmmnda~ol.,s, nor did hdustq, with LIE exception of ttm (fairly we&) 
provincial press councils that were f o d  in Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec, as well as a 
regional press council in the Windsor area. As the Senate Committee's chair Keith Davey 
suggested, however, the primary purpose of the study was to stimulate awareness and 
debate of media issues within the government, the press, and the public (1981, p. 231) - 
and this was perhaps a significant accomplishment in itself. Among other things, it 
provided a point of departure for the more ambitious Royal Commission on Newspapers, 
chaired by Thomas Kent, that followed a decade later. 
The Kent Commission of 198 1 professed to have been "born out of shock and 
trauma" in response to a series of newspaper takeovers, mergers, agreements, and closings 
in 1980 that were part of an alarming trend toward concentration of press ownership in 
Canada @. xi) - a trend that had been forewarned by the Davey report. According to the 
Commissioners, the report reflected "the gravity of the situation within the newspaper 
industry and the intensity of public concern" (p. xi). Remarkably, the opening line of the 
report does in fact issue a bold challenge to the libertarian model and its principle of press 
freedom as a property right. "Freedom of the press," it declares, "is not a property right of 
owners. It is a right of the people. It is part of their right to free expression, inseparable 
from their right to inform themselves" (p. 1). 
The Commission documented in detail the concentration of media ownership that 
had been occurring in recent years, and, like the Davey report, condemned it as a threat to 
the public interest and to the democratic functioning of society. Also like the Davey report, 
the Commission examined a wide range of other factors influencing the construction and 
quality of news - although it did so in considerably more depth. But the Commission's 
final report went well beyond the recommendations of the Davey report. It recommended 
the establishment of a fairly powerful Canadian Newspaper Act, characterized by the 
following main features: 
(I) It would prohibit significant further concentration of the ownership and 
control of daily newspapers and of the common ownership of &ese newspapers 
and other media. 
(2) It wodd correct the very worst cases of concentration that now exist. 
(3) It would provide an incentive to the wider ownership of newspapers that 
change hands, and of new newspapers and magazines. 
(4) It would raise the status and enhance the freedom of journalists by protecting 
their rights, if a newspaper is under an ownership that has major interests 
outside the newspaper, and provide an opportunity for the voice of tihe 
community, whose citizens have a particular stake in the quality of the local 
newspaper, to be heard. 
(5) It would establish, in conjunction with the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, a Press Rights Panel which would monitor the implementation 
and effectiveness of the legislation. 
(6) It would provide for a tax credit and a surtax to encourage newspapers to 
devote more of their resources to the provision of information. 
(7) It would provide matching grants to help to improve news services within 
Canada and for Canadians about the world. (pp. 237-238) 
The report elaborated on each of these recommendations in considerable detail, 
including specific limits for ownership (pp. 238-241), targets for divestment (pp, 241- 
244), investment incentives @p. 244-245), press-employee contractual arrangements (pp. 
245-250), tax credits and surtaxes (pp. 252-254), news service responsibilities (pp. 254- 
255), and specific guidelines and powers for a Press Rights Panel that would monitor 
compliance with the above regulations and act, as necessary, as a "supreme court of record" 
for the press (pp. 250-252). 
The Kent report thus clearly challenged one of the twin normative principles of the 
libertarian model. By proposing a clear role for government, it conceptualized the role of 
the press as an essential public service and a public trust, not to be abandoned carelessly to 
the operation of the free market and the unregulated pursuit of private profit. 
The Kent Report was succeeded in 1982 by draft legislation intended to follow 
through on many of its recommendations. The legislation was never successfully 
introduced? but had it been, it would have been a unique statutory instrument among 
established Western democracies. While the legislation was never formally introduced, the 
fact that it was proposed and endorsed by many at such a high level of government remains 
significant. It suggests that Canadians may not be inexorably bound and committed to 
libertarian normative ideals. In addition, it provides a precedent from which future 
Canadian challenges to these ideals can draw support. 
Other Normative Chaiienges to the Libertarian Press 
Outside of Canada, a range of other challenges to libertarian press ideals have also 
emerged in the last half of the twentieth century. A brief review of some of the more 
prominent of these challenges provides insight into other normative territory that has been 
explored. 
Soviet Communisnr. Arguably the most sustained challenge to the libertarian 
press in this century derives from Soviet Communism, which for 70 years maintained a 
press that was radically different from the libertarian model. Although the Soviet Union's 
model of the press (and of communism itself) represents a ~ i ~ c a n t  departure from many 
of the i d d s  held by Karl Marx, an understanding of the Soviet press must begin with the 
theories of Marx. 
Karl Man, although a journalist himself, left little prescriptive theory regarding the 
operation of the press, other than a lifelong argument for freedom of expression and a 
lifelong condemnation of authoritarian control and censorship - which he had been a 
According to the chair of the Commission, Tom Kent, the primary reascrn it never made it 
into legislation was &at by the time the Commission had finished its work and generated its 
recommendations, the issue had receded from the public agenda and the political will had 
therefore dissipated - the window of opportunity was missed (Kent, 1994). This 
m c b i o n  is taken up again in Chapter Four. 
frequent target of since his days as a student journalist irr Russia. From Marx's broader 
t.kmrh, however, can be dwiv'eb two implicit principles that qieseiii a dhict chdlenge to 
the libertarian model of the press. The first and most obvious principle is that the press 
must become communal property in a communist society. Like all other means of 
psduction, it was rightfully the collective property of the workers, and on the historical 
path to communism they would eventually have to wrestle control of it fiom the capitalist 
class. The Libertarian notion of private property and the pursuit of profit through the press 
was &us anathema to Max's theories. The second principle is that the press was an 
instrument of class struggle. As part of the ~berbau, or ideological superstructure of 
society, it was simultaneously a mechanism of capitalist control and a revolutionary weapon 
with which to transform false consciousness into class consciousness.6 
With the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the political ascendancy of Lenin, 
the first experiment with a co-;mist press began. Lenin had already, in 190 1, provided 
an interpretation of how the press wodd function as the revolutionary instrument implied in 
Manr's theories: Aside from the dissemination of ideas, the press was to engage in 
"political education" and "the enlistment of political allies"; it was also to serve as a 
"collective propagandist," a bbcollective agitator," and a "collective orgmizer" (Lenin, 1927, 
p. 4). These principles became enshrined in the operation of the Soviet Communist press 
shortly after the 1917 revolution. 
In practice, however, Lenin's references to collective translated more accurately into 
party. As the Bolsheviks consolidated their power they engaged in a steady monopolization 
of the press - in the name of the revolution and the working classes. By the height of the 
Stahkt era the Soviet press had evolved into an instrument of totalitarian influence and 
control - a strange reincarnation of the censorship and authoritarian control that Marx 
It is interesting to note, in .this context, that M m ,  Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and even Stalin 
were all practicing journalists during various periods in their fives. 
himself had condemned. The Soviet media were thus conceived not as vehicles for the 
open expression of workers, but "as instnrnzents for promoting the public good as defined 
by the state and the party which embodied the collective interest of the masses" (Curran, 
1986, p. 123). As Curran (1991) explains: 
The Communist Party as the custodian of scientific materialism has a 'leading 
role' - a euphemism for exclusive political monopoly - in co-ordinating the 
different elements of society in the realization of its common interests. The role 
of the media is defined within this framework: it educates people in the tenets of 
mantist-ieninism; it aids the cc-ordination and mobilization of the people in the 
tasks that need to be fulfilled. (p. 35) 
Thus the justification that distinguished the Soviet model from earlier authoritarian 
incarnations can be understood, according to Siebert et al. (1956), as "based on economic 
determinism, rather than divine right" (p. 141). 
The freedom of expression that Marx valued clearly did not develop w i t h  the 
Soviet Communist madel, nor was the irnpIicit ideal of the press as the communal property 
of a classless society reaiized. These ideals, moreover, have similarly not been realized in 
other countries that have tried to negotiate a path to communism. In each case the absence 
of a clearly articulated viable role for the press within the struggle to create a communist 
society from a revolutioraary one-party state has resulted in its authoritarian control. 
Sociaf Respons&ii@ Theory. While far less radical in its philosophical 
wderpinnings, arguably the most influentid challenge to the libertarian model that has 
emc:rgexi in Western democratic societies can be summed up as Social Responsibility 
rireory. In one version or another, Social Responsibility theory has informed normative 
~ u f s i o ~ f s  o the press i~ m y  Western countries, including Canada, during the latter part 
d the twentieth century. ][ts influence can clearly be discerned, for instance, in both the 
h e y  report and the Kent report d i s d  previously. The theory, however, was 
47 
wdor lb t ty  articulated mnst ckxdy and infiuenrldly in the wid& of the twentieth century 
in the United States, and it is there that an examination of it begis. 
In the period leading up to World War II, the excesses of a staunchly libertarian 
press became the object of intense criticism in the United States. Siebea et al. (1956) 
summarize many of the more recurrent indictments of the press from the period: 
1. The press has wielded its enormous power for its own ends. The owners 
have propagated their own opinions, especially in matters of politics and 
economics, at the expense of opposing views. 
2. ?Tie press has k e n  subservient to big business and at times has let 
advertisers control editorial policies and editorial comment. 
3. The press has resisted social change. 
4. The press has often paid more attention to the superficial and sensational 
than to the significant in its coverage of current happenings, and its 
entertainment has often k e n  lacking in substance. 
5. The press has endangered public morals. 
6. The press has invaded the privacy of individuals without just cause. 
7. The press is controlled by one socioeconomic class, loosely the "business 
class," and access to the industry is difficult for the newcomer; therefore, the 
free and open market of ideas is endangered. (pp. 789-79) 
These criticisms inspired sigmficant debate about the role of the press in a 
democracy and led to calls for the press to exercise a new level of social responsibility in 
order to foster the more effective democratic functioning of society. Many of the criticism 
that emerged in that period were embodied in a I947 report by the privately sponsored 
Commission on the Freedom of the Press, produced at the University of Chicago. Under 
the leadership of the university's chancellor, Robert Hatchins, the report proposed a 
"Social Responsibility Theory of the Press" as a counter to the excesses of libertarianism. 
k its challenge to libertarian principles, the Commission argued that 
the notion of rights, costless, unconditional, conferred by the Creator at birth, 
was a marve1ous fighting principle against arbitrary governments and had Its 
historical work to do. But in the context of an achieved political freedom the 
need of limitation becomes evident The unworkable and invalid conception of 
birthrighis, wholly divorced from the condition of duty, has tended to k g t  an 
arrogant type of individualism which makes a mockery of every free institution, 
including the press. (p. 121) 
The duties the Commission prescribed for a socially responsible pTess included the 
following: the duty to provide a t r u W ,  comprehensive, and intelligent account of the 
day's events in a context that gives them meaning; the duty to serve as a forum for the 
exchange of comment and criticism; the duty to project a representative picture of the 
constituent groups in society; and the duty to facilitate the presentation and clarification of 
the goals and values of society. In addition, it prescribed the right for the press to have full 
access to the day's intelligence. 
The Commission, while asserting that the press should continue to operate as 
private enterprises, urged the institutions of the press to assume these duties out of a sense 
of social responsibility. At the same time, however, it suggested the need for government 
to play an active role as guarantor that the press would actually do this (pp. 125-127). 
Summarizing the underlying justification for the social responsibility theory 
articulated by the Commission and for the notion of potential government accountability that 
it contains, Siebert et al. (1956) write that 
freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the press, which enjoys a 
privileged position under our government, is obliged to be responsible to 
society for canying out certain essential functions of mass communication in 
contemporary society. To the extent that the press recognizes its responsibilities 
and makes them the basis of operational policies, the libertarian system will 
satisfy the needs of society. To the extent that the press does not assume its 
responsibilities, some other agency must see that the essential functions of mass 
communication are carried out. (p. 74) 
The actual legacy of social responsibility theory is subtle and its precise influence is 
not easily assessed. On the one hand, a strong argument can be made that the press has not 
significantly reformed its operation since the Commission's recommendations were first 
- ventured. As indicated in Chapter One, m y  of the criticisms that prompted the social 
responsibility debate are as valid today as they were in t!. first half of &e centufy, Nor - 
and this at least can be said with certainty - has any form of govemmen~ accom~b2ity 
for the press ever been instituted in either the United States or Canada. 
On the other hand, social responsibility theory has provided substance for 
widespread discussion and debate that continues even to this day. Elements of social 
responsibility theory are frequently invoked by the press in bids to enhance its image as a 
responsible provider of public service. Alternatively, politicians as well as citizens 
frequently try to call the press to account on various principles of social responsibility 
- often without even an awareness of the history behind the social responsibility debate. 
Social responsibility theory is also a common component of journalism education. Many of 
its basic tenets, moreover, have been adopted in diverse press codes of ethics, both at the 
level of individual institutions and at the collective level of journalism and newspaper 
associations. The Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, for instance, issued 
a Statement of Principles for Canadian Daily Newspapers in 1977 that affirms many of the 
tenets of social responsibility. Its third article is actually entitled Responsibility, and it 
states that "the operation of a newspaper is in effect a public trust, no less binding because 
it is not formally conferred, and its overriding responsibility is to the society which protech 
and provides its freedom." 
In assessing the overall impact of social responsibility theory, it seems fair to say 
that on a conceptual level the theory seems to have widely influenced public and official 
expectations of the press (and perhaps even the press's expectations of itself). It also 
seems fair to conclude, however, that these expectations have not been translated effectively 
into actual press practice. Much of the apparent commitment by the press to social 
responsibility has proven little more than lip service. The libertarian operation of the press 
has not been significantly reformed. Freedom of expression and the pursuit of profit have 
remain the simple operating principles of the press. They also provide the basis for the 
press's 1~n,yie!&r?g argument against external regulation or any form of governmental 
accountability. 
Variations on the Democratic Theme. While the theory of social 
responsibility was clearly born out of aspirations for a press that would better serve 
democracy, many other variations on the democratic theme have also emerged in the last 
half of this century. Perhaps none of them has gained as much public attention or been as 
widely influential as social responsibility theory, but they are nonetheless important to 
acknowledge in examining the range of normative territory that has been explored. 
Variations on the democratic theme cover a wide spectrum of ideas and practices 
that range from the high abstractions of Jiirgen Habermas to diverse on-the-ground 
experiments of practicing journalists and editors. A comprehensive examination of the 
entire range of these variations would be a dissertation in itself and is well beyond the scope 
of this thesis.7 The purpose of the cursory overview that follows is merely to acknowledge 
that a small but growing dialogue does exist on this theme and to suggest that there is a 
growing consensus on the need for more "democratic" media, however defined. 
In the academic world, one of the more influential theories of democratic 
communication is arguably Jiirgen Habermas' theory of the public sphere (1994). 
Haberrnas asserts that, in order for democracy to work, it requires a functional public 
sphere: a space in which citizens can engage in rational dialogue and critical deliberation 
regarding the affairs of society, freely exchanging views, expressing interests, and 
contributing to public decision-making. "Today," Habermas further asserts, "newspapers 
Denis McQuail(1992) has attempted something of this sort in his overview of the field of 
normative media theory and policy issues in Media performance: Mass communication and 
the public interest. McQuail concludes that almost all normative media theory can be 
distilled into various interpretations of three elemental values: freedom, equality, and social 
order, which he then attempts to operationalize into evaluative criteria for public policy. 
and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere" (1974, p. $2). 
which includes freedom, equality, symmetry, and rationality - that should define the 
public sphere. 
Habermas' writings on the public sphere have spawned a large body of secondary 
literature and analysis.8 Frequently he is criticized for his extreme degree of abstraction. 
the diff"1culty of ttanslating his ideas into practice, or his implicit exclusion of "non-rational" 
forms of expression. Even many of his critics, however, rather than dismissing the 
concept of a public sphere, seek instead to refine the concept, make it more conceptually 
accessible, and adapt it to existing political and economic realities. Some concept of a 
public sphere thus informs, either implicitly or explicitly, much current thought on the role 
of the mass media in a democracy. 
Whether originating from a public sphere perspective or not, in the wider discourse 
on democratic communications there is one prominent idea that is almost universally 
expressed: it is the idea that the media of mass communication must facilitate more than 
simply the flow of information and entertainment within society. They must facilitate 
dialogue, deliberation, discussion, exchange - or whatever else such democratic 
communication might be called - between diverse segments of society, on issues of 
public interest. Anderson, Dardeme, and Killenberg (1994) capture this sentiment: 
The primary role of journalism should not be either to inform or entertain. The 
prime role ofjournalism in our view, and the only way by which it can survive 
as a viable institution in the public arena, is to take responsibility to stimulate 
public dialogue on issues of common concern to a democratic public. (p. xx, 
original emphasis) 
* Refer, for example, to the collections of essays on the subject in The phantom public sphere 
(Robbins, 1993) or Communication and citizenship: Journalism and the public sphere in 
the new media age (Dahl5n & Sparks, 1991). 
me ahnost wdversdly acho.ddged counterpart of this idea is the conclusion that 
the current "marketplace of ida'' su_3pospdy creakd by tk ihxi3.1iiin m d d  of Lgle press 
is either too exclusive, too distorted, or too constrained to facilitate these communication 
processes. 
Based on these related conclusions, a range of alternatives to the current operation 
of the mass media have been proposed. For instance, one of the simplest of proposals is an 
access model of the mass media, in which the media are viewed as common carriers of 
public expression, in a manner analogous to telecommunication systems such as telephone 
or mail services. Access models call for the regulation of infrastructure, but not content, 
and are based on the principle of universal access. Within such a model, any citizen or 
group with time and interest should be able to access the media to publicly express their 
perspectives. Representation under such a model is as direct as possible, with minimal 
professional mediation. The actual sites of media production, moreover, may be made 
directly available to the public. An example of such an access model in practice is 
community cable television, which allows diverse groups to produce and air their own 
perspectives, w i t .  the legal limits of free expressio?. The difficulty with the access 
model in mass media, however, is that it tends to be unable to attract an audience of 
sigJllficant size or diversity. In the case of community cable, for instance, programs tend to 
speakpast one another on entirely different issues, not to one another in a focused manner. 
It is thus difficult to imagine focused and sustained dialogue on specific public issues, 
involving diverse segments of the population, emerging from a simple access model (refer 
to Lichtenberg, 1990, and McQuail, 1992, for further discussions of the access model ). 
Another closely ~ la ted  model is the democratic-participant model (Ehl~nsberger, 
1970; McQuail, 1383). The central idea of the model is the rejection of centralized, top- 
down, commercialize& professionally provided and controllled media in favour of multiple, 
local id participant-owned and mtrolIed media. The model, according to McQuail 
(19831, "expresses a sense of disillusionment with established political p h e s  and with 
media sysar i ,  which are seem as having broken faith witiz the people. There is also an 
ele-mnt of redo .?  against 'mass society', wfiich is ~ ~ e r - ~ i g a i i z d  md aenaiing" @. 
132). Thus the model departs from the access model by emphasizing the creation of small- 
scale community media, as opposed to access to "mass" media. 
Another model of a more democratic media form has alternately been called a pilblic 
service, or social democratic model, and it is based on the idea that all forms of advertising- 
based commercial media will inherently fail to serve the democratic communication needs of 
a society, and therefore noncommercial, publicly-funded media of mass communication 
are required as an essential service within democracies (Keane, 199 1; Picard, 1985; 
Wiams ,  1966). "The central rationale of the public service approach," states Curan 
(1986), is to create media that serve "the public good rather than the private gain" (p. 98). 
While specific variations have been proposed, the unlfying characteristic is some form of 
collective or public ownership - which is seen as the way "to ensure true independence 
from vested interests, access and diversity of opinion" (McQuail, 1994, p. 239). 
In Canada, the public service model is quite familiar in broadcasting, with CBC 
radio and television having provided some form of public service for decades. It is 
interesting to note that the Royal Commission on Newspapers received recommendations 
from a number of journalists for the establishment of a public service newspaper along 
similar lines: a Crown Corporation with the same independence as CBC radio and 
television, publishing a national newspaper with regional variations. The idea, however, 
was rejected by the Commission. According to chair Tom Kent (1994), the Commission 
felt that "print CBC," as it was labeled, was "a miserable choice" @. 26). Print, it felt, may 
be more susceptible to political manipulation than broadcast media. And even if it was not, 
the public was likely to hod tfiis perception. The Commission therefore concluded that a 
Crown Corporation press would have a difficult time establishing public credibility, and 
dlat 
either it woiid yield to political pressures to some degree and be manipulative; 
or it would establish and retain its independence only by being bland and very 
dull, an expensive nullity. In neither case would the use of taxpayers' money 
be justified. (p. 26)9 
Another model rooted in democratic aspirations has been alternately called the 
development, or advancing model (Altschull, 1984; McQuail, 1983). This model has been 
proposed primarily for countries en route from dependent, colonial, and often materially 
impoverished conditions, to supposedly independent, democratic, and materially 
prosperous conditions. Although variations of the model exist, McQuail(1983) 
summarizes their general emphasis as being on "the primacy of the national development 
task (economic, social, cultural and political); the pursuit of cultural and informational 
autonomy; support for democracy; and solidarity with other developing countries" (p. 13 1). 
He also suggests that in light of these developmental goals, "responsibilities of the media 
are emphasized above their rights and freedoms" and therefore "limited resources available 
for media can legitimately be allocated by government, and journalistic freedom can also be 
restricted" @. 13 1).10 
Much of the thinking around development models derives from discussions within 
the "development profession" regarding the need for a New International I$omtion 
Order. These discussions gathered momentum throughout the 1970s and culminated in the 
United Nations commissioned MacBride report: Many voices one world, followed by the 
-- 
9 It is unfominate Ulaf the Commission reached this conclusion so hastily. The two outcomes 
feared by the Commission certainly do not represent the only possible outcomes for a 
publicly funded national gewspaper. The potential for such a public service press 
undoubtedly warrants further consideration. Unfortunately, in the current climate of 
government fiscal restraint and anti-big-government sentiments it is unlikely that such an 
option will be seriously considered again in Canada in the immediate future. 
lo While this is a popular variation of the developmental model, it is certainly not the only 
way that the media has been conceptualized as an instrument of developmental processes, 
and in Chapter Three of this thesis a very different developmental function of the press is 
posited. 
Pdms media deckzraiiiorr of UP4ESCO (li/iacBricie, 1980; Noraenstreng, & Hannikainen, 
1984). These reports did coatmin, in my opinion, many pr'&sewo?&y recommendations 
regarding the reform of globd information disparities and dependencies, and the need to 
employ the mass media in service to the development of democratic societies. 
Unfortunately, the international political will to follow through with the recommendations 
has yet to be mustered. 
New Journalism Movements. While many of the models ciiisclasseO above 
have been generatd by academics, and in some cases considered by policy makers, a 
parallel search for new media practices has also taken place on the ground among many 
working journalists and editors. These "new journalism" movements, as they are 
sometimes called, comprise a wide range of approaches, but each has emerged as a distinct 
effort - however well-conceived - to strengthen the role of the media in its service to 
democratic society. In most of these movements, moreover, one can discern a shift away 
from the "straight" or "objective" reporting that was the almost unchallenged journalistic 
ideal during the first half of this century and toward a more subjective and probing style of 
journalism, born from the recognition that journalists were not merely holding a mirror up 
to the day's events but were active participants in constructing the news.11 Altschull 
(1990, pp. 312-324) provides an excellent summary discussion of many of these 
movements, and the following overview is particularly indebted to his discussion. 
" It has been widely argued that this general trend began in response to the experiences of journalists being duped by the accusations and _propaganda of the McCarthy crusades in the 
early 1950s, which they faithfully reported as objective recorders of the day's "news," thus 
becoming unwitting accomplices to the witch-hunt mentality of the era. A case can be 
made, however, that journalists were already questioning the distinction between objective 
facts and subjective interpretations well before the McCarthy era, and the McCarthy 
experience merely accelerated and reinforced the trend. For a further discussion of this 
subject, see, for example, Joseph McCarthy and the press, by Edwin Bayley (1981). 
Probably die first among these movements has generally been referred to as 
investigative jo~?-r&!is??z. Tf?e roots ~f ~~~~~~~~fe jo&.i&sm can actuaUy be traced bazk 
at least to John Stuart Mill's conception of the press as a security against corrupt or 
tyrannical government (as discussed in Chapsr Two), for investigative journalism implies a 
role for the journalist in aggressively tracking down and exposing corruption among public 
officials and within public life. The journalist thus serves as "the citizen's eyes and ears in 
scrutinizing the powerful'' (Altschull, 1990, p. 263). Although traces of the tradition have 
thus been present since the inception of journalism, the investigative role, and identity, of 
many journalists was greatly intensified with the experiences of Watergate, when 
journalists became aware that they possessed the power to bring down not only cormpt 
low-level bureaucrats and elected officials but the actual president of the United States 
himself. Through this experience, an aggressive form of "gotcha" journalism has grown, 
in which the journalists compete for, among other prizes, the journalistic prestige that 
accompanies toppling a high public official from office through critical investigative 
reporting. 
A closely related movement in journalism has been referred to as enterprise 
journalism. Enterprise journalism is in part a reaction against the public relations era, in 
which journalists have become the target of the communication strategies of public officials, 
corporations, and most recently even social activist organizations. The movement 
represents an effort among many journalists not to rely on information from public relations 
hmdouts and press conferences and instead to do the necessary research to uncover the 
"real" news and motives behind the public relations smoke screens. 
Another related movement has been referred to as adversary journalism - a 
phrase generally employed by those who see it as an unduly cynical and destructive trend in 
journalism Adversary journalism is similar to investigative journalism in that it implies a 
public watchdog role for the press. But it is not merely concern& with uncovering specific 
cases of public corruption. Rather, it situates the press as the permanent "foe of authorityy'; 
no miter who is in power, the adversary journalist is "eternally in the opposition" 
(AJftschld!, 13'30, p. 318). h many ways, adversary journalism thus derives from a similar 
rationale as the concept of the loyal opposition that has become an institutional feature of 
British-style parliaments - including the Canadian Parliament The basis of this rationale 
is the idea that opposition is essential if truth is to be tested and corruption challenged. 
One of the more controversial journalism movements of recent decades is advocacy 
journalism, in which the journalist becomes an active spokesperson for a cause. The 
advocate-journalist rejects neutrality and objectivity outright and instead "picks and chooses 
among the available source material in search of weapons to help the cause" (Altschdl, 
1990, p. 3 18). Closely related to advocacy journalism is underground journulisrn, an 
advocacy form of journalism specifically associated with the counterculture of the 1960s, 
which challenged consumer culture and modern lifestyles, militarism and established power 
structures, as well as traditional politics and authority, and sought to engage journalism as 
an instrument of social action and resistance. 
Interpretive journalism is yet another recent movement. In this model, the journalist 
seeks to become an expert analyst on the subject he or she is covering - doing extensive 
background reading, researching, interviewing, and even attending seminars if necessary 
- in order to gain a firm grasp of complex and controversial issues. Interpretive 
journalism thus requires immersion in the subject area in order to present in-depth and 
informed analysis from all sides of an issue. 
Another recent journalism movement, which has been simply dubbu new 
journalism by Altschull(1990), rejects objectivity altogether in favour of becoming 
personally involved in the story itself for the purposes of examining the subjective roots of 
human experience. The new juumlist, according to Altschull, "becomes a living breathing 
part of the story, using as his or her model the practices and techniques of the novelist" @. 
317). 
In stark contrast to new journalism, precision journalism is a movement toward 
e o n ~ o u d j i  adopting the me~ods  of science as a tool for journalism in the attempt to 
present a "scientifically accurate" picture of trends and events i i 1  public life. The precision 
journaiist thus focuses his or her research on primary source material, employs scientific 
sampling techniques, questionnaires, and surveys, and even hires professional researchers 
to collect data. Objectivity is the reborn ideal of the precision journalist (Meyer, 1991). 
In a book entitled The dissident press, Kessler (1 984) examines a journalism 
movement h a t  does not, $3 neatly into Altsckd's siimq, although it overlaps somewhat 
with the advocacy and underground models. Dissident journalism , or alternative 
journalism, refers to journalism that takes place outside of mainstream journalism, giving a 
voice to groups that have been denied access to the mainstream press. The dissident press, 
according to Kessler, serves both an internal and external purpose. Internally, it attempts to 
foster "a sense of unity and purpose" within the marginalized group; externally, it attempts 
to educate others about the group and present "ideas generally ignored by the conventional 
press" (p. 158). Examples that Kessler examines include the Afro-American community, 
utopian groups, feminists, corrxnuIlists, anarchists, war-time pacifists, and immigrants. It 
must be pointed out, however, ahzt the dissident (or alternative) press is generally not the 
press of fast choice for such groups. It is not a prt$erred alternative - it is often the only 
aft~rmtive, adopted when access to the conventional press has been effectively barred and 
no other options exist for public expression. 
Another journalistic movement that must be acknowledged - and one that fits very 
centtally into the search for more democratic media forms - is the very recent movement 
coming to be known as public jourruzLtism (sometimes refened to as civic journalism). The 
public journalism movement started in the United States in the late 1980s, born out of 
"widespread professional dissatisfaction" with the state of the press (Charity, & Austin, 
1994, p. i) . In less than a decade, journalists and editors from dozens of newspapers 
- around the United Stars have begun experimenting with public journalism principles. 
Jay Rosen, professor of journalism at New York University, has played m 
important role in articulating these principles, which in several respects parael the 
consultative model subsequently outlined ir, this thesis. In an essay entitled Public 
journalism: Firstprinciples, Rosen discusses a few of these principles (Rosen, & Memn, 
1994). "A public," Rosen writes, "is something more a market for information, an 
audience for a spectacle, or a pollster's random sample. Publics are formed when we turn 
from our private and sepzrate affairs to face common problems, and to face each other in 
didope and Disciission" (p. 6). Public jolmalism seeks actively to foster such public 
dialogue and discussion by engaging citizens, listening to them, and giving them a public 
voice. It seeks to redesign political coverage by emphasizing "the concerns of citizens 
rather than the maneuvers of candidates or the machinations of insiders" (p. 9). It also 
actively seeks to identify the public's own agenda of priority issues, to legitimate this 
agenda, to focus its coverage on it, arid to follow through with it until "public judgement" 
can be reached (pp. 12-14j.12 To do this, public journalism tries to change the tone of 
public discourse from confrontational to deliberative. It also challenges presumptions about 
the hitations of c i tkns  and assumes insread that "average citizens are capable of 
intelligent judgement, mature understanding, and rational choice if offered the opportunity" 
(p. i8).13 
12 The concept of p u 6 k  judgement was developed by Yankelovich (1991) in his book 
Coming to public judgement: Making democracy work in a complex world. According to 
Yankelovich, public judgement implies "more thoughtfulness, more weighrng of 
alternatives, more genuine engagement with the issue, more taking account a wide variety of 
factors than ordinary public opinion as measured in opinion polls"; it_ &O impIies " m o ~  
emphasis on the normative, valuing, ethical side of questions than on rhe factuat. 
infomationzl side" (p. 5). It "is &e state of highly developed public opinion that exists 
o m  p p l e  have engaged an issue, considered it from all sides, understood the choices it 
leads to, and accepted the full consequences of the choices they make" (p.6). 
l3 It is difficult to convey 'k subtlety of thought characteriziig the public journalism 
movement in a brief summary description like this. For an adequate discussion of public 
journalism, the reader is refered to Austin (1994), Charity and Austin (1994), Rosen (1991, 
1994), and Rosen and Merritt (194). 
The example sf public journalism is, I believe , one of the more promising 
"democratic" movements in journalism today. It has benefited from a valuable interplay 
between critical academic insights and prescriptions, and practical newsroom experience 
and experimentation. It also appears, at the m.oment, to be steadily consolidating itself in 
far-flung newsrooms around the United States. The example of public journalism will be 
taken up again in Chapter Four. 
In examining the normative roots of the libertarian model of the press, its import 
into Canada, various reform issues and efforts in Canada, as well as a range of normative 
alternatives originating outside of Canada, I have out of necessity compressed a massive 
subject into a very small space, Generalizations have admittedly been made, and many of 
the subtleties and nuances of this history, and these normative alternatives, have been left 
out. But the discussion in this chiyta should at least have highlighted many of the 
important landmarks in the field of normative press theory and thus provided some context 
for the discussion &at follows. Above all, if this chapter has reminded the reader that the 
.= ._ 
press, as we k&w it today, is not a natwal or normal or inevitable media form but is the 
institutionalized expression of specific normative ideals and commitments that should be 
open to challenge, then this chapter will have Milled its primary purpose. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONSULTATIVE PUBLIC FORUM 
As the preceding two chapters suggest, Canadians have secured a remarkable 
degree of protection for freedom of expression - a freedom that the citizens of many 
countries around the world have yet to secure. The "freedom of thought, belief, opinion 
and expression ixluding freedom of the press and other media of communication" is 
enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Th~s is the second of four 
"Fundamental Freedoms" set out at the beginning of the Charter to which all Canadians are 
constitutionally entitled, and it is certainly a freedom to be preserved. By itself, however, 
suchfieedoni of expression does not create a ppublicfom within which the ideas, 
perspectives, interests, and concerns of' citizens and groups can be exchanged, in a 
consultati've atnwsphere, with other citizens, other groups, and policy makers. This is the 
central concern of this thesis. The libertarian press ethic, by itself, does not translate into 
an inclusive, consultative public fonun. Moreover, it is widely used to legitimate press 
structures and performance that in many respects are contrary to this objective. 
The libertarian model of the press was derived from a very specific struggle against 
feudal authoritarianism originating in the seventeenth century. Aspects of that struggle may 
still be relevant today, but social, political, and economic conditions have changed 
considerably since the seventeenth century, as have public needs and aspirations. The 
libertarian model of the press, I submit, has become anachronistic, and as Canada enters the 
twenty-first century it is time to reform it according to contemporary needs and aspirations. 
The consultative model proposed below is offered in an attempt to stimulate dialogue and 
refiection regarding these contemporary needs and aspirations. 'it implicitly acknowledges, 
and bid& up% many of *& democratic aspkations expressed in the normative models and 
movements in Chapter Two. In addition, however, I believe it offers both a more detailed 
and more encompassing vision of the role the press could serve in society. 
Why a Consultative Public Forum? 
In my past and present roles as labourer, student, parent, small business owner, 
high school teacher, and community activist, I have come to the conclusion that the 
comiiunicative needs of contemporary citizens are not well served within the current 
operation of the press. People rarely have adequate opportunity to publicly articulate their 
ideas, perspectives, interests, and concerns regarding social policies and practices that 
affect their lives. I have also seen the same general conclusion widely expressed in my 
contacts with a large cross-section of the population. Many people are frustrated by their 
inability to make themselves heard - by the lack of a public forum in which they can be 
heard - on issues that they are concerned about. The typical results of such frustration, 
moreover, are apathy on the one hand and extremism on the other. 
Citizens who know they cannot be heard publicly have very little incentive to speak 
or participate in civic life. Instead, they often become passive spectators, watching the 
political arena from the sidelines as others determine the policies and programs that will 
affect them. Civic initiative and leadership are thus often left to others, and civic apathy 
becomes a characteristic of a culture in which the voices of diverse segments of the 
population are systematically excluded from, or simply not invited into, the public arena. 
On the other hand, groups that are determined to express themselves publicly are 
forced, in the absence of such a fonun, to resort to increasingly extreme measures in order 
to put their issue on the public agenda. Marches, rallies, civil disobedience, illegal actions, 
and even terrorism have a l l  become part of a culture ~f protest that dominates contemporary 
civil society, and all of these forms of protest have variously been invoked by groups 
seeking a public voice i? Qmda. Such protests, however, are often not the strategies of 
first resort for these groups. bther, they frequently resort to them only when other 
avenues for constructive dialogue and change are unavailable or exhausted, and when they 
have become disirtusioned with traditional Hitical processes. Media-genic actions, or 
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"pseudo-events" as Boorstin (1980) has dubbed them, are thus staged as acts of strategic 
communication in order to momentarily force issues onto the public agenda. As the news 
value of these actions diminishes quickly with the passage of time, these same groups then 
watch their issues recede from the public agenda long before they have been resol\&, or 
they are forced to continually escalate their tactics in the sort of guerrilla approach is public 
comrr~unications discussed in the introduction to this thesis. This approach may be 
effective for a while, but the escalation itself often polarizes the issues, distorts the original 
intent of the group, undermines their public credibility, and further reduces the chances for 
effective dialogue or resolution. 
If apathy is to be overcome, extremism avoided, and a more inclusive, 
participatory, and functional civil society created, public forums must be available for 
genuine consultation and dialogue between the diverse peoples and interests of Canada, 
along with their elected representatives. The press has the potential to serve in this manner, 
Of course, transforming the press into such a forum is not all that Canadians will need to do 
in order to overcome the many conflicts and challenges facing them. Such an assertion 
would be hopelessly simplistic and naive. Political institutions are also in need of reform 
Economic relationships need to be adjusted. Pernicious attitudes like racism and sexism 
need to be rooted out. And narrow obsessions with science, technology, and material 
development - as exclusive measures of social progress - will have to be transcended. 
But it is precisely in the context of these broader movements and goals that the need for 
press reform - the need for the development of an inclusive, consultative public forum - 
becomes most apparent 
An argument can be made, of course, that significant press reform is impossible 
with~t?t he prior reform of the politicat-economic relationstrips aiid social attitudes 
mentioned above. But I do not believe the question of reform is that shp1e. I suggest that 
all of the priorities outlined above, including press reform, are intimately connected. Both 
the need and the possibilities for press reform should be understood in the context of 
diverse movements for social, political, and economic change that are occurring on many 
fronts. No one of these fronts is isolated. Progress on one front enhances the mutual 
possibility for progress on other fronts. They are all interdependent - all part of a 
complex ecology of social change. 
I will return to this argument in Chapter Four. There is little point discussing the 
prospects and preconditions of press reform before the nature of the proposed reform has 
been cla~%ed. The following two sections, therefore, will sketch the broad outlines of the 
consultative model that is being proposed. First, its objectives will be presented, and then 
its operating principles will be discussed. Together, these two sections will define the 
consultative model as proposed in this thesis. 
Objectives 
Contributing to the development of a more inclusive, participatory, and functional 
civil society is the broad objective of the consultative model. But this objective is too 
general to be of much practical value. More specific, tangible objectives are needed, from 
wbich operating principles can be derived, strategies for implementation can be developed, 
and progress toward reform can be evaluated. Toward this end, the broad objective above 
can be divided into three component objectives: community development, collective 
decision-making, and conflict resolution. Each of these areas are being identified widely as 
growing public priorities, and each of them could be facilitated in part by the press. In 
practice, each of these objectives overlap and are closely interrelated. But as component 
objectives, each draws attention to different aspects of the civil society puzzle. Each is 
therefore discussed separately below. 
Community development. A public forum is needed within which the grassroots 
emergence of cooperative attitudes, relationships, dialogue, ideas, and initiatives 
contributing to the enhancement and enrichment of community life can be fostered. 
Community development, as the term is used here, refers to the development of the 
social and political fabric of community life, from the grassroots up. It conceives of 
development as an organic, internally generated process, not an engineered, externally 
imposed one. It is therefore concerned with the cultivation of cooperative attitudes and 
relationships between diverse people and groups and with the emergence of constructive 
dialogue from these relationships. Ultimately, it is concerned with the practical ideas and 
initiatives to enhance and enrich community life that emerge &om this dialogue. 
Community development. in this sense, is as much a social and political process as 
an economic or technological one. It is concerned with the quality of life, not merely the 
quantity of life. It is measured more by the emergence of cooperative attitudes, 
relationships, dialogue, ideas, and initiatives than mere economic expansion or material 
acquisition. It prescribes the empowerment of citizens to collectively affect change in their 
own lives and in the conditions of their own communities, seeking to redefine political 
activity as personal civic responsibility, commitment, and service, not as the mere 
delegation of responsibility to others through an occasional trip to the ballot box followed 
by a withdrawal from public life. 
Of course, many people are already engaged in this type of community 
development, and isolated forums do seek to foster these processes. The press, however, 
could vastly augment these processes by purposefully serving as a wide-reaching public 
forum for them And it is uniquely positioned for this role. This is not to say that it should 
displace existing forums in the process. Rather, it should be viewed as a complementary 
forum that widens the scope of public involvement, serves as a link between other more 
locafized and specialized forums, and even encourages the creation of new ones, The press 
is thus uniquely positioned to serve as a forum o f f o r m ,  so to speak. 
As it currently operates, however, the press serves this process minimally at best. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the press's current tendency to address its audience as 
passive consumers and spectators, to present public affairs as something beyond the sphere 
of most citizens, and to systematically exclude the voices of many citizens and groups from 
the public arena all undermine the processes described above. If the press is to contribute 
to the development of a more inclusive and participatory civil society, will it not have to 
begin to purposefully foster and encourage the active participation of citizens in the 
development of cornrnunity?'4 
14 In recent decades, few terms have been spared the efforts of both academics and political 
activists to deconstruct their meaning and reveal the contradictions and unequal pDwer 
relationships that are embedded in them. The term community is one of these terms. 
Cogent arguments have been made regarding the hegemonic and ideological implications 
of the term. These arguments draw mention to the manner in which the term has been used 
as a device for invoking conformity, compliance, the suppression of dissent, blind 
allegiance, and even fanaticism, as well as propagating &false sense of homogeneity, group 
identity, and consensus. The historical and political basis of these arguments is 
acknowledged here. But rather than condemning the term, these arguments should prompt 
us to rethink a i d  clarify the concept of community. The term community, as used in this 
thesis, assumes that individuals and groups exist in social, political, and economic 
interdependence, with a range of shared, fundamental needs and aspirations. At the same 
time, the diversity of cultural expression that distinguishes individuals and groups within a 
community can be seen as a source of richness and collective strength. Community, 
therefore, need not imply uniformity, but can imply a unity in which diversity is valued as 
an essential condition and strength of community. This concept is similar to the ecological 
concept of community, in which the interdependence of the species that make up an 
ecological community is primarily characterized by symbiosis and mutualism, and the 
diversity of species is a measure of ecological strength, stability and richness. 
On a similar note, &e word development has also been the subject of considerable 
critique and deconstruction. These efforts draw attention to the manner in which prevailing 
notions of development have frequently resulted in discrediting traditional economies, 
cu l tu~s ,  and knowledge systems, imposing upon them externally designed schemes for 
reform, and leaving many of them impoverished, dislocated, and dependent. Again, I 
zh~rvtedge Lh5s !egacy; @&I, I suggest the need ro r e t .  and clarify our 
undersrandmg of the term rather than abandon it. The term development, as used in this 
thesis, assumes that dl cultures embdy aspects that wes* pesesing, eiihiiciiig, and 
building upon. as well as aspects that may well need to be re-evaluated, reformed, and 
sometimes even abandoned. It also assumes that cultures are fluid and adaptable 
phenomena md !.hat the people within them engage in these processes all the time. The 
essential qualification here, I suggest, is that it must be the people within cultures, or 
communities. that engage in and direct thes: processes, determining which aspects of their 
cultures they will build upon or abandon. It should not be people external to the culture or 
Collective deciswn-making: A public forum is needed to facilitate the flow of 
ideas, perspectives, recommendations, concerns, criticisms, arta! inquiries from diverse 
segments of the public to those who have been invested with public decision-making 
authority on their behalf; likewise, to facilitate the eflorts of those who have been 
invested with public auhurity to acquaint the public with their plans and ukcisions, and 
to familiarize them with the circumstances, problems, concerns, and rationales that 
unrlzrllie them. 
Not all people can participate directly in all decisions affecting the life of a 
community. Aside from the physical barriers to direct democracy in a spatially dispersed 
country like Canada, most people do not have the time, the energy, or the desire to stay 
informed and participate in decisions on all aspects of public life. Most people are too busy 
trying to put food on the table, pay the rent, raise the children, wash the dishes, take out the 
garbage, and find a few moments at the end of the day to relax. On many public issues and 
policies, decision-making auhority is therefore conferred through some form of elected 
representation. Whatevcr the form of this representation,ls forums for more effective 
community, except to the extent that they may be invited to offer outside perspective or 
experience. 
I5 The prevailing liberal-democratic form of representation in Canada is, itself, arguably in 
need of significant reform. The intensely partisan, aggressive, adversarial electoral and 
decision-making procedures that characterize this system tend to translate elected 
representation into elite positions of power, not service, and into the pursuit of self-interests 
and constituent-interests, not collective-interests. Would it not be worth experimenting, for 
instance, with electoral processes in which nominations, campaigns, electioneering, and so 
forth, are abandoned entirely and elected positions are not actively pursued at all? Why not 
make public service truly a position of service by making every citizen eligible t be voted 
for md =me, and by =rakLcg eleced service a ieslponsibiiity of citizenship and a condition 
that accompanies the very right to vote? In such a system, why not abandon parties 
altogether and have the freedom to vote for any other citizens with demonstrated personal 
integrity, with a history of commitment to the collective public welfare, and with the 
consui~ve skills needed U, consalt together with people of diverse backgrounds? Why not 
invest legislative decision-making authority in non-partisan assemblies of such e l e m  
individuals, none of whom would have individual authority outside of the assembly, nor 
communication between the public and their elected representatives are essential to its 
optimal functioning and to engaging citizens as fully as possible in the process of public 
decision-making . 
On any given public issue, there will always be segments of the population who 
want to stay informed and who want to be heard - or who want to bring new issues onto 
the public agenda. And while different issues will naturally draw different segments of the 
population into the public arena, the quality of cornmunication between the public and their 
elected representatives will largely determine the effectiveness of public policies and 
decisions, as well as the level of trust, confidence, respect, and support that all segments of 
the public are willing to extend to their governments. 
Governments are increasingly recognizing this fact. Witness the gro~5ig trend 
toward government-sponsored public consultations regarding natural resource exploitation, 
urban planning, and other controversial public issues. While these consultative exercises 
often prove to be superficial, they demonstrate a growing acknowledgment that the public is 
becoming less tolerant of traditional closed-door decision-making practices that cater to the 
needs of powerful special interests. Many segments of the public are therefore increasingly 
demanding credible forums in which they can contribute their ideas and perspectives to 
differentiated positions of power within the assembly? And why not, after electing 
individuals based on the criteria above, allow them to function collectively according to the 
promptings of their own consciences, consulting with segments of the public as needed, and 
responsible to the public at regular election intervals, but otherwise shielded from the 
prevailing system of interest group liberalism in which public policy is dictated not by 
consideration of ethical principle and the collective public welfare, but by the dictates of the 
most powerful and effective lobbies? 
A &iscwsbn of wch f&i--rzachiilg political reform, however, is outside the scope of 
this thesis. The questions above are posed primarily to suggest the possibility of alternatives 
to prevai!ing models of partisan-likral democracy -models t b t  have become so 
naturalized that alternatives rarely even enter into public discourse. For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, I submit that even within the current political system, the creation of more 
effective forums for communication between the public and its elected representatives 
would still assist in its improved hcti~ning (and might even open up possibilities for more 
- fUnrtamental, long-term reforms). 
public decision-making, emure that their interests a-e represented, offer recommendations, 
concerns, and criticisms, and receive answers to inquiries. 
Again, the press is uniquely positioned to serve as one such forurn. Of course, 
many journalists and editors have traditionally aspired toward this service. But the state-of- 
the-press overview in Chapter One suggests that the press is currently performing this 
service poorly. The libestarian model of the press does not sufficiently support this 
objective. Instead, it tends to provide a forum for public communication that is primarily 
uni-directional, fiom elected representatives and other officially accredited sources to the 
public. And even this uni-directional communication is highly fragmented, simplified, and 
decontextualized. 
ConJTict resolution. A public forum is needed in which the resolution of social 
conflicts can be fostered and the underlying causes of conflict can be publicly 
recognized and addressed. 
In a pluralistic and multicultural country like Canada, conflicts between diverse 
segments of the population can have a paralyzing effect on civil society. Aboriginal rights 
disputes, separatist struggles, ethnic and religious animosities, labour disputes, 
environmental controversies, and myriad other ongoing conflicts undermine cooperation, 
dividc communities, create sosial and economic instability, and retard social development. 
This is not to suggest that the parties to many of these conflicts are unjustified in their 
concerns, that the roots of all of these conflicts are imaginary, or that these conflicts should 
be swept under the carpet in the interests of promoting some false sense of social harmony. 
Rather, it is to suggest hat  we, as a society, have much to leam abut  recognizing and 
addressing the root causes of conflict before they occur, as well as resolving conflicts once 
they do. 
fn fairness, efforts are being made on these fronts. For instance, research into the 
under1ying social, political, and economic c a w s  of various social conflicts, as well as 
research into ways of resolving them is being conducted from a wide range of disciplinary 
perspectives, and university courses exploring these issues from these diverse perspectives 
are being offered. Popular books and articles are similarly being written, inviting larger 
audiences to reflect upon, and get involved with, these issues. Non-governmental 
organizations are emerging specifically to contribute to the prevention and resolution of 
often desperate and bloody conflicts. Grassroots organizations and community groups are 
beginning to experiment with new approaches to resolving and addressing the root causes 
of conflicts. These issues and skills are even being integrated into primary and secondary 
education curricula. 
There is still, however, much to be learned - and practiced - regarding the just 
and equitable prevention and resohition of conflicts. In fact, many of the processes that 
pass for conflict resolution today are little more than politically engineered efforts to manage 
or suppress the expression of conflict, and they often divert attention away from the social 
injustices and power inequities that are so often at its root. As a result, many social 
activists and others who have participated in such processes have become understandably 
disillusioned and skeptical with even the suggestion of conflict resolution processes and 
forums. 16 
While I acknowledge the frustration that such experiences have bred, I think it is 
important not to lose sight of the real and frequently urgent need to resolve what are often 
deep-rooted and sometimes structural conflicts between diverse groups and interests in 
society. Do we want, we need only ask, to continue to be a society where conflicts and 
$6 Unfortunately, many prevailing notions of conflict resolution have significant parallels with 
the notions of development discussed previously. Both, for instance, have been taken up by 
experts as something they ~~, and qualified, to do to other people. In fact, both 
seem to !me spawned entire growth industries in recent decades that have frequently left a 
legacy of disillusionment in their wake, especially among the people whom they have done 
unto. In contrast, the use of the term conflict resolution in this thesis implies that the parties 
to a conflict must themselves be the primary agents of its resolution, by engaging in 
genuine dialogue, reflection, and critical examindon. 
their underlying causes go wcf&sseb, kstakg under the surface, fizeding continual 
eruptions of protest and violence, and leaving diverse segments of t,be ~puiat ion  bier,  
disillwsioned, and oppressed? Or do we want to become a society that acknowledges the 
overlaying expressions and underlying causes of conflict, addresses them in a gznuine and 
purposeful manner, and develops the skills, commitments, opportunities, and political 
capacities to resolve them? 
I suggest that the latter are worthwhile, attainable, and widely shared social 
aspirations. I also submit that there are cormunicalive prlncipies and practices that lend 
themselves to their realization, and that these can be applied to a wide range of conflicts, 
within a variety of forums. I submit, moreover, tbat the press can be conceptualized as one 
such forum. 17 
Applying such principles and practices to the operation of the press certainly goes 
against the grain of its present commercial operation. As discussed in Chapter One, conflict 
is news. If anythmg, newsworkers are currently under pressure to drum up conflict even 
when it hardly exists. They have few economic incentives to provide a forum for the 
resolution of conflict when it does exist. If the press, however, is to contribute to the 
development of a more functional civil society, I suggest it will have to rethink its 
exploitation of conflict as a market commodity. Could it not instead begin to serve as one 
of an increasing number of forums in which divergent values and interests are expressed 
and reconciled, in which stereotypes and prejudices are overcome, in which mutual 
I am not suggesting here that newsworkers join the growing ranks of conflict resolution 
professionals, adopting the mission to actively manage and resolve conflicts for diverse 
social gmaps. Rather, when confsicis involve the diverse interests, attitudes, and perceptions 
of iarge groups, (or even entire populations) the mass media can serve as ; uniquely suited 
forum within which these groups themselves can seek to resolve their conflicts. This implies 
that newsworkers consider how to reform the operation of the mzdia in a manner that (a) 
does not unnecessarily Mame or incite conflicts, and (b) provides the best possible 
communicative environment wittrin which resolution can occur between large groups. 
understanding and sympathy is fostered, and in which the entrenched social structures and 
relaeionships underlying many social conflicts are acknowledged and addressd? 
From a communications perspective, it is helpful to consider two broad sources of 
conflict and how the press might foster their resolution. The first source of conflict is 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Both language and actions are symbolic media of 
expression, and the meanings that individuals or groups intend to express through their 
words or actions are often very different from the meanings interpreted by others. By 
extension, the motives of one individual or group in expressing specific words or actions 
are often interpreted as entirely different motives by others. This misinterpretation, 
moreover, is frequently the source of acute social conflict. As discussed in Chapter One, 
however, the press currently tends to seek out and exploit public expressions that lend 
themselves to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It does this in a variety of ways, by 
relying on sources that represent the most extreme positions within an otherwise more 
moderate population, by simplifying expressions, by taking statements and actions out of 
context, by playing on stereotypes and prejudices, and otherwise framing public affairs in 
ways that enhance their potential conflict value. From the objective of conflict resolution, 
however, the press c~uld  instead serve as a forum in which the intended meaning and 
motives of such expressions and actions are conscious~y probed and clarified, carefully 
presented in context, and framed in ways that dispel prejudices and stereotypes, minimize 
the chances of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, and thereby reduce conflict. 
On the other hand, another acute source of conflict resides in those forms of 
expression and behaviour, as well as those social structures and relationships, that are 
systematically and purposefully discriminatory, exploitative, or oppressive. In such cases, 
the problem is not one of misunderstanding or misinterpretation. It is one of injustice. The 
pias, of course, carmot act as a legislative or judicial body in addressing injustice. It can, 
however, provide a forum in which such injustices are publicly acknowledged, 
investigatd, a d  mdyzzd - in which they are kept alive in public discourse until they are 
active& &s?ssed through !e,n&lo~v'e, fdicid, and orher mechanisms. 
For the press to serve as such a forum would, of course, only be part of the 
solution to most social conflicts. There are many dimensions to the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts, and communication is only one of them. Conflicts that are the result 
of purposeful discrimination and exploitation, for instance, require organized and resolute 
public action. But even such action, and the legislative and judicial solutions that they 
should prompt, can be empowered and reinforced by genuine public consultation regarding 
the underlying nature and sources of the injustice. 
All three of the objectives described above overlap and are intimately related. 
Community development, collective decision-making, and conflict resolution cannot easily 
be separated as distinct processes, They have been separated above mcrely to provide 
categories for the purpose of analysis. The achievement of each objective actually 
contributes to the other, and coliectively they contribute to the overarching objective of 
developing a more inclusive, participatory, and functional civil society. 
In a similar manner, each of the operating principles that follow are intimately 
related to each other, and supportive of all three objectives. No individual principle or set 
of principles can be associated exclusively with one objective. They are all principles of 
ahat I will refer to as the consultative process, and it is the collective application of these 
consdative principles that supports each objective. 
Operating Principfes 
Cornunity development, collective decision-making, and conflict resolution are all 
subjects that are being theorized in increasingly abstract and mathematical terms by an army 
of academics. Complex economic development formulations abound. Sophisticated 
mathematical models of management and decisiu~i-&g are proHerating. And 
excepxflng!y abstract theorie~ of mnfict resolufion, such as game theory, are in vogue. All 
of these theories leave the layperson bewildad, intimidated, and exc!uded h m  the very 
processes they need to engage in. 
Associating consultative principles with these objectives may give the misleading 
impression that they are similarly abstract, mathematical, or incomprehensible. Indeed they 
are not. Their application can be considered an art, not a science, and many of them are 
already applied daily by individuals and groups from all walks of life. I suggest that they 
are basic principles of group communication that, when practiced in concert with the 
appropriate motives, patience, care and respect, and a degree of personal detachment, make 
up the consultative process. 
In describing these principles, I am drawing on over a decade of active experience 
- and experimentation - with them I have consciously participated in and observed 
their application (and lack of application) in a variety of semgs, including workplaces, 
classrooms, student societies, cooperative organizations, and community groups, in 
Canada and abroad. And while I have come to recognize their practical value through these 
experiences, I have also come to recognize that they are not easy to internalize and translate 
into practice. Neither are they something that can simply be imposed. Effective 
consultation can only emerge out of mutual dedication and commitment. Reforming the 
operation of the press, as well as the public's interaction with it, dong the lines of these 
principles, would require such dedication and commitment. 
In order to extrapolate consultative principles to the operation of the press, a simple 
analogy is useful: The relationship betweeli the press and the public can be compared to the 
relationship between a facilitatur and the members of a group participating in a roundtable 
~ 0 d ~ f i o n .  ?1K ftlItCtion Of the press, like the facilitator, is to facifitate consultatio? by 
muring that mutually acceptable consultative principles are followed. Of course, the 
d o g y  has its limitations. For example, in a small group meeting it is often possible for 
the ikditator to ensure thar everyone has an opportunity to voice an opinion. The press, as 
a facilitator of public discome, obviously cannot give every citizen a voice on every issue. 
KevertheIess; consdmive p~kcipks k adspi& by the press as it seeks to 
facilitate public discourse. These principles include: 
Complexity, subtlety, and context. Complexity, subtlety, and context must be 
acknowledged and addressed ifmeani~zsful initiatives, decisions, and resolutions are to 
be generated from the consultative process. 
Effective consultation requires that participants have access to a sufficient level of 
background information and knowledge regarding the issue on the table. In order to arrive 
at informed decisions, they must be able to consider the issue in its fullest possible 
complexity, subtlety, and context. Reducing a complex issue to a single simplistic 
narrative, interpretation, or set of :acts does not provide the adequate background 
understanding for this to happen. 
The tendency of the press to simplify and decontextualize complex and subtle issues 
was discussed in Chapter One. It places fundamental constraints on public consultation. 
As a facilitator of public discourse, the press must find creative ways to overcome this 
systemic tendency. Change will be required on several levels if this is to happen. 
On the most basic level, many journilkts and editors will need to rethink any 
assumptions about the public's incapacity to grasp complexity, subtlety and context. The 
practice of some journalists who write to an assumed lowest common denominator - 
dmzbing down &e news as journalists say - is antithetical to the development of a 
competent and functional civil society. It is also arrogant: an insult to public intelligence. 
Certakdy, when complex c i . h i c a l  and academic jargon is involved, journalists have a 
responsibility to translate that jargon into language that is meaningful to the layperson. But 
there is no justification to assume that lay people cannot grasp the complexity, subtlety, and 
contxt of issues if they are presenred in a lucid manner, in language with which they are 
familiar. If ~ f ;  ything, overly sh-pLfying md decontextualizing issues in order to present 
them to a public that is assumed to be civicly incompetent is a seff-hlfiqg practice that 
may well breed civic incompetence. 
But assumptions about public intelligence are only part of tile problem. The press, 
in its current operation, in part lacks, and in part is unwilling to commit, the resources 
needed to provide the public with adequate background on complex issues. Journalists 
rarely receive adequate training and resources to thoroughly research and present complex 
issues. The deadlines that have come to characterize the frenetic production of fragmented 
znd instantaneous news also rarely allow for depth and insight in the presentation of issues. 
Fewer well researched articles, even if they are not cheap or immediate, would likely 
constitute a more valuable contribution to civic discourse than the current deluge of 
instantaneous and often superficial news. But journalists need the time, resources, and 
skills to probe and clarify perspectives on complex issues. The trend toward generalist 
reporters may also need to be reevaluated. Coverage of complex contemporary issues, 
such as th~se  associated with the environment, require from journalists a degree of 
specialization and background familiarity in order to grasp the issues and translate them into 
language that is accessible to the layperson. 
Creative strategies can be devised in order to ensure that adequate resources are 
available for these purposes. For instance, as a facilitator of public discourse, the press 
does not have to assume full respnsibility for all of the background research, 
investigation, and writing required to adequately present complex issues. The function of a 
facilitator is not to dominate consultation by acting as the sole source of knowledge and 
information. Rather, the facilitator's function is to enlist and invite the widest possible 
range of contributions from all participants, many of whom are, themselves, in the best 
positions to provide adequate background information, knowledge, and perspective - 
even in publishable f o m  
This leads us to the next principle: 
from the widest range of sources possible, is a means to collective insight urd 
mierstanding. 18 
The diversity of perspectives that characterizes the Canadian public is an 
indispensable public resource. Endowed with the wealth of tremendous cultural and 
experiential diversity, Canadians would be well served by purposefully and systematidly 
drawing on this collective inheritance. The degree to which we develop this collective 
capability is the degree to which we effectively tap one of our most valuable national 
resources. 
The press, as a facilitator of public discourse, has a responsibility to ensure that the 
widest range of reasonable perspectives are represented. To be fair, some effort toward 
this end has historically been made. But the systematic privileging of some sources, and 
exc1us;on of others, based on social, economic, or political status, seriously undermines 
this function. It represents an entrenched pattern of operation that impoverishes public 
discourse. In its current operation, the press systematically recognizes some voices from 
the floor, and systematically excludes others. 
If this pattern is to be overcome, the press must first make a conscious effort to 
e n - ~ e  the representation of segments of the population lacking the sophisticated public 
communication strategies, skills, and resources that are often present in the public relations 
departments of government and industry. Adequate human and financial resources will 
have to be devoted to this end. In addition, abuses of representation by resource-rich and 
Sy perspecfives I am referring to the sum of perceptions, values, and interests, derived from 
culture and experience, that determine an individual's or group's interpretation, or frame, 
of issues and events. And by the term reasonable I mean to exclude racist, sexist, fascist, and 
other hateful or discriminatory expressions that deliberately seek to discredit and demean 
the perspectives of other groups. 
PR-savvy segments of the popdation need be controlled. The commurrications strategies 
of such privileged sources should not be allowed to dominate or manipdate pubk 
discourse. 
But addressing the imbalance of public communication resources will be only half 
the battle. Press workers will also consciously have to confront personal and 
organizational sources of bias, such as the beliefs, attitudes, values, routines, and pressures 
that influence j~urnalists and editors in their work. These include, for example, beliefs 
about the relationship between political figures, scientific experts, and citizens; they include 
(often subtle) attitudes and stereotypes b a d  on racism, sexism, and class distinction; they 
include values attached to material versus nonmaterial aspects of individual and community 
life; and they include news-gathering routines and pressures that consistently filter diverse 
perspectives out of the media. Uncovering these internal sources of bias wiU require 
systematic and ongoing processes of reflection and education within newsrooms and 
journalism schools. 
As a facilitator of public discourse, the press must strive to overcome its internal, 
and often systemic, prejudices and learn to recognize all voices from the floor, within 
reasonable limits. Of course, this leads to the question of what is a reasonable limit? This is 
an exceedingly difficult issue that is embedded in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, where "reasonable limits" are applied not only to freedom of expression but to 
a l l  rights and freedoms. I would argue that these limits must, in a general sense, be gauged 
by the degree to which the freedom of one individual or group begins to undermine the 
welfare of others, and of society as a whole. Granted, the exact line defining such welfare 
will always be difficult to draw exactly. On the other hand, consensus already exists in 
Canada about the limitation of many freedoms of expression, such as hate literature and 
other forms of discriminatory expression. Clearly racist, sexist, fascist, and other 
expressions that deliberately seek to discredit and demean the perspectives of other groups 
do not have a legitimate place in public discourse. 
i acknowledged that excluding such perspectives from public discourse is an 
extremely difficult and oftex controversial process in itself. Swh expiessions cm o f m  
manifest themselves with great subtlety, and gray areas will always exist. But wrestling 
with these gray areas is nothing new. It is part of what defines our humanity. What would 
be new would be a conscious and systematic effort by the press to represent the wide range 
of perspectives that clearly are within reasonable limits, and yet are systematically excluded 
by its current operation. 
Accuracy of representation. Diverse perspectives only become co flective 
resources if every perspective is represented in a manner that is as accurate andfaithjhl 
to the original intent of its source as possible. 
In a small group, it is possible to ensure that every individual is in a position to 
communicate his or her own perspectives directly to the group. Each person can be assured 
an opportunity to present his or her sentiments as accurately as possible through the 
medium of speech. And speech is not merely the spoken equivalent of printed language. 
Speech is enriched by the nuances of tone, pitch, volume, timing, etc., as well as other 
para-linguistic nuances such as gestures, facial expressions, posture, and so forth, that are 
absent from print Speech is therefore a relatively unmediated form of communication that 
allows for a tremendous subtlety of expression.19 
In contrast, representation in the press is highly mediated. Printing is itself a layer 
of mediation that robs communication of many of the nuances discussed above. But in 
addition to the mediating nature of print itself, journalists and editors mediate what makes it 
l9 It must be emphasized that even speech is mediated by differences of assigned meaning 
and interpretation that derive from differences of culture and experience. These differences 
will always represent a partial barrier to "accurate" communication. 
ifltcl fi7t iind iri what form it is finally printed. 3y selecting, s m m g ,  editing, and 
pmqb-~skg sources, the press l-mqoxs a- hyer of m d a t i m  that woldd ?x entirely 
unacceptable for facilitators of real-time consultative forums. Yet the physical and 
operational constraints of the press dictate that, to a certain extent, this mediation is 
unavoidable. Brevity and conciseness, for instance, are necessary on a printed page where 
space is limited, and expressions that are not brief or concise need to be edited or 
summarized in some manner. 
But if the press must mediate, or re-present, the perspectives of diverse sources, 
can it not do so with more care than it currently does? In mediating the expressions of 
others, the press has a responsibility to ensure that all perspectives are represented in a 
manner that is as accurate and faithful to the original intention of the source as possible. 
Misrepresentation is, again, antithetical to the consultative process (it is also, for that 
matter, antithetical to existing etftigal codes of journalism). Yet, as discussed in Chapter 
One, it systematically happens within the current operation of the press. 
If a relatively accurate and faithful representation is to be accomplished, journalists 
and editors need to be aware of, and resist, tendencies and pressures to superimpose their 
own interpretations, or frames, on them. Thus, while journalists must often translate 
lengthy (and sometimes highly technical) perspectives into concise and accessible language 
- they can strive to do so without compromising the original intent. Accurately conveying 
diverse perspectives on issues is as important as accurately conveying the background, or 
"facts," associated with issues. Opportunities for sources to represent themselves as 
directly as possible, or to verify the accuracy of representation before publication, would go 
a long way toward this end. 
Again, one caution needs to be raised. Accurate and faithful representation of 
diverse perspectives does not imply that the press should act as a naive and indifferent 
conveyor of communication strategks that seek to manipulate the public through 
misinformation, false accusation, and so forth. The American press was caught up in a 
web of exactly this sort during the McCarthy era in the 1950s, when it became an unwitting 
xcoqi ice  to IvicZafthyism by biindy conveying the accusations that were the ammunition 
of the McCarthy crusades. Subsequent realization of their complicity in the McCarthy 
hysteria forced many journalists and editors to reevaluate their responsibilities to the: public 
and to adopt a much more critical stance in relation to the political communications 
emanating from public officials. But such complicity still occurs in subtle and often 
unwitting forms. It is also connected as much to the strategic communication practices of 
the private sector as it is to tbe public sector. 
The press, in its potential role as a facilitator of public consultation, would therefore 
continue to have a responsibility to screen out deliberate attempts to manipulate the public 
through misinformation and false accusations. Again, this is one of those gray areas that 
does not lend itself to simplistic definitions or criteria. Journalists and editors will have to 
constantly wrestle with these issues as they encounter difficult judgement calls. But this 
responsibility need not be interpreted in such an extreme manner that it undermines the 
fundamental principles of ensuring diverse and accurate representation in the press. The 
risk of abuse should not eclipse the overarching comrnitrnent to diverse and accurate 
representation. 
Moderate tone of expression. Moderation in the tone and mode of expression is 
as important to the consultative process m the content that is expressed. 
Freedom of expression need not be interpreted as a license for extreme and divisive 
modes of expression. Ridicule, humiliation, insult, and other offensive, demeaning, and 
conflict-inducing modes of expression undermine the consultative process. Yet they have 
k o m e  the norm for much of what passes as public comunication today. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the press shares some responsibility for this state of affairs. 
Might n3t freedom in the latitude of our public expression be best gauged by the 
same courtesy, respect, dignity, and care that we expect or appreciate from others in our 
private communications, even when we hold difkrent perspectives? I submit that these 
h h n t a l  qualities of expression have profound practical implications on any level of 
&co.riX. neglect diminidires our willingness and capacity to listen to, understand, 
and sympathize with others. It results in alienation, polarization, and the breakdown of 
communication. 
I suggest that the press has an opportunity to foster such a tone of public 
expression. Rather than seeking out and emphasizing extreme, conflict-inducing modes of 
expression, the press is in a unique position to foster the careful exercise of free 
expression. Ln, this respat, the press ha an advantage over the facilitator of a roundtable 
meeting that occurs in red-time. For while the real-time facilitator often cannot anticipate or 
influence the tone of expression that will develop in a meeting, the press can. It is under no 
obligation to print expressions that threaten to undermine the entire consultative process. 
Rather, the press is in a position to work with its sources, when necessary, to rephrase 
inflammatory and divisive expressions before they are printed. (Ironically, this is quite the 
opposite of how the press generally operates at present.) I suggest, moreover, that this can 
be done without compromising, delegitimizing, or excluding the perspectives and 
experiences of diverse sources. 
For instance, fostering a moderate tone of public expression need not imply 
glossing over conflicts that are indeed very real, by demanding that sources bury their 
differences and speak to each other in polite civil tones. On the contrary, it implies finding 
and facilitating modes of expression that allow conflicting perceptions, values, and interests 
to be examined critically, but in an atmosphere of tolerance and a spirit of mutual 
commitment To do this, conflict has to be contextualized within a view of human nature 
that assots the human capacity to overcome it and establish cooperative and reciprocal 
relationships. For same, acceptance of this view may first require a critical reexamirution 
of the proposition that conflict is an inevitable and determining expression of human nature. 
But I submit that mutuality, reciprocity, service and cooperation can be emphasized as 
attainable patterns of h u m  interaction. Conflicts can be understood and presented as 
soluble challenges that are encountered, md can be overcome, in the process of buiiding 
just and equitable social structures and relation~hips.~o And expressions of conflict can 
occur within this context 
Fostering a moderate tone of public expression also neei not imply a cold, 
rationalistic public discourse in which emotion has no piacc. On the contrary, emotion is 
fundamental to human experience and perception, and any effort to foster mutual 
understanding and sympathy cannot ignore i t  The emotiond dimension of people's 
experiences and perceptions can, however, be conveyed without the offensive and 
defensive posturing that we have grown so accustomed to associating with emotional 
expression. For instance, anger and shock, distress and grief, suffering and affliction, 
even when experienced as a consequence of the injurious or exploitative actions of other 
individuals or groups, can be expressed without attacking, insulting, or humiliating those 
same individuals or groups. And in my experience, resisting the tendency toward such 
offensive posturing is the only effective way to raise self-awareness in others of the 
consequences of their actions, and hence cultivak in them the actual will to reform. 
Finally, fostering a moderate tone of expression must never be interpreted as a 
license to dismiss diverse sources as coarse, uneducated, or irrational, and thereby exclude 
them from public discourse. On the contrary, the implication is to create a public space 
where we can all collectively learn more constructive modes of expression, not a space 
20 There is good reason for conflict to continue to be a cenm subject of the press: It is a 
very real aspect of human experience, and one not to be swept under the carpet. But 
conflict need not be exploited as an entertainment vdue or commercial commodity. The 
f m s  on conflict in the press could, alternatively, be for the purpose of contributing to its 
resolution. In order to do this, divisive perceptions, values, and interests must vigorously 
and continually be examined. But they cannot be examined effectively, still less can 
resolution be reached, in a charged ahriosphere that offends, polarizes, and alienates the 
- respective parties to the conflkt. 
where perfection in such expression h o m e s  a precondition to entrance (as if such 
perfection even exists).21 
What I am suggesting, then, is merely that the press has an opportunity to begin 
cultivating more constructive modes of public expression - expression that can be gauged 
by the degree to which it becomes a catalyst, and not a barrier, to mutual sympathy, 
understanding, and sometimes even consensus. 
Suspended judgement. Consensus can only emerge from diverse perspectives if an 
attitude of suspended judgement is maintained during the consideration of other, open 
conflicting, perspectives. 
Collective decision-making and conflict resolution are most successful when carried 
out in an atmosphere of suspended judgement. Effective consultation often results in the 
emergence of perspectives that are grezter than, and sometimes quite different from, the 
diverse perspectives that were originally contributed. This is impossible, however, when 
prejudgement, or a rush to judgement, prevents the consideration of alternative perspectives 
and obstructs the emergence of new ones. 
The concept of suspended judgement is well illustrated in the following comparison 
of dialogue and debate: 
In dialogue, one listens to the other side(s) in order to understand, find 
meaning, and find agreement. In debate, one listens to the other side in order to 
findflavs and to counter arguments. 
I would also suggest that the very process of illlowing previously marginalized and 
disenfranchised segments of the population into public discourse may mitigate some of the 
expression of hostility and frustration that they have traditionally felt, and that has 
c ~ ~ ~ b ~ t c b  to per eptions of them as "come" or "irrational." Hostility and frustration 
are often, in part, a result of a lack of empowerment, and inviting these segments of the 
population into public discourse is at least a small step toward empowerment and the 
alfevi~tion of frustration and hostility. (Of course they also need to be invited into the 
political and economic arenas of power in society!) 
Dialogue enlarges and possibly changes a participant's point of view. Debate 
@mzs a participant's own point of view. 
fidogue creates an o p e n - r i d d  rsttirde: iirl opemess to being wrong and an 
openness to change. Debate creates a close-minded attitude, a detemination to 
be right. 
In dialogue, one submits one's best thinking, knowing that other people's 
reflections will help improve it rather than destroy it. In debate, one subntits 
one's best thinki~g and defends it against challenge to show that it is right. 
Dialogue calls for temporarily suspending one's beliefs. Debate calls for 
investing wholeheartedly in one's beliefs. 
In dialogue, one searches for strengths in the other positions. In debate, one 
searches for flaws and weaknesses in the other position. 
Dialogue assumes that many people have pieces of the answer and that together 
they can put them into a workable soluti~n. Debate assumes there is a right 
answer and someone has it. (Study Circles Resource Centre, 1993, p. 15) 
Another way of looking at suspended judgement is again through the analogy of a 
roundtable meeting. In such a meeting, individuals can be extremely attached to their 
personal ideas and insist on defending them, or they can strive to be detached from there 
ideas and be willing to openly and honestly consider the ideas of others. Consultation 
becomes most effective in the latter case. Each idea is a potentially valuable contribution to 
the discussion at hand, but only If participants detach their self-identity and estimation of 
self-worth from their ideas. Once offered, ideas can become a collective resource for the 
entire group, to be taken up or discarded, synthesized or revised, as best serves the 
collective purpose. 
Achieving this attitclde of suspended judgement is not easy, even within a small 
group. Revisiting basic assumptions and beliefs - especially when they have become 
intertwined with one's self-identity - can be an extremely difficdt task. But I submit that 
it is a prerequisite for meaningful consultation, and that it can be learned. This does not 
irnply that people should become paralyzed by operating in a perpetual vacuum of 
assumptions and beliefs. It merely implies a willingness - an openness - to the 
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occasional reconsideration of assurnpions and beliefs. In the operation of the press, - the 
cultivation of suspended judgement implies soliciting and presenting diverse perspectives 
not as absolute and entrenched positions, but as relative perspectives and flexible positions 
- as collective resources in the consultative process. 
It should be noted that suspended judgement, as the term is used here, also does not 
imply that all perspectives are equally valid or necessarily true. It should not be equated 
with extreme relativist views, in which the world is nothing more than a social construct 
and all perceptions, values, and interests are equally valid. The logical extension of such 
philosophical positions is to validate the perspectives of discriminatory and oppressive 
groups, such as those who Seny the holocaust, or even those who committed it. Such a 
position is clearly not in accord with the other principles of the consultative process 
described in this thesis. Suspended judgement need not extend to such extremes. Rather, 
suspended judgement can coexist with an assumption that the world does exist apart from 
social constructions, that fundamental governing standards of human relationship can be 
identified, and that social institutions and processes can be governed by these standards. 
Suspended judgement implies, however, that our individual perspectives on these 
standards, and their application, are all limited by culture and experience. 
Suspended judgement, furthermore, does not imply downplaying or glossing over 
differences of perspective. In fact, it implies quite the opposite: It implies paying 
extremely close attention to those differences, listening to them, and probing for 
clarification of their exact nature - but in an atmosphere that supports and encourages 
diverse people to express themselves, and to know that their diverse perspectives are 
welcome. The establishment of such an atmosphere, it should be noted, is especially 
i m p a n t  if the ~ ~ v e s  of less aggressive and less socially confident people are to be 
eficited (people who are often, but not exclusively, the minorities in any population). 
It is toward the establishment of this atmosphere that journalists and editors could 
play a role as facilitators of public consultation. For instance, newsworkers could first seek 
to learn and establish this attitude in their individual lives.and in the c d w q  of &e 
organizations they work for (it" hey haven't idready). They could also strive to demonswdte 
and express it in their interviews, focus groups, and other interactions with diverse sowes  
(if they don't already). They could even promote and publish ongoirrg discussion and 
reflection about suspended judgement in the pages of the press itself. They could &so 
publish it as part of their mission statemen-t, 2nd involve the public in evaluating their 
success in establishing such an atmosphere. Many creative ways could undoubtedly be 
found to encourage such an atmosphere, over time, within the press. 22 
Ethical principle. Constructing public discourse around reference to principle 
provides a context in which just and sustainuble solutions to social problems can be 
devised and implemented. 
Eehical principles, for the purpose of this discussion, can be understood both as 
fundamental preconditiom and r&erents for the creation of just and sustainable socia! 
relationships and structures. For instance, a just and sustainable society cannot be founded 
on inequity between the sexes. Equal rights, opportunities, and respect must be accorded 
both sexes, and reference to this principle must therefore inform social policy and practice. 
This is a matter of ethical principle. Nor can such a society be founded on discrimination 
derived from such spurious distinctions as race. A parallel principle applies. The 
accumulation of extreme wealth and the spread of poverty 2se further causes of acute 
suffering and perpetual social conflict and instability; the elimination of both extremes is 
again a matter of ethical principle. The exploitation of natural resources in a manner that 
22 The goal of this principle, as well as all of the others described in thls thesis, of course, is 
not that newsworkers become some kind of public thought police - public enforcers of 
such principles and attitudes. Rather, the goal is that they gradually assist in fostering the 
development of a universe of discourse that is characterized by these pfinciples and 
attitudes. 
destroys ecological systems and impoverishes present and future generations is similarly 
unjust and unsustainable; ecological stewardship and inter-generational responsibility are 
corresponding ethical princip!: - that must correspondingly be applied. I suggest that all 
social relationships and structures, if they are to be just and sustainable, need to be 
established through the determined application of ethical principles such as those outlined 
above. 
Ethical principles are thus criteria with which social policy and practice can be 
measured, directed, and evaluated. The conscious and determined reference to ethical 
principle is, moreover, the means of reconciling an open and inclusive consultative process 
with the requirements of social justice. This is because it does not leave the consultative 
process open to any result. It leaves it open only to those results that conform to ethical 
principle. 
Reference to ethical principle is therefore inextricably linked to the three objectives 
of the consultative model. The first objective, community development, in its broad social 
and political sense, involves publicly articulating these principles, reaching consensus 
around them, and applying them as guides not just to individual behaviour, but to collective 
action and initiative.23 The second objective, collective decision-making, involves applying 
23 For example, one of the forums i.1 which the public articulation of ethical principles has 
been canied out most aggressively in this century has been the United Nations system, 
which has, at least on paper, forged global consensus around many such principles. This 
process of articulation and consensus building gathered momentum in the first year of the 
United Nation's existence, with its promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which was passed three years later without a dissenting vote in the General Assembly. 
The Declaration, together with its related Covenants, established the principles of universal 
education, freedom of movement, access to infomation, the opportunity to participate in 
political life, the freedom of thought and belief, and the freedom of expression, among 
ohkrs. Subsequent s~cliiations of principle are einhdied in the Dedaaiion on hke Rights 
of the Child, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the 
Cawention on t.!~e E h h t i o n  of A11 Forms of Racial Discrihhation, the Conuentiofi 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief, the Declaration on the Human Environment, and the Declaration on the 
Environment and Development. And while the United Nations has in many respects been 
- hamstrung by a lack of international political will in its efforts to apply and enforce the 
principles embodied in these declarations, they have nonetheless become powerful tools for 
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ethical principles as reference points in problem-solving and policy-making, and as means 
of formulating, comparing, and evaluating diverse options and courses of action. And the 
third objective, conflict resolution, involves applying ethical principles in an effort to 
transcend particular interests uld arrive at social policy and practice that best protects and 
promotes the collective welfare.24 
I further suggest that public discourse based on ethical principles creates a very 
different social dymrnic than discourse based solely on pragmatics. It shifts public 
discourse toward a new centre, in which the instrumental rationality of politicians, 
professionals, and academics is balanced by the ethical judgements and aspirations of all 
citizens. It thus provides the voices of marginalized, oppressed, disenfranchised, and 
silenced minorities a renewed legitimacy in the public arena, leveling the playing field of 
public discourse for them, and redressing the power asymmetries inherent in most social 
conflicts. As discussed above, it also provides a focus with which social relationships and 
structures can be critically reexamined, standards with which policies for social change can 
be formulated, and direction with which practical measures for achieving these policies can 
be devised and implemented. 
Purely pragmatic discourse, on the other hand, operating in an atmosphere of ethical 
reiativism, does not provide the same foundation for just and equitable decision-making. 
Rather, it encourages the entrenchment of self-interested positions and rardy facilitates the 
emergence of consensus. In purely pragmatic discourse, instrumental rationalities prevail 
non-governmental organizations and social movements around the world seeking to insert 
ethical principle into public discourse and call governments and powerful economic 
interests to account on them. 
24 Again, this does not imply that the interests of diverse groups, such as minorities within a 
population, sholald be &legitimated within public discourse and the formulation of public 
policy, or that they should be neglected in the abstract interests of some vague and 
undifferentiated public. On the contrary, it recognizes that the expressed interests of some 
groups (often politically and economically dominant groups) frequently impinge on the 
welfare of others, and in such instances the firm application of ethical principle, not the 
lobbying of competing interests, will best protect and promote the welfare of the latter. 
and, as noted in Chapter One, decision-making is reduced to a process of cost-benefit 
analysis in which dominant interests determine the variables in the cost-benefit equation. 
Such discourse frequently alienates large segments of the population and results in 
outcomes that plant the seeds for future conflict, injustice, and social instability. 
I submit that public discourse can be raised to the level of principle, as distinct horn 
pure pragmatism, and that the press is a potentially valuable forum in which this can occur. 
As discussed in Chapter One, however, the current operation of the press does not foster 
this process. It can be argued, of course, that the press does construct the news against an 
implied background of enduring values or ethical But even if such ethical norms 
are implied in news reporting, this falls far short of the focus proposed here. Constructing 
public discourse around reference to principle requires the active and explicit articulation of 
principles that can serve as referents for social policy and practice, not the passive and 
implicit suggestion of vague ethical norms. It also requires explicitly applying those 
principles in the formulation and analysis of public policy and practice. The process I am 
describing is a deliberate, conscious, and systematic one. 
It is toward making this process deliberate, conscious, and systematic that I suggest 
newsworkers could play a role. For instance, many newsworkers could, without too much 
difficulty, develop the skills needed to probe and clarify the ethical principles that underlie 
(or fail to underlie) public pclicy suggestions, proposals, and alternatives, and they could 
keep these underlying principles alive and focused in public discourse. In the process, they 
could also facilitate the emergence of consensus around ethical principles thernselves.26 
25 The argument asserts, for instance, that crime stories are selected and constructed in a 
mbnnsr t l  implies the ethical desirab!ity of laddness, or that stories er, the subject of 
racism imply the ethical desirability of overcoming racial prejudice. 
26 It can be argued, of course, that consensus around matters of principle is the most difficult 
kind of consensus to reach. But f see the issue differently. In my experience, the type of 
ethical principles that I have discussed have such a resonant appeal to most people's sense 
of justice and equity, that the vast majority of people in our society already instinctively 
respond to them. And if the United Nations system has managed to forge explicit 
consensus around such principles - among politically divergent and often hostile interests 
One caution, however, does need to be raised. In- invoking ethical principle as a 
basis for publlic: discourse and social policy, there will inevitably be those who tend, on the 
one hand, toward the h i d  of htokmnt self-righteous morahiiig chmctelistk of 
religious extremists, and on the other, toward the didactic moralizing that has characterized 
the party-press in many statesocialist societies. I do not believe, however, that either of 
these tendencies constitute such potential threats to Canadian society that we should forego 
experimenting with more moderate and constructive methods of applying ethical principles 
to social concerns. Better, I suggest, to wrestle with these tendencies than to perpetuate the 
bemendous power a~y~mri~ztries inherent in our current brarld of public discourse based on 
the pragmatic pursuit of competing self-interests. 
Finally, the call to construct public discourse, policy, and practice around reference 
to ethical principle is not merely a naive or pious admonition to some vague notion of virtue 
and morality. I submit that it is a powerfid and proven practice will very real political 
implications. Consider the historical struggles for social justice - women's movements, 
civil rights movements, labour movements, post-colonial independence movements - that 
have been empowered by their determined commitment to ethical principle. Consider the 
number of prominent representatives of these struggles - Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther 
King, Nelson Mandela, or most recently Aung San Suu Kyi - that have empowered their 
causes by their consistent pclblic appeal to ethical prieciple. Such struggles, certainly, are 
far from over, and set-backs have been and will continue to be experienced. Historically, 
from every nation on earth - surely we can forge similar consensus in C d a .  The 
primary challenge, I submit, is not forging consensus around principle. It is learning how 
to consciously employ principles as referents wit!!n consultative processes, and thereby 
consistently apply them to matters of social policy and practice, both as formulative and 
evaiuative tools. Cenainly, translating principle into practice wiii produce varying 
interpretations, and the application of principle is therefore not an easy process. But all the 
more rewm to =?&e the process a systematic and conscious one. In addition, an equally 
important challenge is creaning policy (and enforcement) mechanisms with the political 
independence to refuse the influence of those segments of the population that obscure or 
resist the application of principle when it exposes the discriminatory and exploitative nature 
of their pursuits. 
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however, these stniggles have k e n  gieatly empowered when they have successfully 
mmewered public dko~xse out of the quagmk of competing interest claims and into the 
c o w  of ethical principle. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
Having examined the basic objectives and principles of the consultative model, it is 
time to turn to questions of implementation. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not 
to present a how to guide for the model's practical application, in terms of specific 
newsroom skills and practices. Answers to these questions can ody be worked out by 
practicing journalists and editors (perhaps with the collaboration of media theorists and 
researchers) who decide to engage with the moC3 and explore that site where normative 
ideals interact with practice, each shedding light on the other. The purpose of this chapter, 
rather, is to consider the overarching obstacles and opportunities for implementing the 
model as well as the broad stratejes that, if pursued, could enable the type of reforms 
proposed in the model. 
The chapter will begin by discussing the nature of reform as a historical and cultural 
process. This discussion will include the suggestion of realistic expectations regarding the 
manner and rate of reform. Next, the chapter will examine four fronts within which the 
movement for reform would most likely have to be pursued if it is to be effective: the 
public, the press, the political economy, and the academy. 
Reform as a Historical Process 
Meaningful press reform is incomprehensible within the short-term planning 
horizons and quick-fix time-hmes that characterize so much of contemporary public life. 
If the practicality of the consultative model is assessed by the prospects for its immediate 
aod wholesale adoption, then obviously it is grossly impractical. Vested interests and 
enmnched traditions within the press would undoubtedly resist such reform. Resistance 
might also be felt from powerful sources and clients whose self-interests are best served by 
the current operation of the press. Ncr is there sufficient economic incentive or political 
will to radically embrace such reform at this time. 
But if press reform is viewed in a broad historical context, its prospects look 
somewhat more promising. In sixteenth-century Britain, the immediate prospects for a free 
press looked dismal. The political economy was not ripe for reform; the monarchy enjoyed 
absolute authority over the operation and taxation of the press and had little reason to forfeit 
control. Nor had sufficient popular pressure built up to force the issue of reform. In the 
seventeenth century, however, conditions began to change. The authority of the monarch 
began to erode as popular pressure simultaneously mounted. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the ideals of a free commercial press were publicly articulated for the first time during 
this period, when traditional structures and relationships were being challenged. It took 
another century for the ideals of a free commercial press to become established in practice, 
but established they were. A model of the press that was unthinkable in an earlier era has 
provided the entire Western world with its operating principles - so much so that the 
model has largely become an assumed background norm, the natural way to do things in a 
democratic society. 
There was therefore nothing immediate about the process that led to the adoption of 
today's libertarian model of the press. It was a historical process that spanned generations. 
Suggestions regarding its practicality in the sixteenth century would likely have been 
scoffed at. In hindsight, however, the process can be interpreted as the playing out of a 
broad historical imperative in which narrow self-interests eventually succumbed to more 
broadly shared, popular interests. In this case, the narrow self-interests were located in the 
British aristocracy, while the more broadly shared interests were located primarily (but by 
no means exclusively) in the literate, entrepreneurial classes in Britain. It should also be 
remembered, in this context, that the authority of the British aristocracy had been 
considered absolute for centuries, and the power of the entrepreneurial classes had always 
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been subordinate. From a sixteenth-century perspective; the prospects for reform must 
have appeared remote. 
The situation has some parallels today. The possibility of significant press reform 
seems unrealistic to many because the economic incentives and political will for reform 
have been generally lacking throughout the twentieth century. But there are signs that 
suggest incentives might be developing. Respect for the press is at a fairly low ebb, 
journalists are experiencing a crisis of identity, and readership is falling - each of which is 
placing pressures on newsworkers and owners to reconsider the way they operate (Canada. 
Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981; Desbarats, 1990). In addition, big-government 
and big-business - arguably the two primary sources and beneficiaries of the press as it 
currently operates - also appear to be losing public trust, and their authority and interests 
are being challenged from many directions. At the same time, a groundswell of frustration 
with the dysfunction of the public sphere can be discerned arnong citizens, interest groups, 
the academy, and even among many politicians and business leaders. 
This is not a suggestion that radical reform is imminent. We are not going to wake 
up to it tomonrow, next week, or even next year. Expectations regarding the pace of reform 
have to be realistic. Reform of entrenched social structures and relationships takes time, as 
history has demonstrated. Rather, it is a suggestion that reform over the long-term is an 
attainable goal that is worth pursuing and that the conditions for mobilizing reform are 
potentially present It is also an appeal to begin consciously exploring and exploiting these 
conditions in order to facilitate and encourage the process. Ultimately, it is an appeal to 
move beyond the short-term planning horizons that dominate modern political life and begin 
laying the foundations for long-term, meaningful social change. 
In order to do this, it is necessary to idenhfy thc various fronts on which movement 
toward reform needs to occur; to identify the agents, the incentives, and the possibilities 
for action. The following discussion suggests that the movement for reform needs to occur 
on four fronts: the public, the press, the political economy, and the academy. In isolation, 
any of these fronts will likely prove inadequate. Reform will proceed most effectively only 
to the degree that it is pursued on all of these fronts. 
The fuiiovirng analysis, therefore, is a survey oftheJeid so to speak - an 
inventory of the social resources available for reform. It is an attempt to situate seemingly 
isolated reform efforts in a coherent context and to move past cynicism in order to recognize 
and create practical possibilities. 
The Press 
Press reform begis within the press itself. If it is to succeed, journalists, editors, 
boards of directors, and owners will have to examine and reform the traditions, the codes 
of conduct, and the operational imperatives that affect the press. They will have to re- 
evaluate their public role and consider what operational changes would better serve the 
development of a more inclusive, participatory, and functional civil society. Fortunately, 
these groups do have incentives to engage in this process. 
In 1980, rhe Canadian Royal Commission on Newspapers described a "national 
consensus" around the belief that journalism "has lost its vitaiity"(p. 135). Canadian media 
researcher Peter Desbarats offers a similar conclusion. "Journalism," he writes "has lost 
much of its credibility" (198 1, p. 7). Both in the court of popular perception and in the 
findings of academic researchers, the press is increasingly being implicated in tbe 
bankruptcy of contemporary political life and the stagnation of civic discourse. Journalists 
sometimes receive little more public esteem than the politicians they report on - and both 
are often perceived as part of an exclusive class of political and media elite that are out of 
touch with the lives of ordinary citizens. According to the Royal Commission, journalism 
is not a highly respected profession in society today, and "journalists are increasingly 
concerned about declining public confidence in them and in the written press in general" @. 
109). 
Journalists today also operate mder tremendous workplace stress, with few 
personal or profession$ rewards to compensate. Loss of m=ket share and a d e c h d g  
readership, combined with rising costs of labour, capital, and raw materials, are forcing 
newsrooms to tighten budgets. As a result, staff are being cut and restructured, workloads 
increased, and support for investigative reporting, in-depth analysis of issues, as well as 
professional specialization and development are all being minimized. The newsroom is 
therefore becoming an increasingly stressful working environment at the same time that 
journalists are confronting a crisis in public esteem (Desbarats, 1990, pp. 93-95). 
But beyond public esteem and newsroom economics, many journalists are also 
facing a crisis of self-identity. Members of the public and the academic community are not 
the only ones dissatisfied with contemporary journalism. A growing number of journalists 
are themselves increasingly dissatisfied (Canada. Royal Commission on Newspapers, 
1981, p. 31). Many, initially attracted to the public service nature of the profession, 
become disillusianed in short time by its failure to contribute to substantive civic discourse. 
The result, especially when combined with the factors discussed above, has been ax 
exceptionally high rate of attrition among journalists (Canada. Special Senate Committee on 
Mass Media, 1970, p. 65). According to Desbarats (1990): 
Dis i l lu~io~ent ,  skepticism about the commitment of employers to journalism, 
poor management practices, and lack of ~pportunity for professional 
development probably contribute as ~ i ~ c a n t l y  as low salary levels to one of 
Canadian journalism's most severe chronic problems: the constant depletion of 
talent. l?le relative youth of journalists, as documented in the surveys quoted 
earlier, and the low number of average years of experience, point to the problem 
of journalists leaving the business - particularly the most talented ones. @p. 
93-94) 
Jom&sts and editors therefore do have incentives to reform. In addition, owners 
also have incentive to reform. As Rosen (1991) states it, "a healthy public sphere is, in 
some respects, in the circulation interests of newspapers" (p. 273). And creating that 
healthy public sphere will require, among other things, reform of the press. 
Ir? light of these incentives, , m y  newsworkers are begining to quesf on their 
traditional roles and search for ait%mative approaches in their work. This swch is evident 
in the proliferation of new jownalism movements that have emerged in recent decades, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. While these movements illustrate the search for new modes of 
operation, I submit that they fall short of the goal proposed in this thesis of developing a 
more inclusive, participatory, and functional civil society. To the degree they have 
established themselves, most of them have simply tended to replace one type of closed 
forum with another. 
One of the more promising exceptions to this appears to be the public journalism 
movement, also discussed in Chapter Two. The movement is committed to ideals that 
parallel the consultative model in several respects. It views citizens as active participants in 
pubIic discourse and political life. It actively seeks to facilitate constructive dialogue 
between citizens so that they can ;;.ntribute to public policies, pursue social reforms, and 
take civil initiatives. It also consciously attempts to replace confrontation with purposeful 
deliberation as a dominant mode of public discourse. 
Unfortunately, the public journalism movement is such a recent phenomenon that it 
has had little t h e  to prove itself. There has been even less opportunity for any rigorous, 
third-party analysis of its application. To date, almost everything available in print on the 
movement has been written by those scholars and newsworkers who are spearheading the 
movement itself. There has therefore been a good deal of promotion but little evaluation. 
With that said, however, anyone interested in the prospects of the consultative model 
proposed in this thesis would do well to follow public journalism closely. It is so far the 
closest approximation of the consultative model in practice. Analysis and evaluation of its 
successes, and limitations, will therefore yield valuable insights into prospects for the 
reforms proposed in this thesis. 
One lesson that can already be derived horn the public journalism movement, 
despite its nascent state, is that even within the current political economy of the press, 
significant latitude for reform and experimentation does exist. The public journalism 
movement appears to have strong appeal among a growing number of journalists, ditors, 
and even entire newspapers who are now actively experimenting with its application, and 
coming out with a product substantially different from the traditional press. An example 
will best illustrate. 
In 1992, the Wichita Eagle launched a People Project that tried to engage area 
residents "in a search for solutions to problems governments seemed unable to solve: 
faltering schools, crime, political gridlock, and stresses on families trying to cope with 
competing demands" (Austin, 1994, see Wichita: People Project) . The Eagle examined 
each issue in depth, "attempting to penetrate to 'core values' that often stand in the way of 
resolution." It provided names and addresses of organizations working toward soliltions 
and invited residents to write, phone, or fax their "ideas about what's wrong and how to iix 
it." With the assistance of Wichita State University researchers, in-depth interviews "about 
social ills and public problems" were conducted with 192 residents. Public forums were 
also sponsored in which citizens could discuss their concerns, "meet others trying to 
c h g e  things and find resources with which to act" For nine weeks, the Eagle made itself 
fully available for "an informed community discussion of cr i~cal  issues" and "a search for 
solutions" (Austin, 1994, see Wichita: People Project). So what did it look like in the 
paper? It had 
continuous front-page placement Long features with enough background to 
explain the problem and generous quotes from residents; charts and graphics 
challenging readers to think through their opinions on public issues and 
understand what the paper cafled "competing core values"; profiles of 
individuals and their success stories"; boxes with repeated reminders to. . . 
contact the Eagle avi& mnmots a suggestions; lengthy lists of organizations 
to contact for help or to volunteer - all under the logo "Solving it Ourselves: 
the People Projec~" (Austin, 1994, see Wichita: People Project) 
Tfie initiative required a full-time reporter, editor, and artist, as well as four more 
part-time jounnalists as needed. After the project was complete, the response in the 
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newsroom was very positive. Editor Buzz Merritt commented that it was "a liberating thing 
for those who've been in journalism a long time to realize that maybe there's a different 
way to approach it. . . a better way of newspapering, a different tone and attitude that can 
be applied to everyday journalism" Response from the community was similarly positive, 
and the Eagle has since followed up with other "People Projects," one focused on health 
care issues and another on employment (Austin, 1994, see Wichita: People Project). 
The Eagle has since launched three other initiatives based on the success of the 
People Project. It has embarked on an "opinion mapping" project to iden* the places in 
which meaningful community dialogue takes place and to identify the people engaged in 
such dialogue, so that reporters can "get in on the ground floor of public concerns" and 
assist in carrying t k m  forward to action or resolution. The Eagle has also developed an 
initiative to cover and chart grassroots community efforts to solve their own problems. The 
goals are "to celebrate and detail successes, to encourage others and offer a road map of 
solutions [and] to keep the work in the public eye." The initial focus of this initiative has 
been on grassroots efforts to address crime, violence, and deteriorating housing. Finally, 
the Eagle has created a full-time public journalism beat with the freedom to experiment 
freely with public journalism approaches and to work with other beats within the 
newspaper to develop similar approaches (Austin, 1994, see Wichita: People Project). 
The Wichita Eagle initiative is only one of a diverse range of approaches to applying 
the ideas of public journalism27 But it demonstrates that traditional modes of operation of 
the press are not carved in stone, that incentives for reform are felt by many newsworkers, 
and that if journalists and editors are willing to take the initiative, reform can occur. 
27 Many of these initiatives have been collected md summarized in Public life and the press: 
A research repon, which in its latest editions examined more than 40 public journalism 
initiatives amss the United States (Austin, 1994). The report is updated quarterly and is 
available in both an abstract form and a longer version, with details on each experiment. 
The report is not exhaustive but represents the diversity of creative approaches and 
initiatives being taken. 
Of course, the consultative model proposed in this thesis differs in several respects 
from the public journalism model - most notably in its assertion that ethical principles are 
essential referents within public discourse as well as in its more conscious and deliberate 
orientation toward the resolution of social conflicts and their underlying causes. Both 
models, however, are dialogical in nature, and both conceptualize reform within the press 
in a similar manner: Dialogue, reflection, evaluation, experimentation, and refinement are 
not just discursive practices that newsworkers should be fostering within public discourse 
- they are also the methods that journalists and editors themselves will need to practice in 
order to bring about press reform. These practices therefore need to be widely stimulated, 
encouraged, and developed within the press. 
By themselves, of course, even such internal efforts will inevitably run up against 
external constraints. While press reform may begin within the press, internal efforts will 
undoubtedly need to be reinforced and complemented by efforts on each of the other fronts 
discussed below. 
The Public 
Internal efforts to reform the press will be extremely limited unless they are 
accompanied by changes in readership preferences and expectations. The commercial 
press, as discussed in Chapter One, has a unique market relationship to the public; the 
public is simultaneously consumer and commodity. The product of the commercial press is 
not merely content, but also readership. Its service is not merely delivering content to 
readers, but also delivering readers to advertisers. 
Readership, however, is a very unusual commodity. It is a commodity that in part 
determines the means of its own production. By purchasing a newspaper or magazine, 
people are participating, via market mechanisms, in defining the content that secures their 
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attention - and in turn transforming themselves into a cornrnodity.~ As Hackett (1991) 
explains: 
If the audience can indeed be conceptualized as a commodity, it is a commodity 
unlike any other: It participates in its own production. It shares complicity, as 
it were, in its own positioning. . . Consequently, a struggle to change the 
media is also a struggle to change audiences, and their relationship with the 
media. (pp. 70-71) 
Fortunately, such a snuggle is not merely a remote theoretical proposition. Real 
incentives already exist. Many people are growing weary of the constant barrage of 
sensationalism, negativity, and conflict that emanates from the press. At the same time, 
citizens and interest groups from across the political spectrum are frustrated with the lack of 
public discourse regarding issues that are meaningful to them. Given these incentives, the 
struggle to change the public's relationship with the media is being taken up in several 
public arenas. 
One of the most notable of these arenas is public education. Critical analysis of the 
mass media is widely becoming an element of public education curricula under the various 
titles media studies, media education, or media literacy. Primary and secondary school 
educators, curriculum developers, and policy makers are gradually recognizing the need for 
students to develop the skills to critically assess and interpret the mass media - to dig 
below the surface of media content and examine how it is constructed, how issues are 
framed, what biases are reflected, and what factors of production and culture shape it. In 
British Columbia, for instance, the Ministry of Education has called for media education to 
be integrated into all subject areas fiom kindergarten to grade 12. 
28 The influence of readership on content must be qualified with an acknowledgment that 
many other factors also influence press content. It would be more accurate to conceive of a 
complex interplay between the preferences and expectations of readers, the news judgements and traditions of journalists, and the ideological, economic, and organization& 
pressures discussed in Chapter One. Nonetheless, audience preferences and expectations 
are a factor in determining content. 
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A wide range of activity is being generated by this trend. Curriculum developers 
are working to create media studies materials. Teacher training and professional 
development courses are being developed.29 Teachers in the classroom are taking initiatives 
and experimenting with their own approaches and  material^?^ The National F ' i  Bo=d of 
Canada has even produced two films, Media and Society and Constructing Reality, with 
accompanying study guides for media education. Ediizstors are forming associations such 
as the Canadian Association for Media Education. There is, therefore, an undeniable thrust 
in the educational community to raise public awareness about the role of the mass media in 
society and about the public's relationship to the media - about its preferences, 
expectations, interpretive abilities, and so forth. These efforts are not simply training 
students in media production (although that is happening also). Rather, to the degree that 
they succeed, these efforts are fostering critical analysis of the role, influence, and biases of 
the mass media in modern societ)! They are encouraging students to question, challenge, 
and rethink their relationship to the mass media. 
Another arena in which the relationship between the public and the mass media is 
being challenged is the arena of popular literature. The past two decades have witnessed a 
growing interest in media critique among readers of popular literature. Media critics, such 
as Marshall McLuhan and Neil Postman, are becoming familiar public names. Critical 
media publications, such as Vancouver's own Adbusters magazine, are also being 
introduced for a popular audience. While this trend in popular literature has not yet resulted 
in my sigrdicant revolution of public attitudes, it is contributing to a growing critical 
29 One example is the Summer Institute for Media Education recently instituted as a 
collaborative effort between the Education Faculty and the School of Communication at 
Simon Fraser University. 
30 This was exactly my situation teaching media studies units in an environmental curriculum 
at a high school in 1992, and it was one of the reasons that I decided to take up graduate 
studies in the School of Communication. 
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awareness of the media in various segments of the population and causing people to rethink 
their consumer-based relationship to the media. 
Yet another arena in which the relationship between the public and the mass media 
is being challenged is social advocacy. Large numbers of people associated with diverse 
advocacy groups - feminist, human rights, environment, developm;nt, aid others - 
have gained deeply critical perspectives through their experiences with the mass media. As 
discussed in the introduction, and again in Chapter One, many of these advocacy groups 
have had to develop specific communication strategies, specialized skills, and resources in 
an effort to force entry into the exclusive public sphere created by the mass media. Most of 
these groups, however, have achieved only minimal levels of success, resulting in 
widespread resentment and frustration. But one result of these experiences has been the 
alliance of many advocacy movements with efforts to critique and reform both the mass 
media and the public's relationship with them In addition, social advocacy groups, such 
as Media Watch, have sprung up in recent years with the sole purpose of advocating media 
reform. Thus the mass media have themselves become the subject of social advocacy, 
drawing various segments of the population into the struggle for reform. 
These examples of social advocacy also illustrate another dimension of the public's 
role in the reform process. The public's role in reform is not limited to merely changing its 
expressions of consumer choice and influencing press content through market mechanisms. 
The public can also bring about reform of the press at the policy level by exercising its 
political will. Policy-level reforms will be discussed further in the following section, but it 
is important to remind ourselves that public will is the motive force behind policy reform, 
that incentives and opportunities do exist to mobilize that public will, and that a small but 
gowing number of social advocacy groups are already engaging in that process. 
Lest the results of the trends discussed above be exaggerated, however, a word of 
caution is in order. No one of these trends, in isolation, is yet very impressive. They have 
been gathering steam only recently and have so far had only a nominal effect on the 
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operation of the press. But taken together, and in the context of the other fronts discussed 
above and below, they suggest a set of related opportunities that need to be acknowledged 
and encouraged within the broad movement for reform. 
The Political Economy 
As mentioned briefly in the introduction to Chapter Three, an argument can be made 
that sig&icant press reform is impossible without the prior reform of existing political and 
economic structures and relationships. This argument is derived from the historical 
interpretation that the modem political economy serves a dominant class of powerful elites 
that have a vested interest in maintaining a press that serves as an instrument for the 
promotion of consumer culture, political passivity, and profit. 
For the record, I am in agreement with much of this interpretation. Aspects of the 
current political and economic system are not only obstacles to press reform, they are 
obstacles to many movements for social justice and equity in this age. And while the 
current political economy may have been a historical step forward from its feudalistic 
predecessor, aspects of it have become anachronistic at the end of the twentieth century, 
and it should be the object of fundamental reform in its own right. 
Where I disagree with the earlier argument, however, is with the assertion that 
political and economic reform must occur prior to - or be a precondition of - the 
struggle toward reform on other fronts. The issue of preconditional reform raises an 
impossible chicken-and-egg dilemma: If the reform of public discourse depends on the 
prior reform of the ditical economy, is it not equally true that reform of the political 
economy depends on the prior reform of public discourse (and the consciousness raising 
that this implies)? Which refom- then, must precede the other? 
Such chicken-and-egg conceptualizatims are far too simplistic, and I question any 
argument &at asserts the necessity of either of these reforms as aprecondition of the other. 
Instead, I argue that a much more subtle conceptualization of social change is needed. All 
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social, political, and economic reforms are intimately comectd and interdependent. Surely 
this is one of the fundamental lessons being driven home by the experiences of the 
twentieth century. The concept of interdependence has been most clearly articulated in the 
field of ecology. But its application is not limited to ecology. It applies equally well to the 
social, political, and economic spheres, as well as to the relationships between each of 
these spheres - spheres which are themselves little more than artificial distinctions 
imposed as an aid to communication and analysis. 
Thus, as stated earlier, both the need and the possibilities for press reform should 
be understood in the context of diverse movements for social, political, and economic 
change that are occum'ng on many fronts, including political and economic fronts. No one 
of these fronts is isolated. Progress on one front enhances the mutual possibility for 
progress on other fronts. They are all interdependent - all part of a complex ecology of 
social change. Understood in this context, reform on one front cannot be held up as a 
precondition to reform on another. Rather, it has to be acknowledged that movements for 
reform on all fronts mutually interact and enable one another. 
In this context, I maintain that significant latitude for reform does exist both within 
the newsroom and within the public, as discussed in the two preceding sections. Every 
effort on these fronts should thus be encouraged. This can be done, however, while 
acknowledging the concurrent need for reform in the political and economic arena, 
With that said, the press reforms proposed in this paper presuppose that movements 
for political and economic reform are proceeding simultaneously on other fronts. Such 
movements, and their prospects, however, ate beyond the scope of this thesis. And this is 
a subject that is being taken up by a wide range of critical scholars and social advocates 
elsewhere. For the purpose of this thesis it will suffice to comrneilt biiefly on two 
characteristics of the current political economy that relate most directly to the press reforms 
proposed in this thesis. The first is an assumption that human interactions are necessarily 
- characterized by adversarial relationships and that the political and economic arenas are 
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therefore naturally characterized by the contest of wills dnd interests. The second is an 
assumption that public discourse can and should be commodified and sold for profit like 
any other manufactured product. The two assumptions are not actually as distinct as they 
might appear. For instance, the commodification and sale of public discourse in a 
competitive, unregdated maTket is essentially an expression of the contest of interests 
posited by the adversarial conception of human nature. For the purposes of analysis, 
however, they will, as far as possible, be discussed separately. 
Advetsariat relutions. In Canada, as in most modern Western states, the 
govt~i~iie~i., the justice system, and the economy all function according to adversarial 
principles. For instance, the partisan system of electioneering and oppositional debate is an 
adversarial model of public administration. The advocacy system of crin,.al prosecution 
and defense is an adversarial model of justice. And the aggressively competitive capitalist 
system is an adversarial model of economics.31 In addition, relations between nation states, 
between ethnic groups, and between other distinct-identity groups are frequently 
characterized by the adversarial exercise of power. 
So much have these adversarial relationships come to characterize modern life that 
they are widely assumed to be inevitable expressions of human nature - a perception that 
is no where better supported than in the pages of the press. Taken to an extreme, however, 
this assumption leads to a paralyzing contradiction. On the one hand, people yearn for 
cooperation and reciprocity. On the other, uncritical assent is given to the proposition that 
human beings are incorrigibly self-interested and aggressive and therefore incapable of non- 
adversarial relationships, 
31 Each of these models, we need to remind ourselves, are normative models that our 
societies, or at least the most dominant segments of our societies, have chosen as socially 
desirable. 
In fairness, while the press may be complicit in reinforcing this adversarial 
conception of hum1  nature, it did not manufacture the conception. The press, like all 
cultural institutions, operates within a larger cultural context of background assumptions 
and values. And the adversarial conception of human nature that informs our modern 
political economy is a large part of that cultural background at this point in history. 
Efforts to reform the press into an essentially non-adversarial forum for public 
consultation are, therefore, ultimately limited by this cultural background that informs so 
many journalists and editors and influences the preferences, expectations, and behaviours 
cf so many readers. In this respect, the ultimate success of efforts to reform the press into 
non-adversarial structures and relationships depends on parallel efforts to reform the 
political economy in a similar manner. 
Such reforms, of course, are monumental struggles. Expectations regarding their 
success will most likely have to act~pt a historical perspective measured not by months or 
years but by generations. But such refarms are not outside of the historically possible. 
The current form of aggressive and expansionist capitalism may well prove unsustahable, 
as its requirement for continual growth in the processes of material production and 
consumption fails to account for ecological limits to these processes. Current partisan 
political systems may also prove inadequate, as corruptions bred by the adversarial contest 
of power may ultimately prove incapable of producing the just and equitable sccial policies 
that increasingly emancipated populations are demanding. The experience of the past 
century, marked by a search among growing numbers of people in every nation (and even 
entire nations) for alternatives to the modem political economy, might well be interpreted as 
a demonstration of a historical impulse for reform. 
Incentives therefore do exist to begin learning non-adversarial modes of interaction. 
Experiments with such reform are occurring on small and large scales around the planet - 
from groups of people informally learning non-adversarial communication skills, to 
organized cooperative movements, to experimentation on national and international scales. 
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To be sure, radical natic-la1 political and economic reform in Canada may not be imminent. 
But small-scale movements and experiments are happening across the country. And, if a 
historical perspective is maintained, it must be admitted that Canadian history, and the 
development of Canadian political culture, is anything but a finished process. Political 
cultures are fluid and evolving, not rigid md static. 
The commodification of public discourse. As the reader will have noted, 
the consultative model developed in Chapter Three does not contain explicit economic 
prescriptions for the operation of the press. This is not an oversight, it is intentional. The 
consultative model c d s  the press into the service of civil society, not into the service of m y  
particular economic doctrines or formulas. Any economic arrangements that could 
potentially support the model should be experimented with - and there is no reason to 
assume that there is only one correct economic formula. There may well be several 
arrangements that could work, and these may well vary according to changing social and 
economic conditions. 
Currently, the Canadian press operates on the capitalist assumption that public 
discourse can and should be commodified and sold for profit like any other manufactured 
product. This assumption may or may not prove workable as the basis for a consultative 
public forum. But given that the current operation of the press is based on a capitaiist 
model and that this is unlikely to change radically in the near future, experimentation with 
press reform in Canada will, at least initially, have to proceed from this point?2 Efforts to 
32 While the followilg discussion focuses primarily on reform within a commercial context, 
other economic arrangements certainly warrant exploration. As Keane (1991) argues: 
"There is nothing 'natural' or 'necessary' about profit-seeking, privately owned and 
controlled commu.nications media" (D. 153). For instance, the creation of m ams length 
"crown corporation" type of press, with a very clear mandate and operational principles, 
might be experimented with on various levels of government. It could soive many of the 
pmbiems associated with ownership, advertisement, and the commodification of public 
discourse discussed below. On the other hand, 2s the experience of the CBC has 
demonstrated, the difficult issue of funding would need to be addressed, as would issues of 
government interference and control. But it is not inconceivable that a public-service, non- 
profit press could be set up initially thmugh publicly subsidized capital investment, and 
then finance its future operating expenses through subscription and newsstand revenues. In 
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apply the model within a profit-oriented system, however, will have to take into account the 
inherent constraints of the system (as they would have to with any economic system). 
While an exhaustive economic analysis is again beyond the scope of this thesis, two of 
these constraints are flagged below. 
The history of the twentieth century has demonstrated that the commercial press has 
a natural tendency toward concentrated, near-monopoly ownership in an unregulated 
market. Such concentration places potential control of public discourse in the hands of an 
extremely small group of individuals who were never elected by the public to represent 
pubiic interests. This concentrated ownership of the press, moreover, is interlocked with 
concentrated ownership of other non-media industries. The small group of individuals 
sitting on the board of directors of major national newspaper and newsmagazine chains are 
also sitting on the board of directors of other major corporate and industrial interests 
(Clement, 1975; Winter, 1988) 
Although it would take further research to determine if such control is consciously 
exercised by these media owners and boards of directors, it can be assumed with a fair 
amount of confidence that media owners and their boards do staff senior management 
positions with people who share their commercial and ideological orientations and that these 
orientations are very likely carried, however subtly, into the organizational culture of the 
press. Furthermore, what can be stated with even more confidence is that historically these 
owners and their boards have shown little vision and exercist:d little corporate leadership in 
ensuring that the press serves as a forum for an inclusive, participatory, and functional civil 
society. Whether this is a result of commission or omission can be debated, but efforts to 
the long run, such a public-service press may well be the most desirable arrangement, in 
terms of the public interest. In the short term, however, the prospects are remote, and initial 
experimentation will have to proceed within the commercial press. Perhap, definite 
limitations will become evident in the process, and the alternative of a public-service press 
will then become more appealing. 
reform the press within a capitalist economy will undoubtedly need to arouse the economic 
interests, and imaginations, of these media owners. Part of this is the public's 
responsi'iility - a function of consumer preferences and expectations, as discussed above. 
Part of this responsibility may also belong to the academic community, as will be discussed 
below. But part of the responsibility certainly also belongs to policy makers and 
regulators. 
Current economic policies have largely created the commercial press as it operates 
today. Alternative policies could very well assist in reforming it. Incentives that make the 
consultatk model more profitable m y  have to be implemented if it is to catch on in a 
capitalist economy. For instance, why not develop operational criteria for a consultative 
press, view those that operate according to such criteria as essential public services, and 
eliminate tax burdens on them? Or even subsidize them? Iden-g such operational 
criteria would be difficult but not impossible. And tax-free or subsidized public-service 
status could be a powerful incentive for experimentation with alternatives in the operation of 
the press. 
Aside from such economic incentives, regulations could also be introduced. For 
instance, minimal public content requirements could be regulated in the same manner that 
Canadian content is now regulated in much of the mass media (besides, what could be more 
Canadian than the diverse voices and perspectives of the Canadian public being expressed 
in a forum intended for that purpose?). Regulations that limit or prohibit ownership 
interlocks with non-media interests could also be imposed (as they are in the banking 
industry) in order to reduce the possibility of direct conflict between commercial and public 
interests. 
These are not entirely radical or unrealistic proposals. Monopolies and near- 
monopolies have almost always been regulated in Canada, as well as in most parts of the 
Westem world, in the name of public interest, The press is actually a historical exception, 
and perhaps its time should be up. The underlying point of these suggestions, however, is 
not to prescribe specific policy measures but to suggest the possibility that creative policy 
alternatives are possible and that they should be explored. 
The second major constraint of the commercial press is the logic of advertising 
revenues and audience maximization discussed in Chapter One. The potential conflict 
created by this logic - between the interests of the public versus the interests of advertisers 
-is difficult for the commercial press to reconcile. For instance, it can be argued that the 
public would benefit fiom a sustained, critical examination of consumer culture and 
economic expansionism, including focused consultation regarding possible lifestyle 
alternatives and economic reforms. Such critique and consultation, however, is n ~ t  in the 
immediate self-interest of a large segment of the commercial sector, whose profits depend 
on the promotion of consumer culture and economic expansion. Thus, even though most 
newsrooms exercise care in separating their advertising decisions •’corn their editorid 
decisions, it can be argued that a newspaper or newsmagazine will not knowingly alienate a 
large segment of its advertising clientele by facilitating a sustained critique of consumerism 
and economic expansionism. 
But this argument has its limitations. The commercial press does, on occasion, 
critique the underlying assumptions of consumer culture - and it seems increasingly 
willing to do so as popular environmental awareness increases and readership expectations 
chmge. The press also challenges its own sources of advertising revenue on occasion. A 
glance through many metropolitan dailies will reveal occasional stories exposing corporate 
fraud and industrial corruption. The view of the media held by many business elites - as a 
generally left-leaning institution aligned against the corporate world - would also seem to 
suggest at least a grain of truth to the media's willingness to challenge big business.33 
33 See, for instance, Conrad Black's A v i m  of the press (1981) for an example of one such 
viewpoint. 
It should also be acknowledged that advertising iS not limited to the promotion of 
consumer-industrial products. The arts, service, and information sectors are all sources of 
advertising revenue, as are government agencies and, increasingly, even public interest 
groups. Non-commercial advertising bases could therefore also be more aggressively 
pursued. 
Advertising, it should not be forgotten, is also not the only source of revenue for 
the commercial press. Subscriptions and newsstand sales are also significant sources of 
income - and to the degree that they can replace advertising revenue, they could alleviate 
much of the conflict of interest described above (it could also reduce the enormous amount 
of paper that is consumed by advertising). Other creative approaches to decreasing reliance 
on advertising revenue could also be explored, such as bringing down production and 
distribution costs. For instance, current trends in publishing technology, combined with 
increasingly feasible customer ser;;lice options, could permit the production and distribution 
of smaller, partially customizable newspapers, with subscribers ordering only those 
sections that they actually read and paying appropriately. But the purpose of this 
discussion, again, is nut to prescribe a specific revenue formula for the commercial press. 
Rather, it is to suggest that alternative revenue arrangements are available even within a 
co~nmercial operation. But they must be pursued purposefully md creatively. 
Many practical economic issues will need to be solved if the commercial press is to 
be significantly reformed. They will not, however, be solved from an armchair. Practical 
e e n t a t i o n ,  trial and error, and commitment will be necessary within the press, the 
p b k ,  and within the poky arena And while within the press and public have 
afready been cfiscussed, it is worth noting briefly a few of the incentives that exist among 
pky z-. 
T k  press, as iit cmeody operates, d m  not serve the policy process well. As 
cfiscussed in Chapter Three, it is not only the public that lacks opportunity through the press 
to mndt aid inform those upon whom it has conferred decision-making authority. Those 
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who have been invested with authority also find it extremely difficult to consult with or 
inform the public. The press does not facilitate these processes well. Policy makers are 
well aware that their public communications will be fiitered through the press and received 
by the public in a highly fragmented, simplified, decontextualized, and often inflammatory 
manner. They are also aware that even the most enlightened policies and programs that 
they propose are easily undermined by powerful and highly organized interest groups that 
mount successful media campaigns, dominate public discourse with opposition, and pre- 
empt or drown out less organized but more widespread expressions of popular will and 
support. Yet in our current political system even the most sincere and progressive policy 
makers are hamstrung unless expressions of popular support and political will prevail. 
A communications environment such as that just described has a sigdicant impact 
on the ability of elected representatives to do the work for which they were elected, as well 
as on the level of trust, confidence, respect, and support that they receive from the public. 
Incentive therefore does potentially exist for policy makers themselves to push for press 
reform in the interests of creating a more functional communications environment that 
supports rather than interferes with the formulation of policies designed in the public's 
interest. 
The Academy 
Academics also have a s i m c a n t  role to play in the movement toward press 
reform. In examining this rde, it is necessary to consider the focus of media theory and 
research as  well as the relationship between academics and the press, the public, and policy 
makers. 
On the level of theory and research, there is little doubt that the conceptual models 
that scholars employ in their work influence their perceptions of the phenomena they are 
researching. Simply put, conceptual categories foreground some aspects of reality and 
obscure others. Furthermore, the selection or formulation of conceptual models is not a 
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neutral, objective process. It inevitably reflects the subjective biases - the assumptions, 
experiences, intaests, and values - of the researcher (and/or the financial sponsor of the 
research). These biases, moreover, are not simply personal. Often they become collective 
biases, and they can influence the entire research agenda of an academic community.34 For 
instance, medical research in most of the twentieth century has been heavily influenced by a 
reductionist, control-oriented medical model that focuses on cures rather than prevention, 
and foregrounds pharmaceutical and surgical interventions while obscuring nutritional, 
herbal, and other forms of health maintenance and healing. 
Given the manner in which subjective biases influence our conceptual models and 
our models influence our perception (and construction) of the social world, academics have 
a responsibility to exaxnine the biases underlying their conceptual models, to make them 
explicit, reflect on them, and engage in dialogue over them, Our conceptual models will 
never be fiee fiom bias, but we can become conscious of our biases and purposefully 
modify our conceptual models when necessary. 
I suggest that such a self-reflexive process would be timely in the field of media 
studies, where organizational , ideological, and political-economic models have tended to 
overshadow what could be called citizens models, or what Rosen (1991) calls public 
models, of the media: models that examine specifically how citizens and civil society want 
or need the m a  to function, and evaluate the media from civil-needs-based criteria 
Granted, as discussed in Chapter Two, some media scholars have ventured into this 
territory. But in my experience their work is dwarfed by the magnitude of work that has 
been carried out within the other conceptual frameworks mentioned. 
I submit that conceptual models based on the needs and aspirations of citizens 
provide a much needed lens for Imhg at the media today. Crgariiathnal, ideological, 
See Thomas Kubn's work on scientific paradigms in The Structure of Scientifc 
Revolutions (1962) for a classic discussion of this topic. 
and political-economic models have certainly provided many valuable insights into the 
operation of the media, and it will be necessary to draw on these insights if the media is to 
be reformed. But the limitation of many of these models is that they primarily foreground 
the problems existing within the media today rather than foregrounding our needs of the 
media tomorrow. They therefore have not provided a vision of reform that can capture the 
imagination of the press, the public, and policy makers. 
One of the primary purposes of this thesis has been to contribute toward the 
articulation of such a vision. Once we have a broad vision of media reform, conceptual 
models can be developed and refined, and in turn become powerful conceptual tools for 
reform. Such models would allow critical media scholars to move beyond what McQuail 
(1994) has described as our tendency to pass judgement on the media, "rather than 
formulate or clarify the standards of judgement" (p. 236). They would begin to provide 
specific civil-needs-based criteria with which to analyze and evaluate cment media 
performance. 
Beginning with a baseline evaluation of the press as it operates today, ongoing 
analysis and evaluation through such a lens could be a great assistance in guiding press 
reform through successive stages of approximation and refinement toward a socially 
desired end. The insights gained through such analysis and evaluation would provide an 
informed perspective from which academics could engage the press, the public, and policy 
makers in dialogue and education about media reform. 
For instance, media scholars have the opportunity to engage journalists during their 
initial training in journalism schools, as well as at mid-career stages through books, 
professional development conferences, and workshops. Journalism courses offer an 
excellent venue to examine the normative assumptions and biases of the prevailing model of 
journalism, present alternatives, and get the next generation of journalists thinking in new 
ways about the function of journalism in society. Such opportunities need to be pursued if 
. incoming journalists are to contribute to media reform. But this process will in part depend 
on academics themselves having formulated new models-of journalism with value to the 
public, as discussed above. Similarly, mid-career professional development conferences 
and workshops, such as the annual conference of the Canadian Association of Journalists, 
need to be utilized in the same manner in order to engage practicing journalists with the 
issues and even draw their attention to personal and collective incentives for reform. These 
conferences and workshops will need to move beyond presenting reform issues in the 
abstract (as this thesis largely has). They will have to address specific, individual practices 
and patterns of behaviour in the profession and provide hands-on opportunities to learn 
new practices and patterns, such as developing reporting skills that foster the resolution - 
as opposed to the inflammation - of conflicts. Such workshops, moreover, will have to 
address not just the journalist on the beat, but every level of hierarchy within the press. 
Reform of the press cannot occur without reform of individual behaviours within it. 
On the public front, academics have an unprecedented opportunity to capitalize on 
the recent trend in media education as a means of engaging secondary and post-secondary 
students and teachers in media reform issues. Media education curricula provide an 
excellent venue for engaging young up-and-coming citizens in the critical examination of 
their own preferences and expectations of the media. They also provide an opportunity to 
introduce alternative perspectives on how the media could better serve them as citizens, as 
well as raise awareness of how they can affect change in the operation of media. Media 
education curricula also provide a venue for developing the kind of civic competence that 
such media reform will ultimately require from citizens. This includes the ability to stay 
abreast of relevant public issues and to consider diverse perspectives on those issues. It 
also includes the ability to articulate personal (or shared) perspectives in concise, written 
form, and to submit them to the press for consideration by others. 
Academics also have an opportunity to engage the public through the publication of 
these same issues in the popular press, in language that is accessible to the lay person, that 
suggests popular incentives for reform, and that suggests concrete opportunities to affect 
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reform. Another opportunity exists within the growing networks of public interest groups 
and social advocacy movements that contain individuals who are eager to develop media 
relations skills and ate increasingly recognizing the media themselves as the subject of 
social advocacy. Many of these groups are already expressing interest in the insights 
offered by academics on media reform. 
Finally, academics also have an opportunity to engage directly with policy makers 
in a dialogue on press reform. Academics can assume leadership in presenting a case for 
reform, articulating a vision of reform, and translating that vision into practical ideas and 
policy options. They can also prepare themselves to insert their vision, their ideas, and 
their proposed policy options into public debate during those crucial moments when 
political circumstance and public will align to create favorable conditions for reform. 
According to Tom Kent (1994), chair of the 1980 Royal Commission on Newspapers, it 
was this very lack of vision and a qilable policy options that was the primary reason reform 
did not emerge out of the newspaper concentration "crisis" of 1980. By the time the Royal 
Commission had been appointed, undertaken its study, drafted its recommendations, and 
seen its recommendations drafted into a legislative proposal, the political will for reform 
had dissipated - the moment was lost. Kent's advice: 
The time will probably come again when policy to revitalize newspapers is again 
a feasible item of the government agenda. . . . It will not do to start the thinking 
then. 
That is the most important working conclusion from our experience. The 
necessary motto for reformers, in this as in other matters. . . be prepared 
- for the day when some conjunction of circumstances creates a will for 
change; that day belongs to those who have practical ideas ready. (p. 39) 
On all of these fronts, academics have opport~nity to contribute to media refont 
But to do so in a meaningful manner, I suggest that we f ist  have to be confident that our 
conceptual models will lead us to the type of reforms our society wants and needs. 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis admittedly swims against a strong tide of cynicism in the 1990s. Many 
of the humanitarian hopes and aspirations that were widely held at the beginning of this 
century have been eroded - and often abaiidoned entirely - through experiences of war, 
through painfully slow progress in the field of human rights, through recurrent expressions 
of intolerance and fanaticism, through ongoing scenes of human tragedy and suffering, 
bough  failed social experiments, and through myriad social, economic, and environmental 
crises plaguing the planet. As the century draws to a close, it thus appears to many that 
humanity is in a more sorry state now than it was at the start of the century. 
I believe, however, that such a perspective is limited. It does not acknowledge, for 
instance, that these troublesome issues have been with us for millennia, yet our collective 
awareness of them, and reflection on them, has substantially increased in recent history. 
We are better positioned now than at any point in history to begin consciously and 
purposefully addressing them. This has occurred, moreover, in part because of 
developments in our media of mass communication. 
It is ironic then that these same developments in mass communication are also 
largely responsible for our cynicism. Our mass media have enabled us to see ourselves 
collectively for the first time, but the image we see is not what we might have hoped for, 
and it has thus become a source of cynicism and disillusionment. In our cynicism, 
moreover, we in tum despair of trying to reform the mass media into an instrument for 
social change. Therefore the mass media &en serve as little more than a social looking 
glass, however distorted the image. 
If we want to conscious~y !x-ing about social change I submit that we need, among 
other things, to reconceptualize the role of the mass media in society. Yes, the mass media 
may serve as a (somewhat distorted) looking glass. Yes, the mass media may even serve 
as a (somewhat exclusive) market place of ideas. But it can potentially serve as much 
more. And we need to begin to conceptualize it as something more. We need a new 
metaphor. And the metaphor I am proposing in this thesis is the consultative public forum. 
Of course, I am not implying that the objectives associated with the consultative 
forum are the only social fmctions the mass media should serve. The looking glass itself 
may remain a valuable function. Cultivation of the arts, provision of entertainment, and 
facilitation of other cultural modes of expressions are also extremely valuable functions. 
But I am suggesting that with a conscious effort we can add to these functions in order to 
meet social needs and aspirations that are currently unfulfilled. 
Community development, collective decision-making, and conflict resolution, as 
defined in this thesis, are all social objectives that the mass media can contribute to, and I 
submit that these objectives do represent very real and widely shared contemporary needs 
and aspirations. Likewise the provision of complexity, subtlety, and context; the inclusion 
and accurate representation of diverse perspectives; the fostering of a moderate tone of 
expression within an atmosphere of suspended judgement; and the construction of public 
discourse around reference to ethical principle - these are all communicative principles that 
represent very real contemporary needs and aspirations, and can be fostered within the 
media. 
The degree to which the mass media begin to operate according to the objectives and 
principles outlined in this thesis is, I suggest, the degree that we will begin to engage the 
media in valuable public functions that are long overdue. Of course, the &el proposed in 
this thesis is only one way to envision media reforms, and it has focused primarily on only 
one component of the mass media. Ultimately we need to engage in the widest possible 
dialogue and reflection in order to arrive at a shared vision of how the press, as well as 
other i-s media, could function. From such a vision, general strategies for reform can be 
devised and translated into speafic hes  of actions, md criteria can be formulated for 
ongoing evaluation, approximation, and refinement. But to do so, we need to first 
overcome cynicism regarding our capacity for conscious social change. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, I submit that the long-term prospects for press 
reform are reasonably good. Incentives exist, and movement can already be discerned on 
several ikonis. Certainly, we need to have realistic expectations about the pace of change, 
and we need to situate our efforts within the context of broader movements for social 
change that are proceeding on other fronts. We also need to organize our efforts, and be 
deliberate, systematic, and persistent. But change is an attainable and worthwhile goal. To 
assume otherwise is disempowering and self-defeating. Change, moreover, begins in our 
own respective spheres of action, be they the press, the public, the political economy, or 
the academy. 
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